<mods:mods version="3.3" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-3.xsd" xmlns:mods="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"><mods:titleInfo><mods:title>Costs of a Ceiling on Kyoto Flexibility</mods:title></mods:titleInfo><mods:name type="personal"><mods:namePart type="given">D.</mods:namePart><mods:namePart type="family">Gusbin</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm type="text">author</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:name type="personal"><mods:namePart type="given">G.</mods:namePart><mods:namePart type="family">Klaassen</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm type="text">author</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:name type="personal"><mods:namePart type="given">N.</mods:namePart><mods:namePart type="family">Kouvaritakis</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm type="text">author</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:abstract>This paper examines the potential costs of a ceiling on the use of flexibility mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol using POLES, a partial equilibrium model of the world energy systems. The results suggest that if emission trading were restricted to Annex I countries, halving the traded volume would increase costs by US$11 billion per year. If emission trading were to operate at a global level, reducing the trade to half the perfect market volume would increase annual costs by US$12 billion per year. Global carbon emission might, however, be 1% lower. The sensitivity of the results is discussed.</mods:abstract><mods:originInfo><mods:dateIssued encoding="iso8601">1999</mods:dateIssued></mods:originInfo><mods:originInfo><mods:publisher>RR-00-011. Reprinted from Energy Policy, 27:833-844 [1999].</mods:publisher></mods:originInfo><mods:genre>Monograph</mods:genre></mods:mods>