TY  - RPRT
CY  - IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria
ID  - iiasa4987
UR  - https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4987/
A1  - Kryazhimskiy, A.V.
A1  - Sonnevend, G.
Y1  - 1996/04//
N2  - For two populations of players playing repeatedly a same bimatrix game, a dynamics associated with the method of analytic centers for linear programming is described. All populations' evolutions converge to static equilibria. All evolutions starting in a same connected set converge to a same equilibrium. If a starting time is sufficiently large, "almost all" evolutions end up at a single equilibrium representing all populations' pure strategy groups (phenotypes) with nonzero proportions. The dynamics is interpreted as populations' rule to learn best replying.
PB  - WP-96-039
M1  - working_paper
TI  - Central Paths and Selection of Equilibria
AV  - public
EP  - 23
ER  -