

## REDD-based Offsets: Benefit Sharing and Risks

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### **Research Highlights**

In this study we identified promising approaches to effective financial support of **R**educed **E**missions from **D**eforestation and **D**egradation (REDD) [1].

- 1. Parties' risk aversion increases the volume of contracted REDD-based offsets at fair prices.
- 2. Benefit sharing mechanism increases contracted amount and at the same time decreases the price.
- 3. Public funds might help closing the price gap and ultimately enable REDD.


### **Methodology and Results**

We construct a microeconomic model of interaction between the forest owner (REDD-supplier), electricity producer, and electricity consumer [2].


The decision-making process of the electricity producer (under uncertain CO<sub>2</sub> tax/price) consists of:

- 1. Choosing power plant load factors to minimize the cost given the hourly electricity demand profile and installed capacities of particular power generation technologies;
- 2. Setting electricity price to maximize the profit based on the demand function indicating consumer's sensitivity to electricity price;
- 3. Hedging by REDD-based offsets.


The **fair REDD offset price** in the study is understood in the sense of parties' **indifference** to whether contract a given amount of offsets, or not. **Fair prices** represent **risk-adjusted supply and demand curves** for REDD-based offsets.




Risk preferences are modeled by exponential utility functions [3].



Fair prices of the risk-neutral electricity producer (EP) and forest owner (FO) depending on the volume of REDD offsets. The future CO<sub>2</sub> price distribution is uniform within the range 0-80 US\$/ton CO<sub>2</sub>.



Fair prices with respect to risk preferences:  $\alpha$ <0 – risk-taking,  $\alpha$  $\simeq$ 0 – risk-neutral,  $\alpha$ >0 – risk-averse.




Risk-averse (r.-a.) behavior considerably increases the contracted amounts of REDD offsets and creates a higher potential for REDD implementation.

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
## Technological data for the case-study\*


Technology	Annual fixed cost, thousand US\$/MWy	Variable cost, US\$/MWh	Installed capacity, MW (≈ size of Belarus)	Emission factors, ton CO <sub>2</sub> /MWh
Coal-fired	224	18.9	3800	1.02
Natural gas-fired combustion turbine	64	55.6	1900	0.55
Natural gas-fired combined cycle	96	39	2200	0.33

\* Sources: [4]-[6].



Average hourly electricity demand (based on [7]).





Financial instrument supporting REDD might help avoid bankruptcy of CO<sub>2</sub>-intensive producers at high levels of CO<sub>2</sub> price.

Benefit sharing mechanism increases contracted amount and at the same time decreases the price.

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### References

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