Oscillations in the evolution of reciprocity

Nowak, M. & Sigmund, K. (1989). Oscillations in the evolution of reciprocity. Journal of Theoretical Biology 137 (1) 21-26. 10.1016/S0022-5193(89)80146-8.

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Abstract

A game-theoretical analysis of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma shows that the evolution of ensembles of stochastic strategies displays a dynamics of high complexity and unpredictability.

Item Type:	Article
Research Programs:	World Population (POP)
Depositing User:	Romeo Molina
Date Deposited:	11 Apr 2016 12:25
Last Modified:	27 Aug 2021 17:40
URI:	https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/12623

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