eprintid: 4987
rev_number: 22
eprint_status: archive
userid: 351
dir: disk0/00/00/49/87
datestamp: 2016-01-15 02:08:06
lastmod: 2021-08-27 17:15:48
status_changed: 2016-01-15 02:08:06
type: monograph
metadata_visibility: show
item_issues_count: 2
creators_name: Kryazhimskiy, A.V.
creators_name: Sonnevend, G.
creators_id: 1514
title: Central Paths and Selection of Equilibria
ispublished: pub
internal_subjects: iis_met
internal_subjects: iis_pop
internal_subjects: iis_sys
divisions: prog_dyn
abstract: For two populations of players playing repeatedly a same bimatrix game, a dynamics associated with the method of analytic centers for linear programming is described. All populations' evolutions converge to static equilibria. All evolutions starting in a same connected set converge to a same equilibrium. If a starting time is sufficiently large, "almost all" evolutions end up at a single equilibrium representing all populations' pure strategy groups (phenotypes) with nonzero proportions. The dynamics is interpreted as populations' rule to learn best replying.
date: 1996-04
date_type: published
publisher: WP-96-039
iiasapubid: WP-96-039
price: 10
creators_browse_id: 1393
full_text_status: public
monograph_type: working_paper
place_of_pub: IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria
pages: 23
coversheets_dirty: FALSE
fp7_type: info:eu-repo/semantics/book
citation:   Kryazhimskiy, A.V. <https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/view/iiasa/1393.html> & Sonnevend, G.  (1996).  Central Paths and Selection of Equilibria.   IIASA Working Paper. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: WP-96-039     
document_url: https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4987/1/WP-96-039.pdf