Exploitable Surplus in N-Person Games

Young, H.P. (1979). Exploitable Surplus in N-Person Games. In: Applied Game Theory. Eds. Brams, S.J., Schotter, A., & Schwödiauer, G., pp. 32-38 Germany: Physica-Verlag HD. ISBN 978-3-662-41501-6 10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_2.

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Abstract

Any cooperative n-person game with transferable utility has a noncooperative mode in which the players sell out of their positions to an external market of entrepreneurial organizing agents. Assuming a market of price takers, this game of competitive self-valuation always has an equilibrium price solution. Every core imputation in the original game constitutes a set of equilibrium prices. If there is no core the entrepreneurs can exploit the coalitions for a profit, i.e., they realize a positive rent for their organizing function. Application is made to determining fair wages to labor, and finding equilibrium prices for legislators selling their votes.

Item Type:	Book Section
Depositing User:	Romeo Molina
Date Deposited:	01 Dec 2016 10:29
Last Modified:	27 Aug 2021 17:28
URI:	https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/14042

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