eprintid: 4994 rev_number: 39 eprint_status: archive userid: 351 dir: disk0/00/00/49/94 datestamp: 2016-01-15 02:08:07 lastmod: 2021-08-27 17:15:49 status_changed: 2016-01-15 02:08:07 type: monograph metadata_visibility: show item_issues_count: 2 creators_name: Young, H.P. creators_id: AL1397 title: Social Coordination and Social Change ispublished: pub internal_subjects: iis_ecn internal_subjects: iis_inn internal_subjects: iis_mod internal_subjects: iis_sys divisions: prog_ins divisions: prog_ted abstract: Social and economic institutions govern how people interact with each other--they define the "rules of the game." Choosing the rules is at bottom a pure coordination problem, since people must agree on the rules in order to play. We posit that these rules evolve endogenously through the repeated interactions of individuals. They choose best replies to their environment subject to some inertia and error. Over the long run, such a process selects institutions (rules) that are efficient, and fair in the sense that the expected payoffs are centrally located on the Pareto frontier of the payoff possibility set. date: 1996-06 date_type: published publisher: WP-96-032 iiasapubid: WP-96-032 price: 10 creators_browse_id: 2539 full_text_status: public monograph_type: working_paper place_of_pub: IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria pages: 31 coversheets_dirty: FALSE fp7_type: info:eu-repo/semantics/book citation: Young, H.P. (1996). Social Coordination and Social Change. IIASA Working Paper. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: WP-96-032 document_url: https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4994/1/WP-96-032.pdf