The Market Value of a Game

Young, H.P. (1979). The Market Value of a Game. IIASA Working Paper. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: WP-79-018

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Abstract

A correspondence is observed between a class of n-person cooperative games and production functions with fixed, discrete factor inputs. This correspondence motivates a simple way of valuing the players (or factors): the players, or factor representatives, set prices on themselves in the face of a market of buyers. A noncooperative price-setting game results for which equilibrium prices always exist. Interpreted as a cooperative game it always has a core, which reduces to the core of the original game if the latter is nonempty. This concept was originally applied to the problem of determining the relative value of the players in a voting game when a market exists for their votes.

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