relation: https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4987/
title: Central Paths and Selection of Equilibria
creator: Kryazhimskiy, A.V.
creator: Sonnevend, G.
description: For two populations of players playing repeatedly a same bimatrix game, a dynamics associated with the method of analytic centers for linear programming is described. All populations' evolutions converge to static equilibria. All evolutions starting in a same connected set converge to a same equilibrium. If a starting time is sufficiently large, "almost all" evolutions end up at a single equilibrium representing all populations' pure strategy groups (phenotypes) with nonzero proportions. The dynamics is interpreted as populations' rule to learn best replying.
publisher: WP-96-039
date: 1996-04
type: Monograph
type: NonPeerReviewed
format: text
language: en
identifier: https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4987/1/WP-96-039.pdf
identifier:   Kryazhimskiy, A.V. <https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/view/iiasa/1393.html> & Sonnevend, G.  (1996).  Central Paths and Selection of Equilibria.   IIASA Working Paper. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: WP-96-039