info:oai:pure.iiasa.ac.at:4987info:ofi/fmt:xml:xsd:oai_dc https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4987/ Central Paths and Selection of Equilibria Kryazhimskiy, A.V. Sonnevend, G. For two populations of players playing repeatedly a same bimatrix game, a dynamics associated with the method of analytic centers for linear programming is described. All populations' evolutions converge to static equilibria. All evolutions starting in a same connected set converge to a same equilibrium. If a starting time is sufficiently large, "almost all" evolutions end up at a single equilibrium representing all populations' pure strategy groups (phenotypes) with nonzero proportions. The dynamics is interpreted as populations' rule to learn best replying. WP-96-039 1996-04 Monograph NonPeerReviewed text en https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4987/1/WP-96-039.pdf Kryazhimskiy, A.V. <https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/view/iiasa/1393.html> & Sonnevend, G. (1996). Central Paths and Selection of Equilibria. IIASA Working Paper. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: WP-96-039