RT Monograph
SR 00
A1 Kryazhimskiy, A.V.
A1 Sonnevend, G.
T1 Central Paths and Selection of Equilibria
YR 1996
FD 1996-04
SP 23
AB For two populations of players playing repeatedly a same bimatrix game, a dynamics associated with the method of analytic centers for linear programming is described. All populations' evolutions converge to static equilibria. All evolutions starting in a same connected set converge to a same equilibrium. If a starting time is sufficiently large, "almost all" evolutions end up at a single equilibrium representing all populations' pure strategy groups (phenotypes) with nonzero proportions. The dynamics is interpreted as populations' rule to learn best replying.
PB WP-96-039
PP IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria
AV Published
LK https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4987/