Evolution of density-dependent cooperation

Seppänen, A. & Parvinen, K. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9125-6041 (2014). Evolution of density-dependent cooperation. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology 76 (12) 3070-3087. 10.1007/s11538-014-9994-y.

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Cooperation is surprisingly common in life despite of its vulnerability to selfish cheating, i.e. defecting. Defectors do not contribute to common resources but take the advantage of cooperators' investments. Therefore, the emergence and maintenance of cooperation have been considered irrational phenomena. In this study, we focus on plastic, quantitative cooperation behaviour, especialy on its evolution. We assume that individuals are capable to sense the population density in their neighbourhood and adjust their real-valued invesments on public goods based on that information. The ecological setting is described with stochastic demographic events, e.g. birth and death, occurring at individual level. Individuals form small populations, which further constitute a structured metapopulation. For evolutionary investigations, we apply the adaptive dynamics framework. The cost of cooperative investment is incorporated into the model in two ways, by decreasing the birth rate or by increasing the death rate. In the first case, density-dependent cooperation evolves to be a decreasing function of population sie as expected. In the latter case, however, the density-dependent cooperative investment can have a qualitatively different form as it my evolve to be highest in intermediate-sized populations. Indeed, we emphasize that some details in modelling may have a significant impact on the results obtaned.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Adaptive dynamics; structured metapopulation; public-goods cooperation
Research Programs: Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
Bibliographic Reference: Bulletin of Mathematical Biology; 76(12):3070-3087 (December 2014) (Published online 12 September 2014)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 08:50
Last Modified: 27 Aug 2021 17:23
URI: https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/10767

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