REDD-based Offsets: Benefit Sharing and Risks

Krasovskii, A. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0940-9366, Khabarov, N. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5372-4668, & Obersteiner, M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6981-2769 (2015). REDD-based Offsets: Benefit Sharing and Risks. In: Systems Analysis 2015 - A Conference in Celebration of Howard Raiffa, 11 - 13 November, 2015, Laxenburg, Austria.

[thumbnail of Conference Poster]
Preview
Text (Conference Poster)
REDD-based Offsets_Benefit Sharing and Risks.pdf - Published Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial Share Alike.

Download (732kB) | Preview
Project: Economics of climate change adaptation in Europe (ECONADAPT, FP7 603906)

Abstract

In this study we apply systems analysis methods to modeling financial instruments supporting the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) program. We consider a risk-aware forest owner and an electricity producer evaluating the REDD-based offsets with benefit-sharing mechanism under uncertain CO2 prices. For a range of CO2 prices and respective risks perceived by the forest owner (seller) and electricity producer (buyer), we apply a model of fair (indifference) pricing. The decision-making process under uncertainty is formalized in the spirit of Howard Raiffa’s “Decision analysis” (1968). Parties’ risk preferences are reflected by exponential utility functions. The potentially contracted amounts of REDD offsets are analyzed under various risk preferences and for different benefit sharing opportunities and price levels. Our results show that a risk-averse attitude considerably increases the contracted amounts of REDD offsets (compared to risk-neutral case) and, therefore, creates a higher potential for REDD implementation. We demonstrate a possibility of situations, when parties could agree on a certain range of REDD contracts, for example, smaller amounts of REDD offsets are traded for higher prices, and larger amounts for lower prices, but contracting a moderate amount at a moderate price is impossible. Higher benefit-sharing ratios can also increase contracted amounts even in the case of risk-taking electricity producer. Our modeling results highlight two ways to promote higher REDD participation: (i) increasing risk aversion of the energy producers, and (ii) implementing the mechanism of benefit/risk sharing between REDD consumer and supplier.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Poster)
Research Programs: Ecosystems Services and Management (ESM)
Depositing User: Michaela Rossini
Date Deposited: 19 Jan 2016 15:39
Last Modified: 14 Jun 2023 13:23
URI: https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/11809

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item