

An exact solution method for binary equilibrium problems with compensation and the power market uplift problem*

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Mathematical cheat sheet, March 17, 2016

This document summarizes the mathematical formulation for easier reference of the GAMS implementation provided at http://danielhuppmann.github.io/binary_equilibrium/. All equation numbers are identical to those in the manuscript (version as of February 4, 2016).

Theoretical formulation (Section 3.4)

$$\min_{\substack{x_i, y_i, \tilde{y}_i^{(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_i)}, \tilde{\lambda}_i^{(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_i)} \\ \kappa_i^{(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_i)}, \zeta_i^{(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_i)}}} F\left((x_i, y_i)_{i \in I}\right) + G\left((\zeta_i^{(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_i)})_{i \in I}\right) \quad (14a)$$

$$\text{s.t. } \nabla_{y_i} f_i\left(\mathbf{1}, \tilde{y}_i^{(1)}, y_{-i}\right) + (\tilde{\lambda}_i^{(1)})^T \nabla_{y_i} g_i\left(\mathbf{1}, \tilde{y}_i^{(1)}\right) = 0 \quad (14b)$$

$$0 \leq -g_i\left(\mathbf{1}, \tilde{y}_i^{(1)}\right) \perp \tilde{\lambda}_i^{(1)} \geq 0 \quad (14c)$$

$$\nabla_{y_i} f_i\left(\mathbf{0}, \tilde{y}_i^{(0)}, y_{-i}\right) + (\tilde{\lambda}_i^{(0)})^T \nabla_{y_i} g_i\left(\mathbf{0}, \tilde{y}_i^{(0)}\right) = 0 \quad (14d)$$

$$0 \leq -g_i\left(\mathbf{0}, \tilde{y}_i^{(0)}\right) \perp \tilde{\lambda}_i^{(0)} \geq 0 \quad (14e)$$

$$f_i\left(\mathbf{1}, y_i^{(1)}, y_{-i}\right) + \kappa_i^{(1)} - \zeta_i^{(1)} - \kappa_i^{(0)} + \zeta_i^{(0)} = f_i\left(\mathbf{0}, y_i^{(0)}, y_{-i}\right) \quad (14f)$$

$$\kappa_i^{(1)} + \zeta_i^{(1)} \leq x_i \tilde{K} \quad (14g)$$

$$\kappa_i^{(0)} + \zeta_i^{(0)} \leq (1 - x_i) \tilde{K} \quad (14h)$$

$$\tilde{y}_i^{(0)} - x_i \tilde{K} \leq y_i \leq \tilde{y}_i^{(0)} + x_i \tilde{K} \quad (14i)$$

$$\tilde{y}_i^{(1)} - (1 - x_i) \tilde{K} \leq y_i \leq \tilde{y}_i^{(1)} + (1 - x_i) \tilde{K} \quad (14j)$$

$$x_i \in \{0, 1\}, (y_i, \tilde{y}_i^{(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_i)}) \in \mathbb{R}^{3m}, (\lambda_i^{(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_i)}, \kappa_i^{(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_i)}, \zeta_i^{(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_i)}) \in \mathbb{R}_+^{2k+4}$$

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The power market application (Section 4)

The generator's optimization problem

Each generator $i \in I$ seeks to maximize her profits from generating and selling electricity over the time horizon $t \in T$:

$$\min_{x_{ti}, y_{ti}, z_{ti}^{\text{on}}, z_{ti}^{\text{off}}} -p_{tn(i)}y_{ti} + c_i^G y_{ti} + c_i^{\text{on}} z_{ti}^{\text{on}} + c_i^{\text{off}} z_{ti}^{\text{off}} \quad (15\text{a})$$

$$\text{s.t. } x_{ti}g_i^{\min} \leq y_{ti} \leq x_{ti}g_i^{\max} \quad (\alpha_{ti}^{\text{on}}, \beta_{ti}^{\text{on}}) \quad (15\text{b})$$

$$x_{ti} - x_{(t-1)i} = z_{ti}^{\text{on}} - z_{ti}^{\text{off}} \quad (15\text{c})$$

$$x_{ti} \in \{0, 1\}, \quad y_{ti}, z_{ti}^{\text{on}}, z_{ti}^{\text{off}} \in \mathbb{R}_+$$

Demand for electricity and network feasibility (market clearing)

The spot market is cleared by a player seeking to maximize the welfare (utility) of consumers while guaranteeing feasibility of the transmission system. She takes the unit commitment at time t and the dispatch of each power plant as given, written here as y_{ti} , and she assigns locational prices p_{tn} , which the generators consider in their optimization problems:

$$\min_{d_{tj}, \delta_{tn}} \sum_{j \in J} -u_{tj}^D d_{tj} \quad (16\text{a})$$

$$\text{s.t. } \sum_{j \in J_n} d_{tj} - \sum_{i \in I_n} y_{ti} + \sum_{m \in N} B_{nm} \delta_{tm} = 0 \quad (p_{tn}) \quad (16\text{b})$$

$$d_{tj}^{\max} - d_{tj} \geq 0 \quad (\nu_{tj}) \quad (16\text{c})$$

$$f_l^{\max} - \sum_{n \in N} H_{ln} \delta_{tn} \geq 0 \quad (\mu_{tl}^+) \quad (16\text{d})$$

$$f_l^{\max} + \sum_{n \in N} H_{ln} \delta_{tn} \geq 0 \quad (\mu_{tl}^-) \quad (16\text{e})$$

$$\pi - \delta_{tn} \geq 0 \quad (\xi_{tn}^+) \quad (16\text{f})$$

$$\pi + \delta_{tn} \geq 0 \quad (\xi_{tn}^-) \quad (16\text{g})$$

$$\delta_{t\hat{n}} = 0 \quad (\gamma_t) \quad (16\text{h})$$

Sets & Mappings	
$n, m \in N$... nodes
$t \in T$... time step, hours
$i \in I$... generators, power plant units
$j \in J$... load, demand units
$l \in L$... power lines
$i \in I_n, j \in J_n$... generator/load unit mapping to node n
$n(i), n(j)$... node mapping to generator i /load unit j
$\phi \in \Phi$... set of dispatch options (schedules) for each generator
$t \in T_\phi$... hours in which a generator is active in dispatch option ϕ
Primal variables	
x_{ti}	... on/off decision for generator i in hour t
$z_{ti}^{\text{on}}, z_{ti}^{\text{off}}$... inter-temporal start-up/shut-down decision
y_{ti}	... actual generation by generator i in hour t
y_{ti}^{on}	... generation if binary variable is fixed at \bar{x}_i
d_{tj}	... demand by unit j in hour t
δ_{tn}	... voltage angle
Dual variables	
$\alpha_{ti}^{\text{on}}, \beta_{ti}^{\text{on}}$... dual to minimum activity/maximum generation capacity
p_{tn}	... locational marginal price
ν_{tj}	... dual to maximum load constraint
μ_{tl}^+, μ_{tl}^-	... dual to voltage angle band constraints
ξ_{tn}^+, ξ_{tn}^-	... dual to thermal line capacity constraints
γ_t	... dual to slack bus constraints
Switch and compensation variables	
$\kappa_{ti}^{\text{on}}, \kappa_{ti}^{\text{off}}$... switch value (defined per time step)
ζ_i	... compensation payment (defined over entire time horizon)
Parameters	
c_i^G	... linear generation costs
$c_i^{\text{on}}, c_i^{\text{off}}$... start-up/shut-down costs
c_ϕ^D	... total commitment costs in dispatch option ϕ (start-up, shut-down)
g_i^{\min}	... minimum activity level if power plant is online
g_i^{\max}	... maximum generation capacity
x_i^{init}	... power plant status at start of model horizon ($t = 0$)
u_{tj}^D	... utility of demand unit j for using electricity
d_{tj}^{\max}	... maximum load of unit j
f_l^{\max}	... thermal capacity of power line l
B_{nk}, H_{lk}	... line/node susceptance/network transfer matrices

Table 2: Notation for the nodal power market problem

The bi-level multi-objective program

$$\min \sum_{t \in T} \left[\sum_{i \in I} c_i^G y_{ti} + c_i^{\text{on}} z_{ti}^{\text{on}} + c_i^{\text{off}} z_{ti}^{\text{off}} - \sum_{j \in J} u_{tj}^D d_{tj} \right] + \sum_{i \in I} \zeta_i \quad (20)$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad 0 \leq -u_{tj}^D + p_{tn(j)} + \nu_{tj} \perp d_{tj} \geq 0 \quad (19\text{a})$$

$$0 = \sum_{m \in N} B_{mn} p_{tm} + \sum_{l \in L} H_{ln} (\mu_{tl}^+ - \mu_{tl}^-) \\ + \xi_{tn}^+ - \xi_{tn}^- - \begin{cases} \gamma_t & \text{if } n = \hat{n} \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}, \quad \delta_{tn} \text{ (free)} \quad (19\text{b})$$

$$0 = \sum_{j \in J_n} d_{tj} - \sum_{i \in I_n} y_{ti} + \sum_{m \in N} B_{nm} \delta_{tm}, \quad p_{tn} \text{ (free)} \quad (19\text{c})$$

$$0 \leq d_{tj}^{\max} - d_{tj} \perp \nu_{tj} \geq 0 \quad (19\text{d})$$

$$0 \leq f_l^{\max} - \sum_{n \in N} H_{ln} \delta_{tn} \perp \mu_{tl}^+ \geq 0 \quad (19\text{e})$$

$$0 \leq f_l^{\max} + \sum_{n \in N} H_{ln} \delta_{tn} \perp \mu_{tl}^- \geq 0 \quad (19\text{f})$$

$$0 \leq \pi - \delta_{tn} \perp \xi_{tn}^+ \geq 0 \quad (19\text{g})$$

$$0 \leq \pi + \delta_{tn} \perp \xi_{tn}^- \geq 0 \quad (19\text{h})$$

$$0 = \delta_{t\hat{n}}, \quad \gamma_t \text{ (free)} \quad (19\text{i})$$

$$0 = c_i^G - p_{tn(i)} + \beta_{ti}^{\text{on}} - \alpha_{ti}^{\text{on}}, \quad y_{ti}^{\text{on}} \text{ (free)} \quad (17\text{a})$$

$$0 \leq -g_{ti}^{\min} + y_{ti}^{\text{on}} \perp \alpha_{ti}^{\text{on}} \geq 0 \quad (17\text{b})$$

$$0 \leq g_{ti}^{\max} - y_{ti}^{\text{on}} \perp \beta_{ti}^{\text{on}} \geq 0 \quad (17\text{c})$$

$$x_{(t-1)i} + z_{ti}^{\text{on}} - z_{ti}^{\text{off}} = x_{ti} \quad (21\text{a})$$

$$\beta_{ti}^{\text{on}} g_{ti}^{\max} - \alpha_{ti}^{\text{on}} g_{ti}^{\min} - \kappa_{ti}^{\text{on}} + \kappa_{ti}^{\text{off}} = 0 \quad (21\text{b})$$

$$|\kappa_{ti}^{\text{on}}| \leq x_{ti} \tilde{K} \quad (21\text{c})$$

$$|\kappa_{ti}^{\text{off}}| \leq (1 - x_{ti}) \tilde{K} \quad (21\text{d})$$

$$\sum_{t \in T} \left[\kappa_{ti}^{\text{on}} - c_i^{\text{on}} z_{ti}^{\text{on}} - c_i^{\text{off}} z_{ti}^{\text{off}} \right] + \zeta_i \geq \sum_{t \in T_\phi} \left[\beta_{ti}^{\text{on}} g_{ti}^{\max} - \alpha_{ti}^{\text{on}} g_{ti}^{\min} \right] - c_{\phi i}^D \quad \forall \phi \in \Phi \quad (21\text{e})$$

$$0 \leq y_{ti} \leq x_{ti} g_{ti}^{\max} \quad (21\text{f})$$

$$y_{ti}^{\text{on}} - (1 - x_{ti}) g_{ti}^{\max} \leq y_{ti} \leq y_{ti}^{\text{on}} + (1 - x_{ti}) g_{ti}^{\max} \quad (21\text{g})$$