



Addressing the diversity of Loss and damage in Pacific Island countries to foster a just transition towards a climate-resilient future

John Handmer, Rebecca Monson & Thomas Schinko

To cite this article: John Handmer, Rebecca Monson & Thomas Schinko (16 Dec 2024): Addressing the diversity of Loss and damage in Pacific Island countries to foster a just transition towards a climate-resilient future, *Climate and Development*, DOI: [10.1080/17565529.2024.2437133](https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2024.2437133)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2024.2437133>



© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group



Published online: 16 Dec 2024.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

Addressing the diversity of Loss and damage in Pacific Island countries to foster a just transition towards a climate-resilient future

John Handmer ^a, Rebecca Monson ^b and Thomas Schinko ^a

^aEquity and Justice Group, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria; ^bANU College of Law, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia

ABSTRACT

Pacific Island Countries and Territories (PICTs) are typically regarded as being among the world's most exposed to natural hazards. With climate change, these hazards may lead to losses and damages that pose a near existential threat for some communities. PICTs are highly diverse, but we show that they are being impacted by climate change in ways that are shared across the region, and different to many other parts of the world. The global narrative, institutionalized by the UNFCCC, is often at odds with the local priorities and realities of loss and damage from climate change in small countries with scattered populations, limited infrastructure, little access to insurance, and significant circular subsistence economies. For many in the PICTs, informal economies, religion and indigenous norms are key to social and economic life; and land and sea are fundamental to identity. In contrast to the global narrative, loss and damage is often intangible, impacting mental health, tradition, lifestyles, biodiversity, and social cohesion. This paper identifies these features and highlights the implications for tackling loss and damage. There are significant justice issues that need to be addressed in the context of a 'just transition' towards a climate resilient future.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 25 September 2023
Accepted 18 November 2024

KEYWORDS

Loss and damage; Pacific Islands; culture; non-economic loss; climate justice

1. Introduction: climate risk and loss and damage in the Pacific

In 2018, the Pacific Islands Forum signed the Boe Declaration on Regional Security, which with an 'expanded concept of security' called for recognizing climate change as the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific (Pacific Islands Forum, 2018). Political leaders and policy makers in the region widely regard climate change as a threat multiplier, with the potential to undermine water and food security, exacerbate existing grievances and contribute to conflict (Naupa et al., 2018; Westoby et al., 2021; Pacific Elders Voice, 2023).¹ This message was strongly reinforced by the Pacific Islands Forum in its 2022 Communiqué, which reiterated that 'climate change remains the single biggest existential threat' facing the region and emphasized 'the urgency to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees through rapid, deep and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions'. The Communiqué further stresses the threat of sea-level rise as 'the defining issue that imperils the livelihoods and wellbeing' of Pacific peoples and welcomed progress on Vanuatu's request from the UN General Assembly for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice to clarify the legal consequences of climate change (Pacific Islands Forum, 2022).

The Pacific consistently ranks as the most hazardous region on the World Risk Index, and Vanuatu consistently ranks as the most hazard-prone state in the world. One reason for

this is physical exposure to both climatic and geophysical hazards. Most PICTS (Pacific Island Countries and Territories)² are reporting more intense weather events associated with climate change (Walsh et al., 2019). Tropical storms and cyclones such as Tropical Cyclone Evans in December 2012, Pam in 2014, Gita in 2018, Harold in 2020 and Mawar in 2023 brought destructive winds, rain and sea surges that endangered lives, destroyed crops, homes and vital infrastructure, and contaminated the soil for future crops.

That climate change acts as a threat multiplier has been highlighted by COVID-19. For example, Tonga was still recovering from Cyclone Ian in 2014 when Cyclone Gita hit in early 2018, and this was followed by Cyclone Harold in March 2020, which coincided with the start of the COVID pandemic, and related international border closures and social distancing measures. Responses to COVID complicated both the domestic and international reactions to the cyclone. While there are many information gaps and deficiencies in existing knowledge of the relationship between climate change and viruses, there is general agreement that climate change has already made conditions more favourable to the spread of mosquito-borne diseases (Rodó et al., 2021; Mora et al., 2022). Tonga's experiences in 2020 illustrate the cascading crises expected in a warmer future.

Cyclones provide relatively high-profile, rapid-onset examples of crises wrought by climate change, but the relatively slow-onset disaster of sea-level rise is regarded by both Pacific

region and global intergovernmental bodies as an existential threat for Pacific Island countries (Pacific Islands Forum, 2022; IPCC, 2019). The region is home to three of the four atoll nations in the world: Kiribati, Tuvalu and Marshall Islands (the fourth being the Maldives in the Indian Ocean). These face cumulative risks from multiple drivers including atoll erosion and sea level rise; changes in rainfall ocean-atmosphere oscillation and tropical cyclone intensity; and ocean warming and acidification (Duvat et al., 2021; Oppenheimer et al., 2019). As the vast majority of the region's towns and communities are located in coastal areas, sea level rise has significant implications for infrastructure, livelihoods and ecosystems even in the more mountainous states such as Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Fiji and Solomon Islands. Sea level rise and extreme weather are already claiming lives and assets, and affecting agricultural production and food security in communities across the region. The *IPCC Special Report on the Oceans* suggests that the entire coastal and urban Pacific – the places where the overwhelming majority of the population currently live – will be under water by the end of the century (IPCC, 2019). For example, the Fijian Government has already identified 42 villages for relocation, with the number expected to increase (Chaudary, 2023).

These existing and likely future impacts of climate change on the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of Pacific peoples highlights the inherent injustice of climate change. The region accounts for just 0.03% of the global emissions of CO₂ from fuel combustion despite having around 0.12% of the world's population (about 8 million people) (Hay & Sem, 2000). It is now routine for government policies and the reports of aid donors to note that the Pacific Islands disproportionately experience the cascading risks and constrained opportunities associated with climate change (Kingdom of Tonga, 2015; Solomons Islands & IOM, 2022). The coloniality of climate change is underscored by the fact that the development of the Global North continues largely unabated, while those most affected in the Global South are accumulating debts in the name of 'climate justice', by taking loans to finance climate impacts (Teaiwa, 2020; Sultana, 2022). An obvious example is the accumulation of sovereign debt as poorer countries seek to adapt to, mitigate and recover from adverse climatic events.

The aim of this paper is to first expose the gap between loss and damage (L&D) as it has been conceptualized at the global level and second, to contrast this with some of the realities and priorities in the Pacific Islands as we understand them based on our experience in the region and available literature. We then suggest some priority areas for developing a more just approach to L&D.

In Part I, we sketch some key features of the global L&D narrative that predominates in UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations. We draw on the interdisciplinary literature on loss and damage, including our own previous research (Mechler et al., 2019) and a continuously updated L&D literature database held at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). We draw particular attention to the generalizing, universalizing narratives of L&D. In Part II, we turn our attention to the way these narratives obscure and are often in tension with distinctive features and lived realities of Pacific Island Countries and Territories (PICTs). In this section we draw on existing

literature as well as our own experiences as non-Pacific scholars and practitioners working on climate adaptation, disaster risk reduction, and legal and policy frameworks in the region (e.g. Monson, 2023; Monson et al., 2024). These experiences include research and policy work on community-led climate-driven relocations in the region, and regular interaction with aid donors and government agencies with respect to these topics. We especially draw on work by Pacific Islander writers who are on the frontlines of climate change in numerous ways, not only experiencing the impacts of environmental change within their own communities but who are also frequently involved in UNFCCC and related negotiations. In Part III, we begin to sketch some priority actions for L&D debates if more climate-just outcomes are to be achieved.

2. The global narrative of loss and damage

2.1. The history and current state of L&D policy and research

Pacific people and their governments have long seen climate change as both a moral and material challenge for richer countries (Weir et al., 2017), and have been at the forefront of debates on loss and damage. In 1991, Vanuatu as Chair of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) proposed an insurance scheme to address the consequences of sea level rise as part of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (INC, 1991). It was suggested that the revenue for the insurance fund could come from mandatory contributions from industrialized countries based on GNP and relative greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Although the proposal was rejected, it introduced the topic of adverse impacts associated with climate change and the notion of justice as important parts of the international climate policy discussions (Mechler et al., 2019). By 2013, the concept that polluting developed countries should compensate small island countries for the loss and damage incurred as a result of climate change had moved into the mainstream of UNFCCC climate negotiations; and at the 2013 UNFCCC conference (COP 19) the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (WIM) was established. This formally established the need to address 'loss and damage associated with adverse impacts of climate change' in developing countries 'in a comprehensive, integrated and coherent manner' (WIM, 2013). As part of the Warsaw Mechanism, the Santiago network for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage (SNLD) was established at COP 25 in 2019 in Madrid. Its mandate is to catalyze technical assistance for the implementation of relevant L&D approaches in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. The L&D mechanism is about avoiding, reducing and shifting the burden of L&D, for example to insurers. It is also about finding ways of dealing with the L&D that cannot be avoided through financial or other support mechanisms. However, effort is also devoted to ensuring that rich countries are not held liable for climate risk, and in doing so undermines the global solidarity needed to address the climate crisis.

In international policy and science circles, loss and damage has significantly increased in profile as a serious policy issue in

the last few years (Mechler et al., 2020; Vanhala et al., 2023). This has partly been based on Article 8 of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) which gives explicit recognition to L&D as a stand-alone pillar in achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement, alongside climate change mitigation and adaptation. It also further emphasizes that neither adaptation nor mitigation are sufficient to prevent loss and damage, which can already be observed (Roberts & Huq, 2015; Warner & van der Geest, 2013).

Despite this profile, there is not yet agreement on the scope and definition of 'Loss and Damage'. Literature on the issue recognizes that it is a general term used in UN climate negotiations to refer to both unpreventable, unavoidable and irrecoverable 'loss' and avoidable, repairable or recoverable 'damage'.³ However, recently, at COP27 in 2022, a breakthrough in financing L&D was reached with the establishment of a Transitional Committee mandated to design a new L&D Fund by the end of 2023 (Serdeczny & Lissner, 2023). At the 2023 COP28 summit in Dubai, parties reached an agreement on the operationalization of the loss and damage fund and its funding arrangements. It is an important step, however the USD 700 million promised so far falls well short of potential loss and damage in the Global South. COP29 at Baku in November 2024 did not alter this situation. At COP29 the G77 and China as well as climate-justice groups argued that the NCQG (New Collective Climate finance Goal) should cover L&D, but this was opposed by developed countries, and L&D was left out of the new climate finance deal (Climate Action Network International, 2024).

Historically, L&D is an issue that has almost exclusively been advocated for by developing countries. However, Calliari and Ryder (2023) find that L&D is no longer seen as solely a 'small islands issue', with a growing number of Global North countries referring to the concept in their national climate action plans. The historic focus is apparent in the development of the discourse, as well as in the number of times it is mentioned in UNFCCC member statements, which shows a strong increase since 2013 (Gach, 2019). The global scientific community has provided research showing the kinds of trends and issues that are likely to arise with increased global warming especially in places, like the Small Island Developing States, where adaptation limits are more readily reached (Handmer & Nalau, 2019; Mechler et al., 2019). For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 degrees integrated loss and damage into its report in 2018 (IPCC, 2018; Thomas & Benjamin, 2018).

Slow onset events were the starting point of the L&D discourse, introduced as mentioned above, by the AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States, 1991) to address harms from sea level rise. This initiative specifically requested compensation from industrialized countries due to their perceived responsibility. Over time, the L&D debate has gradually changed from one driven by compensation claims and liability – although these remain important – towards a cooperative approach putting emphasis on knowledge and expertise sharing through the Paris Agreement and the WIM (Calliari, 2018; but see Nand & Bardsley, 2020). This also means a shift in the focus of the debate, as it now also includes other climatic hazards and issues such as migration and displacement (Durand & Huq,

2015). Migration and displacement are critical L&D issues for the PICTS as people are forced from their homes and livelihoods by both rapid and slow onset climate events, causing severe, and possibly existential, economic and non-economic impacts (McAdam, 2020). Despite innovations and advancements facilitated by civil society groups and LDCs, the international L&D discourse and its framing of 'climate debt' have nevertheless become largely 'compatible with dominant structures of hegemony and stripped of disruptive meaning and impact' (Ciplet, 2017, p. 1070; Roberts & Pelling, 2019, discuss other possibilities). One way this has occurred is through the promotion of neo-liberal approaches by international financial organizations, including promotion of market-based instruments (such as market-based insurance and debt), and the dominant 'risk management' framing by industrialized countries (Ciplet & Roberts, 2017). These globally applied approaches focus on readily quantifiable loss and damage using money as the primary metric.

L&D remains vague and contested in both an academic and political context, even after 30 years of debate. Few of the measures suggested for addressing loss and damage go beyond current practice in disaster risk management (DRM) and climate change adaptation (CCA), although the need for novel transformational tools and instruments is frequently stressed. Important shortcomings lie in the vague language and lack of clear definition in Article 8 of the Paris Agreement, in the lack of a clear distinction between L&D and CCA, and in particular whether CCA only addresses potential climatic impacts before they occur or continues afterwards, as this influences available L&D funding (Wallimann-Helmer, 2015).

2.2. Unresolved L&D policy issues and research gaps

Several issues require further deliberation in the L&D international policy discourse. This is especially the case with the WIM's function to 'enhance action and support', where a lack of results has been noted, as most of the focus has been placed on its first two functions neither of which is action oriented. They are: 'enhancing knowledge and understanding' of relevant risk management; and 'strengthening dialogue, coordination ... and synergies' among stakeholders (see e.g. Climate Action Network, 2019; LDC Climate Change, 2019; Thomas et al., 2020). Concrete outcomes remain limited, despite the WIM forming expert groups and workstreams to implement its work plan (Hirsch, 2019). The mandate of the WIM is subject to different interpretations, with tensions surrounding the topic of finance and compensation (Anisimov & Vallejo, 2019). The issue of finance is also strongly debated in terms of sources of funding, appropriate financial schemes, calculation base, accountability and distribution (Roberts et al., 2017; Schäfer & Künzel, 2019; Williams, 2020).

Even though the nature of L&D continues to be vague and contested and the definition of the term has long lacked clarity (James et al., 2014), there is now increasing consensus that:

L&D refers to adverse climate-related impacts and risks from both sudden-onset events, such as floods and cyclones, and slower-onset processes, including droughts, sea-level rise, glacial retreat, and desertification. Mechler et al. (2020)

Despite arguments about the merging of the competing ‘liability and compensation’, and ‘risk and insurance’ framings (Vanhala & Hestbaek, 2016), as well as progress in attribution science, the question of liability is not completely off the table, at least outside the UNFCCC.⁴ In addition, issues of loss estimation, sources and forms of finance (Doelle, 2014; Schäfer & Künzel, 2019), their distribution and effective use (Hirsch, 2019), as well as legal tools for displacement and international mobility (Anisimov & Vallejo, 2019), remain. Global litigation against those seen as primarily responsible for climate change by PICTs is another avenue for compensation. This is discussed later.

Even though L&D has a prominent position in the Paris Agreement, it has been unable to establish itself as a third pillar of climate action and still faces concerns within climate change practice and policy regarding its legitimacy (Calliari et al., 2020). Countries of the Global North in particular argue that DRM (disaster risk management) and CCA continue after harms occur, thereby moving incremental adjustments and current practices to the foreground of discussions. They further maintain that L&D cannot be discussed as ‘more than adaptation’ without proof of causal links between climate-related risks and anthropogenic climate change, which is needed to establish liability. Here, we argue in line with Schinko et al. (2019) that the identification of L&D as ‘beyond adaptation’ could aid in the establishment of a ‘risk and policy space for Loss and Damage’, which could permit moving past the political impasse which exists between those advocating for climate justice, for example in the PICTs, and those calling for the consideration of L&D within an adaptation framework.

With respect to L&D finance, research, the SNLD (the Santiago network) and the Transitional Committee (founded at COP27 see above) need to address several unresolved issues. If this is not done, the fund will be unable to operate properly. First, the scope of L&D and related activities needs to be defined. Second, concrete activities to address slow-onset processes (e.g. sea-level rise) and the resulting non-economic impacts, need to be proposed. The inclusion of a wide range of non-economic impacts, known as NELD (non-economic loss and damage), and the existential threat to PICTs of sea level rise is essential if the finance is to benefit the people of the Pacific islands – but will need to follow the priorities of those directly affected if it is to be of benefit. Third, the question of who should pay for the work of the L&D fund needs to be answered; and fourth, the political and economic feasibility of specific L&D measures need to be assessed (Serdeczny & Lissner, 2023). Related issues concern, what measures are to be funded, and what sources of knowledge are used to inform risk reduction. A particularly contested question in the context of the hegemonic L&D discourse is where the fund will be located, with some industrialized countries (in particular the US and EU) arguing that the World Bank should be the host institution, which is strongly rejected by countries of the Global South (Climate Action Network International, 2023).

We now consider how this global narrative around L&D (Calliari & Ryder, 2023), which has transitioned from an initial context specific compensatory justice and liability framing (championed by the AOSIS in the early 1990s) to a universalizing risk management and market-based instruments framing

(advocated by global North countries), reflects the concerns and priorities of communities in Pacific small island (developing) states and territories (PICTs), as they experience the impacts of climate change.

3. PICTs – shared issues and attributes

The Pacific Islands, like Small Island Developing States (SIDS) generally, are frequently described in the literature on climate change as small, isolated, and remote, and as experiencing overpopulation, economic decline (particularly since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic), resource scarcity and land degradation. These long-standing portrayals of the Pacific have been hotly debated by Pacific Studies scholars, and we highlight two critiques here. First, such narratives often serve the interests of the Global North, for example by constructing the islands as sites of ‘lack’ and in need of solutions from the Global North. Second, such narratives homogenize a region that encompasses one third of the planet, thousands of communities, and unparalleled diversity of cultures, languages, ecologies, livelihoods and political systems.⁵ Indigenous scholars in particular have emphasized that this diversity coexists with (and is often reinforced by) shared political, economic and environmental processes and interests that unite the region (Teaiwa, 2020). We draw on this work to suggest that the region is situated in quite particular ways with respect to loss and damage associated with climate change. In this section we highlight a number of regional features that have bearing on the way L&D is conceptualized and operationalized, but which tend to remain poorly understood by audiences unfamiliar with the region. These include the influence of aid and high exposure to natural hazards; questions of land tenure, urbanization and mobility; the extent of informal economic activity and subsistence livelihoods; the vitality of Indigenous or customary norms and practices; and the heterogeneous influence of religion, in particular Christianity.

3.1. Aid, exposure to climate risk and capacity

Pacific small island developing states (PSIDS) are considered to be amongst the world’s poorest and receive the highest rates of development assistance per capita in the world (Dornan & Pryke, 2017). As mentioned earlier, the South Pacific also consistently ranks as the world’s most hazardous region due to its exposure to cyclones, and other climate and weather hazards as well as seismic and volcanic hazards (Walsh et al., 2019). COVID complicated all aspects of disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation during 2020–2021 (see above at Section 1). All this coincides to generate intense interest and investment in DRR and climate change adaptation (CCA), with the result that the region can be seen as a global leader in institutional thinking and integration of these areas (Hallwright & Handmer, 2021; Monson, 2022). However, this intense global interest comes at a cost. Pacific Island public servants often find their attempts to pursue local solutions constrained by the expectations and demands of donors (Monson, 2022). It also seems likely that donor investment in DRR, climate adaptation, and responding to climate shocks will

drive increases in the public debt of Pacific countries, reinforcing the cascading effects of climate change and climate change policy to national economies (Maldonado & Gallagher, 2022; and see above at Section 2).

Across the region there are very real capacity constraints, particularly with respect to responding to the expectations of the international community. Many Pacific Island countries and territories have relatively small populations, with a small absolute number of staff in governments, and limited capacity to fill vacancies, or to recruit staff with the requisite skills and experience for key tasks. This results in limited capacity to fulfil the expectations of the Global North, such as those regarding public financial management or engaging with Sustainable Development Goals (Haque et al., 2012; Klock & Nunn, 2019, Table 2). The administrative burdens of engaging with UN loss and damage negotiations will be disproportionately borne by these officials.

These processes also intersect with the patterns and inequalities in the published literature on climate change, including whose perspectives appear and ‘count’ in the peer-reviewed evidence for loss and damage. Many researchers who are from the region work at resource-constrained institutions; are heavily engaged in UN climate negotiations or applied policy work linked to initiatives undertaken by governments, churches, international organizations and non-government organizations; and face greater resourcing and time constraints than scholars based in many other parts of the world to devote to publishing scholarly articles (Monson, 2022). Despite the Pacific Islands being held up as examples of the global climate crisis, literature reviews have concluded that research on the nature of climate change and adaptation in the region is fragmentary (Klock & Nunn, 2019). Where climate change and adaptation is studied, it tends to focus on urban areas rather than on rural areas or outer islands. Also, Klock and Nunn (2019) show that documented adaptation in the Pacific emphasizes mainly ‘top down’ initiatives driven by central governments (and by extension their international donors) (Klock & Nunn, 2019), rather than those driven by communities (Monson & Foukona, 2014).

These processes all contribute to the sidelining and constraining of Pacific voices, interests and realities in UN negotiations and in the conceptual and evidentiary development of loss and damage. The accumulation of debt, administrative burdens and workloads all work to reinforce the concentration of control of L&D, and the development of the evidence base underpinning it, in the hands of the better-resourced scholars, bureaucrats and governments from industrialized countries. This sustains the gap between UN narratives of L&D and the lived realities of Pacific Islanders.

3.2. Land, urbanization and mobility

A key loss and damage concern for Pacific states is the accumulated cost of relocating communities due to sea level rise and other environmental changes wrought by anthropogenic climate change. The complexity of L&D cannot be understood without an appreciation of the significance of both land and the customary regimes of land management that persist across the region.

Across the Pacific, Indigenous custom – referred to by a variety of terms including *kastom* in Melanesian Pijins, *fa’asamoa* in Samoa – shapes social life as much as, and often more than the norms and institutions established by central governments. Many countries and territories have incorporated aspects of custom into the state-sanctioned legal system, with some recognizing it as a general source of law (Zorn & Corrin Care, 2008). This is of particular importance with respect to land: in most countries in the region, the laws promulgated by the state expressly recognize that the vast majority of land – typically over 80% – is held under customary tenure. The details of state recognition of customary tenure vary enormously from one jurisdiction to the next, but in most it means that most land is understood to be held collectively by a kin group, rather than by an individual (AusAID, 2008). In Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands in particular, most customary land has not been subject to formal recording of ownership or mapping of land boundaries.

This means that many governments already face a shortage of land available for relocating or establishing new public infrastructure or for relocating communities impacted by climate change. In some locations, this situation is exacerbated by other factors. For example, in Kiribati, state and freehold land is concentrated on two urban atolls, which already face high population density, rapid urbanisation, high reliance on imported goods, high pollution, poor sanitation and limited resources (NAP, 2017). The demarcation of land boundaries or the acquisition of further land by the state risks crystallising nascent disputes over ownership and boundaries, and entrenching or heightening social inequality based on gender, ethnicity and class (Allen & Monson, 2014; Fitzpatrick & Monson, 2022; Monson, 2023).

In all PICTS, public and freehold land tends to be concentrated in urban areas, and Pacific Island cities have some of the highest urban growth rates in the world. Urban areas across the region are also characterized by village-like settlements – that is, by settlement patterns revolving around a kin group, language group, or sometimes island group, with sociocultural arrangements regarded as customary, Indigenous or traditional (Jones, 2016). An example is the largely-informal settlement of Koa Hill in Honiara (Solomon Islands), where most people obtained access to land through family networks. The settlement was divided into governance ‘zones’ based on regional and linguistic affiliations of the Malaitan (a province of the Solomon Islands) groups that established different parts of the settlement, and these were governed by traditional chiefs and committees chosen by residents (Fitzpatrick & Monson, 2022). When Koa Hill was largely destroyed by flash floods in April 2014, many people moved to a new site, April Hill, where they settled into ‘zones’ similarly characterized by regional and linguistic affiliations, and also by church denomination, with formal decision-making authority largely held by (male) church leaders and chiefs.

Understanding customary arrangements – which in many senses persist even on alienated, registered town land – is crucial to understanding not only the economic or material aspects of sea level rise, but its moral implications, psychosocial impacts and affective dimensions. While the former may be relatively straightforward to quantify for the purposes of

L&D, the latter are likely to be both very significant and difficult if not impossible to assess in money terms. Social relations and protocols are embedded in land and sea, but these places are not merely a stage upon which life plays out, nor can they be fully understood in terms of an abstract object owned by human subjects – for most Pacific Islanders, the human and non-human world are intimately connected and cannot be disentangled (Teaiwa, 2014; Monson, 2023). Landscapes, seascapes and skies provide the basis for cultural practices, indigenous knowledges and understanding of self and belonging (Monson, 2014). For example, marriage, kin groups, seafaring, gift exchange, and traditional medicine all emerge from and reproduce relationships with and knowledge of land, sea and sky, as well as relationships between people, flora, fauna and places. Pacific visual and spoken languages such as stories, songs, dance, weaving and carving also reproduce emplaced economic, environmental and social knowledge which has provided the foundations for Indigenous wellbeing, economies and governance for many generations ('Atu Emberson Bain, 1994; Bhagwan et al., 2020).

Key to understanding potential loss and damage is the fact that for many people, their relationship with landscapes, seascapes and skies is not one of property rights but of kinship. This means that people are not merely 'guardians' of particular places, but are genealogically related to them (Case, 2019; Teaiwa, 2014), and the health of landscapes and seascapes, and the maintenance of cultural heritage and practices, is directly related to mental and physical wellbeing (McNamara & Westoby, 2011; Yates et al., 2022). Irrespective of the actual impact of climate change, discussing potential threats and losses may also have severe health and wellbeing impacts for Pacific people (Clissold et al., 2022), meaning that global discourses and UN negotiations regarding loss and damage, in and of themselves, generate harm.

As land and sea are transformed by climate change, this has multiple and ongoing impacts for biodiversity and ecosystem services, Indigenous and local knowledge, and current and future ways of being. Some forms of loss and damage are well-known outside the region and are readily quantifiable. For example, it would be difficult but possible to quantify the loss and damage impacts of ocean acidification and siltation on the coastal ecosystems that many communities in Vanuatu rely on for their livelihoods (Talakai, 2015). However, this would require input and knowledge from those most intimately affected.

3.3. Informal economic activity and subsistence livelihoods

In many PICTs, opportunities for paid employment are relatively limited, and a large proportion of the population is involved in some sort of subsistence production. The extent of informality and subsistence makes L&D more difficult to define and quantify than in regions with high levels of participation in the formal economy, which is much better documented and quantified.

Across the region there is a large amount of informal economic activity (ILO, 2021), and some areas are highly dependent on remittances (Collins, 2022). For example, in Tonga

– which has a large formal economy compared to many others in the region – 82% of the working age population were nevertheless engaged in subsistence production (Tonga, 2018). In Solomon Islands in 2018, 85 per cent of women and 77 per cent of men were engaged in what the World Bank defined as 'vulnerable employment', that is, work that was unpaid, or with irregular income, and lacking formal work arrangements with social protection benefits (World Bank, 2019).

Overseas remittances from relatives working abroad are also crucial for many Pacific households and national incomes. In 2019, for example, almost two-sixths of Tonga's GDP and one-sixth of Samoa's GDP came from remittances. In Fiji, remittances earn more than traditional export markets such as sugar and garments, and now comprise the second largest source of foreign exchange after tourism (Collins, 2023).

Some literature on climate change has linked this dependence on subsistence agriculture to growing food insecurity. Communities across the region report that changing rainfall and seasonality are disrupting gardens and tree crops, and coastal inundation is threatening water sources and food crops, while ocean warming and acidification is expected to kill coral reefs and disrupt fish stocks (Jolly, 2018). However, we again emphasize the immense socio-ecological diversity within and between Pacific Island countries.

Some contexts, such as the densely populated atolls of Micronesia, are reliant on income from a narrow set of export commodities, and face increasing dependence on imported foods, which leaves them vulnerable to economic and environmental variability and undermines food security. However, this is not necessarily true of other contexts such as much of Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands. Allen (2015) has studied these issues on Malo in Vanuatu, which is likely to be similar to many other rural contexts in Melanesia. He found that the food system continues to be dependent on subsistence production, with just 20 per cent of people's daily energy requirements coming from imported foods. Moreover, these food systems have generally been very resilient, involving wide genetic diversity of indigenous and introduced species, and innovation of 'traditional' practices and exchange relations (Allen, 2015). Existing scholarship often demonstrates that subsistence agriculture has underpinned flexibility and resilience in food systems, offering a buffer against external shocks such as the Global Financial Crisis and the COVID pandemic (Monson et al., 2023; Leweniqila & Vunibola, 2020). However, there are exceptions to this general pattern: for example, the 'Weather Coast' of Guadalcanal (Solomon Islands) experiences seasonal food shortages because of a combination of extreme wet weather and plant disease. In some PICTS there are also dietary issues, from both traditional and imported food, leading to an absence of key nutrients and in some countries, high levels of diabetes (Duckworth, 2017; WFP&PC, 2018).

3.4. Religion

Assessments of both economic and non-economic loss and damage will need to incorporate the significance and influence of Christianity in much of the Pacific, which has recently been described as 'so profound that even the lives of non-Christians

(for example, followers of ancestral religions or converts to other global religions like the Bahá'í Faith or Islam) might be analysed as living “within” a Christian world’ (McDougall, 2020). Statistically, Pacific countries are amongst the most Christian in the world: census data indicates that in most countries across the region, virtually all the population identifies as belonging to one of the Christian churches (e.g. 99 per cent in PNG).⁶ This is not to obscure variations across the region: in Fiji, for example, which has a substantial Hindu population (24%) and smaller Muslim population (5.7%) (Fiji Bureau of Statistics, 2017; US State Department, 2022), public life is generally resolutely Christian and the Methodist church in particular exerts significant political authority (see further Rautuva and Lawson, 2016; Ryle, 2005). Despite variation, across the region Christianity is central to multiple forms of social ordering, law and governance, and churches provide not only a social hub, but a system of institutions, norms and governance that extend from the national (and often international) arena right through to rural villages. The churches are often critical to solidarity and collective action, and Christianity has been said to be ‘the ground and starting point for political action’ across the region (Tomlinson & McDougall, 2013).

The spread of Christianity in the region was undeniably bound up with colonial expansion. However, it would be a mistake to assume that most Pacific Islanders contrast Christianity or other global religions with Indigenous, local or traditional culture. Many people regard Christianity as essential to the ‘Pacific Way’, whereas Euro-American systems of law and governance are often firmly cast as ‘foreign’ (Tomlinson & McDougall, 2020). The ideologies, practices and institutional structures associated with Christianity are of course heterogeneous, and vary greatly both within and between different denominations, even within the same linguistic and cultural area. For example, in the Western Province of the Solomon Islands, the main churches – the Seventh Day Adventists, United Church of Solomon Islands, and Christian Fellowship Church – have had very different approaches to their ancestral traditions, and to resource governance and consumption (McDougall, 2008; Monson, 2023). Pacific women’s movements recognize that Christianity has often served to deepen gender inequality, while in other instances has provided a foundation for empowerment and political mobilization (Slatter, 2012).

Models of Pacific health developed by Pacific Islander scholars consistently emphasize that concepts of ‘health’ are holistic and extend beyond physical and mental health to social, cultural and spiritual health. This extends to Christianity, with Indigenous theologies and church networks often seen as central to responding to climate change, and enhancing social and economic development, throughout the region. For example, throughout 2020 there was a series of region-wide meetings on ‘Changing the Story of Development’ sponsored by the Pacific Islands Forum, the University of the South Pacific, the Pacific Theological College, and the Pacific Conference of Churches, focused on critiquing and reimagining mainstream models of ‘development’ (Bhagwan et al., 2020). The Pacific Conference on Churches has long been central to regional alliances such as the Pacific Climate Warriors,

asserting both a regional ‘Pacific Way’ and profoundly enmeshed knowledges as central to facing the global ecological crisis (Teaiwa, 2018; Monson et al., 2023). In the Solomon Islands, church-based networks are likely to be crucial to providing support systems for mitigating and responding to loss and damage, for example by facilitating the archiving of important knowledge and the relocation of communities displaced by sea level rise (Monson & Foukona, 2014).

4. Towards a just approach to L&D in the PICTs

There are numerous ways to experience loss and damage from climate change, yet policy makers and researchers have tended to focus on those that can be easily measured (see for example a review by McNamara & Jackson, 2019). These are generally those for which there are values in global markets. However, it is often the less tangible or difficult-to-measure losses that can undermine and destroy entire societies and cultures. This tendency is exacerbated by the reality that much climate change and adaptation research and reports concerning small island developing states ‘... focuses on the core or near-core, while remote rural areas or outer islands are less often examined ...’ (IIED & ICCCAD, 2021); so even when focused on PICTs are likely to reproduce the global narrative.

We have shown that much of the global narrative is concerned with ensuring that the countries primarily responsible for climate change avoid liability, while nevertheless supporting a range of generally top-down activities with a strong market focus, to adapt to a changing climate. This is not to say that the funded activities are inappropriate or unwise, but that they are only part of the story.

In addition to our analysis, the desirability of combining the global and local is also examined in a SPREP (Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Program, n.d.) report. This sets out and frames L&D in terms of both global environmental concerns:

The types of loss and damage of greatest concern in the Pacific Island Countries relate to sea level rise, ocean acidification, coral bleaching, impacts on terrestrial and marine biodiversity, fisheries and aquaculture, and agriculture.

And in terms of local community concerns, where the SPREP report frames these concerns in terms of their non-monetary nature:

there is a great concern over losses that cannot be quantified in monetary terms, such as loss of lives, loss of culture and language, loss of connectivity to customary land, and in some cases losses of entire islands or sovereign states.

This point on community concerns is also highlighted in a recent report from Ian Fry, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Climate Change and UNFCCC negotiator for Tuvalu and AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States), which mentions the importance of ‘non-economic losses ... [which] ... include, inter alia, loss of life, human health, cultural heritage and sovereignty’ (Fry, 2022, p. 14). Both economic as well as non-economic losses are part of the current L&D discussion in the UNFCCC. The concept of non-economic loss and damage (NELD), in its simplest definition, refers to the loss of values that are not commonly traded in markets, such

as those being identified here as of concern to local communities – the concept is global, but in operation it needs to reflect local priorities and values (Serdeczny et al., 2016). Such values include loss of, and damage to, the values listed above as well as mental health and well-being, culture, way of life and social cohesion, and biodiversity (Clissold et al., 2021; McNamara et al., 2021; Warrick et al., 2017), as well as the spiritual values discussed earlier in Section 3. These are all important values for the Pacific (and many other areas) and ways need to be found to ensure their full inclusion.

As Teaiwa and many other scholars of the region have consistently pointed out, global discourses of climate change reproduce a homogenous vision of the Pacific region as populated by people who are ‘small island victims of global processes who will likely have to leave their homes’ (Teaiwa, 2018, p. 33). There is a tendency to assume homogeneity across the reality of the very diverse PICTs, where L&D will manifest differently for small islands, coastal areas, land-locked areas, and countries with different fiscal and administrative capacities, infrastructure and institutions. However, diversity also occurs within communities, and L&D impacts will be different for people with for example, different resources, status and health (IIED & ICCCAD, 2021). These and other issues can intersect ‘with race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, indigenous identity, age, disability, income, migrant status and geographical location [to] ... compound vulnerability to climate change impacts, exacerbate inequity and create further injustice’ (Fry, 2022, p. 8, clause 29). The uneven impacts of climate change across these groups raise significant justice and equity issues. Fry (2022, p. 17) argues for ensuring that ‘the voices of those most affected must be heard and the losses and damages they are suffering must be understood and accounted for. Many are calling for far greater participation of and climate justice for vulnerable groups’.

4.1. L & D estimates are too low:

The idea of ‘building back better’ after a disaster, was introduced in the Sendai agreement on disaster risk to reduce the chance of future damage and improve resilience. However, it is impractical for places seemingly in a state of constant recovery from frequent repeated events. In these circumstances, the focus is necessarily on immediate needs making it harder than usual to focus on longer term risk reduction. An example from the Pacific is provided by the West Coast of the island of Espirito Santo, Vanuatu. As a result of a combination of the direct impacts of the high winds from cyclones and severe weather on homes and people and of extensive damage to the natural environment, the people are facing a humanitarian crisis (Bharadwaj & Shakya, 2021). The environment ‘typically provides a high percentage of people’s daily food intake, water supply, building materials, medicines and income generation’ (Bharadwaj & Shakya, 2021). In turn this pressure for food has led to the ‘partial collapse of tradition environmental stewardship governance (and cultural maintenance) ...’ (SPREP, n.d.; Bharadwaj & Shakya, 2021).

The challenges faced by atoll countries are even more severe. These atolls are increasingly likely to be impacted in multiple ways from multiple hazards, which can act to prevent recovery and longer-term risk reduction. Examples include:

sea level rise (inundation, saline intrusion, and storm surges), diminished or depleted water resources ..., coral bleaching (impacting the tourism sector, fisheries) and changes to the fisheries sector ...

Repeated or simultaneous occurrence of these hazards, especially if extreme and accompanied by severe ecological damage, are leading to consideration and use of relocation. For people in the Pacific with semi-subsistence livelihoods depending on the sea, land and climate, ecosystem services are the key to livelihoods and resilience. One of the most important lessons learned is that the official assessments of climate L&D significantly underestimate the impacts (Bharadwaj & Shakya, 2021).

Another important issue is that ‘Pacific Islands have limited access to commercial risk sharing products, due to insurance markets that are small or difficult to establish’ (SPREP, n.d.). Nevertheless, there have been a few initiatives since 2007 when the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative commenced. Recently, the Pacific Insurance and Climate Adaptation Programme (PICAP) was established in 2021 to (among other things) develop micro-insurance for the people of PSIDS.

4.2. The risk of maladaptation

Maladaptation increases loss and damage, although this might not be immediately apparent, and may itself result in irreversible loss, or may reinforce the current regional hegemony by further marginalizing PICTs. In November 2023, Australia and Tuvalu (a Pacific Island nation of 10,000 people) signed an agreement touted as the world’s first climate migration treaty, the ‘Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union’. This gives 280 people a year from Tuvalu the right to settle in Australia as in-effect climate refugees. However, in return Tuvalu appears to sign away some of its sovereignty. Without any intended irony the treaty starts by ‘reaffirming the Parties’ sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence;’ before stating that

Tuvalu shall mutually agree with Australia any partnership, arrangement or engagement with any other State or entity on ... [matters including but] not limited to defence, policing, border protection, cyber security and critical infrastructure, including ports, telecommunications and energy infrastructure. (Article 4)

The treaty has yet to be ratified by the Tuvalu Parliament. Writing for the Toda Peace Institute, Kitara and Farbotko (2023) state that the treaty ‘does not deliver climate justice for Tuvaluan people’ and is instead a deal which delivers on Australian defence ambitions. There are other less generous assessments mentioned in a National Indigenous Times article (McKay, 2023).

At the least, this raises the prospect that countries could trade key aspects of their existence as nation states for possible partial solutions to their climate risk. To some it is a solution, but to others it is maladaptive as it trades one existential threat for another.

4.3. The PICTs bring a different perspective

The PICTs are not hapless victims of climate change and recipients of loss and damage. They bring important perspectives

to the global narrative as for example when the 2017 COP was chaired by Fiji (Hasenkamp & Worliczek, 2018). The Pacific islands also bring strong arguments for climate justice – that they should be compensated for the loss and damage brought by the impacts of climate change as they have effectively no role in causing the change. Pacific youth insist that they are ‘not drowning, [but are] fighting’ (Titifanue et al., 2017) and have been at the forefront of global struggles for climate justice. A group of students from PICTs at Vanuatu’s law school took these arguments further. They have been instrumental, through the Vanuatu government and the UN General Assembly, in seeking an advisory opinion from the ICJ (International Court of Justice) on the obligations of states with respect to climate change and climate harm. As part of its procedure, the Court has asked for submissions from UN member states and is expected to give an opinion in 2024 (ICJ, 2023).⁷

Compensation (reparations or restitution) should address the concerns of the people of the Pacific rather than the standard measures of global organizations. There is a case for going further and ensuring that the needs of those outside the main towns who are far less visible are addressed – as mentioned earlier in this section. We have set out many of these issues in section 3 above.

Based on a review of the existing scientific literature on L&D and the manifestation of losses and damages beyond limits to adaptation in more general, a number of policy-relevant research gaps have been identified. These include the need for more focus on NELD and the experiences of people in the Pacific and elsewhere (McNamara & Jackson, 2019; McNamara et al., 2021), as well as the inclusion of traditional and place-based knowledge held by Pacific people.

5. Conclusions

The global narrative on L&D, based on neo-liberal thinking, market based financial instruments, and universally applied framing and procedures reflecting the priorities of multi-lateral financial organizations and their main sponsors, the industrialized countries, largely ignores the concerns of the people confronted with the potentially existential impacts of the climate crisis, particularly in the Global South. The concept in practice needs broadening to include those it is trying to help and their knowledge, interests and values. Assessing and managing losses and damages from climate change as part of a just transition involves a procedurally fair and shared approach between the people and communities concerned, governments, civil society organizations and international donors, which includes local and traditional knowledge.

The L&D narrative and policy discourse needs to be made much more inclusive. Focusing on the PICTs, we find that the importance of symbolism, culture, custom, religion, customary land (and sea) tenure, biodiversity, the local and the informal all need to be explicitly included in an integrated manner given their intertwined nature. This inclusion needs to keep in mind the great diversity across the Pacific both between states and territories and within their communities. Losses and damages from climate change are highly variable and have different implications for different groups such as women, youth,

subsistence farmers and fishers, and marginalized people – for example.

Justice and equity issues, across distributional, procedural, compensatory, representative and transitional forms of justice, need to be fully recognized here to help ensure that changes in the way climate change impacts are managed do not worsen people’s circumstances and disadvantage them further – for example, in communities that are facing the prospect of relocation. Our knowledge of how to support this to achieve fair outcomes in systems of informal and traditional governance is very limited, and needs attention in research and policy. Managing L&D as part of a just transition not only involves fostering outcome fairness in the form of distributional justice, but requires to that end a shared and procedurally just approach between the communities concerned, governments, civil society organizations and international donors. The responsibility is shared – there are other sectors with an inclusive shared cooperative approach which could be identified and drawn on for their lessons.

Notes

1. Anna Naupa, Murray Ackman, Patrick Tuimaleaifano ‘Boe Declaration: navigating an uncertain Pacific’ *The Interpreter* 3 October 2018, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/boe-declaration-navigating-uncertain-pacific>. For a review of Pacific Islander stakeholders’ perspectives on non-economic losses creating the risk of further losses, see Westoby, R, Clissold, R, McNamara, K. E., Latai-Niusulu, A., and Chandra, A. (2021) ‘Cascading loss and loss-risk multipliers amid a changing climate in the Pacific Islands’, *Ambio* <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-021-01640-9>. For a recent review emphasising that climatic conditions contribute to conflict in regions dependent on agriculture and in combination with other socioeconomic factors including low economic development and political marginalisation see: Vally Koubi ‘Climate Change and Conflict’ (2019) *22 Annual Review of Political Science* 343-360.
2. Note that here we may use Pacific islands, PICTs (Pacific Island Countries and Territories) and PSIDS (Pacific Small Island Developing States), interchangeably while acknowledging that there are differences. We also acknowledge that some prefer the term ‘large ocean states’.
3. See e.g. K. Warner et al. (2012) ‘Evidence from the frontlines of climate change: loss and damage to communities despite coping and adaptation’ Loss and Damage in Vulnerable Countries Initiative. Policy Report No 9. United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, Bonn, R Verheyen (2012) ‘Loss and Damage: Tackling Loss and Damage – a new role for the climate regime?’ Loss and Damage in Vulnerable Countries Initiative, J Morrissey and A Oliver-Smith (2013) ‘Perspectives on Non-Economic Loss and Damage: Understanding Values at Risk from Climate Change’ International Centre for Climate Change and Development, Dhaka. For recent legal analysis of the term see Meinhard Dolle and Sara Seck ‘Loss and damage from climate change: from concept to remedy?’ (2020) 20(6) *Climate Policy* 669–680
4. Within the UNFCCC, paragraph 51 of the COP21 Decision text takes liability and compensation off the table for L&D.
5. For discussion of these narratives see e.g. Epeli Hau’ofa (1994), ‘Our Sea of Islands’, *Contemporary Pacific* 6(1): 148-1616; Teresia Teaiwa (1996) ‘Review: A New Oceania: Rediscovery our Sea of Islands by Eric Waddell, Vijay Naidu and Epeli Hau’ofa’ 8(1) *The Contemporary Pacific* 214-217, Greg Fry ‘Framing the Islands: knowledge and power in changing Australian images of ‘the South Pacific’ (1997) 9(2) *Contemporary Pacific* 305-344, Tarcisius Kabutaulaka ‘Mapping the Blue Pacific in a Changing Regional

Order' in Graeme Smith and Terence Wesley-Smith (eds) *The China Alternative: Changing Regional Order in the Pacific Islands* (ANU Press, 2021) 41–69

6. To give just two examples, the most recent available data indicates that 88% of the population of Samoa attends one of six denominations and more than 99% of Papua New Guineans identify with a Christian church: Division of Census-Surveys and Demography (Samoa) *Samoa Socio-Economic Atlas 2016* (Government of Samoa, 2016), 28; National Statistical Office (Papua New Guinea) and ICF *Papua New Guinea Demographic and Health Survey 2016–2018* (NSO and ICF, 2019), 41.
7. This is a globally significant recent legal case supporting the argument that the Pacific brings a different view: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/20/from-vanuatu-law-school-to-the-hague-the-fight-to-recognise-climate-harm-in-international-law>.

Acknowledgements

We acknowledge with gratitude the support of our employers and granting organizations.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding

The IIASA authors were supported by funding from the Austrian Climate and Energy Fund, Austrian Climate Research Program (ACRP), Project TransLoss (Project Number B960205). Professor Monson was supported by an Australian Research Council DECRA grant (DE210100486).

Notes on contributors


John Handmer is an Emeritus Professor with the Equity and Justice Research Group at IIASA (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis) in Austria, and at RMIT University in Melbourne, Australia. He is a Fellow of the Australian Social Science Academy and works on justice and resilience for disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation.

Rebecca Monson is a Professor of Law at the Australian National University. Her work focuses on legal pluralism and natural resource management, particularly in the Pacific. In 2021–2022 she led the drafting of Solomon Islands' relocation guidelines, and she won the Australian Legal Research Awards book prize for *Gender, Property and Politics in the Pacific: Who Speaks for Land?* (Cambridge University Press 2023).

Thomas Schinko Leads the Equity and Justice Research Group in the IIASA Population and Just Societies Program. His research interests are in climate risk management and just transitions. He focuses on the assessment of socioeconomic impacts of climate risks, the identification of climate risk management strategies, and ethical and politico-economic aspects in the context of a just transition to a sustainable future.

ORCID

John Handmer  <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6674-7946>

Rebecca Monson  <http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7427-757X>

Thomas Schinko  <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1156-7574>

References

- Allen, M. (2015). Framing food security in the Pacific Islands: Empirical evidence from an island in the Western Pacific. *Regional Environmental Change*, 15(7), 1341–1353. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-014-0734-5>
- Allen, M., & Monson, R. (2014). Land and conflict in Papua New Guinea: The role of land mediation. *Security Challenges*, 10(2), 1–14.
- Anisimov, A., & Vallejo, L. (2019). *Loss and damage under the UNFCCC: Ways forward for the Warsaw International Mechanism*. <https://www.iddri.org/en/publications-and-events/issue-brief/loss-and-damage-under-unfccc-ways-forward-warsaw-international>
- AOSIS ((Alliance of Small Island States). (1991). *An insurance mechanism for the consequences of sea level rise*. <https://www.aosis.org/an-insurance-mechanism-for-the-consequences-of-sea-level-rise/>
- 'Atu Emberson Bain, Ed. (1994). *Sustainable development or malignant growth? Perspectives of Pacific Islander women*. Marama Publications.
- Australia – AusAID. (2008). *Making land work*. Vols. I and II. Commonwealth of Australia. 4, 29, 119.
- Bhagwan, J., Huffer, E., Koya-Vaka'uta, F. C., & Casimira, A. (Eds.). (2020). *From the deep: Pasifiki voices for a new story*. Pacific Theological College.
- Bharadwaj, R., & Shakya, C. (Eds.). (2021). *Loss and damage case studies from the frontline: A resource to support practice and policy*. IIED. <https://pubs.iied.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/2021-10/20551iied.pdf>
- Calliari, E. (2018). Loss and damage: A critical discourse analysis of Parties' positions in climate change negotiations. *Journal of Risk Research*, 21(6), 725–747. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2016.1240706>
- Calliari, E., & Ryder, B. (2023). What does loss and damage mean at the country level? A global mapping through nationally determined contributions. *Global Environmental Politics*, 23(3), 71–94. https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00725
- Calliari, E., Serdeczny, O.M., & Vanhala, L.C. (2020). Making sense of the politics in the climate change loss & damage debate. *Global Environmental Change*, 64(December 2019), 102133. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2020.102133>
- Case, E. (2019). I ka Piko, to the summit: Resistance from the mountain to the sea. *The Journal of Pacific History*, 54(2), 166–181. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00223344.2019.1577132>
- Chaudary, F. (2023, May 31). Tides threaten Fiji: 42 villages earmarked for relocation. *The Fiji Times*. <https://www.fijitimes.com/tides-threatening-fiji-42-villages-earmarked-for-relocation/>
- Ciplet, D. (2017). Subverting the status quo? Climate debt, vulnerability and counter-hegemonic frame integration in United Nations climate politics—a framework for analysis. *Review of International Political Economy*, 24(6), 1052–1075. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2017.1392336>
- Ciplet, D., & Roberts, J.T. (2017). Climate change and the transition to neoliberal environmental governance. *Global Environmental Change*, 46, 148–156. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2017.09.003>
- Climate Action Network. (2019, October 1–5). *Submission: Review of the Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage October 2019*. https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/201910231649—CANInternational_Submission_on_WIM_review_October_2019.pdf
- Climate Action Network International. (2023, October 20). *Developed countries hold up negotiations on Loss and Damage Fund as stalemate on location of the Fund undermines trust*. <https://climatenetwork.org/2023/10/20/developed-countries-hold-up-negotiations-on-loss-and-damage-fund-as-stalemate-on-location-of-the-fund-undermines-trust/>
- Climate Action Network International. (2024, November 23). *Betrayal in Baku: developed countries fail people and planet*. https://climatenetwork.org/2024/11/23/cop29_betrayal_in_baku/
- Clissold, R., McNamara, K.E., Westoby, R., & Chandra, A. (2021). Non-economic loss and damage: Insights from the Pacific Islands. *The Climate Analytics Blog*. <https://climateanalytics.org/blog/2021/non-economic-loss-and-damage-insights-from-the-pacific-islands/>
- Clissold, R., McNamara, K.E., & Westoby, R. (2022). Emotions of the Anthropocene across Oceania. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, 19(11), 6757. <https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19116757>
- Collins, J. (2022, January 18). Bang for buck: Getting the most out of Pacific islander remittances. *The Interpreter*. <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/bang-buck-getting-most-out-pacific-islander-remittances>

- Collins, J. (2023). *Reducing remittance costs in the Pacific Islands*. Lowry Institute Policy Brief. <https://www.lowryinstitute.org/sites/default/files/2023-10/COLLINS%2C%20Pacific%20remittances%2C%20PDF%20v5.pdf>.
- Doelle, M. (2014). The birth of the Warsaw loss & damage mechanism: Planting a seed to grow ambition? *Carbon & Climate Law Review* 35. SSRN Electronic Journal. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2389851>
- Doelle, M., & Seck, S. (2020). Loss and damage from climate change: From concept to remedy? *Climate Policy*, 20(6), 669–680. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2019.1630353>
- Dornan, M., & Pryke, J. (2017). Foreign aid in the Pacific: Trends and developments in the twenty-first century. *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, 4(3), 386. <https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.185>
- Duckworth, S. (2017). Hunger in the Solomon Islands. *The Borgen Project, blog*. <https://borgenproject.org/hunger-in-the-solomon-islands/>
- Durand, A., & Huq, S. (2015). *Defining loss and damage: Key challenges and considerations for developing an operational definition*. <http://icccad.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Defininglossanddamage-Final.pdf>
- Duvat, V.K.E., Magnan, A.K., Perry, C.T., Spencer, T., Bell, J.D., Wabnitz, C.C.C., Webb, A.P., White, I., McInnes, K.L., Gattuso, J.-P., Graham, N.A.J., Nunn, P.D., & Le Cozannet, G. (2021). Risks to future atoll habitability from climate-driven environmental changes. *WIREs Climate Change*, 12(3), e700. <https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.700>
- Fiji Bureau of Statistics. (2017). *Population by religion*. <https://www.statsfiji.gov.fj/statistics/social-statistics/population-and-demographicindicators/#religion>.
- Fitzpatrick, D., & Monson, R. (2022). Property rights and climate migration: Adaptive governance in the South Pacific. *Regulation & Governance*, 16(2), 519–535. <https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12365>
- Fry, G. (1997). Framing the Islands: Knowledge and power in changing Australian images of ‘the South Pacific’. *Contemporary Pacific*, 9(2), 305–344.
- Fry, I. (2022). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change. Promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change mitigation, loss and damage and participation. UN General Assembly, 77th Session. 26 July.
- Gach, E. (2019). Normative shifts in the global conception of climate change: The growth of climate justice. *Social Sciences*, 8(1), 24. <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8010024>
- Hallwright, J., & Handmer, J. (2021). Progressing the integration of climate change adaptation and disaster risk management in Vanuatu and beyond. *Climate Risk Management*, 31. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2020.100269>
- Handmer, J., & Nalau, J. (2019). Understanding loss and damage in Pacific small island developing states. In R. Mechler, L. M. Bouwer, T. Schinko, S. Surminski, & J. Linnerooth-Bayer (Eds.), *Loss and damage from climate change: Concepts, methods and policy options* (pp. 365–381). Springer International Publishing.
- Haque, T., Knight, D., Knight, D., & Jayasuriya, D. (2012, December 1). *Capacity constraints and public financial management in small Pacific Island countries*. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6297, SSRN. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2192835>
- Hasenkamp, O., & Worliczek, E. (2018). COP 23: A “Pacific COP” with “Islandised” outcomes? (COP Research Note). http://pacific-geographies.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PG49_COP23.pdf
- Hau’ofa, E. (1994). Our sea of islands. *The Contemporary Pacific*, 6(1), 148–161.
- Hay, J.E., & Sem, G. (2000). *Vulnerability and adaptation: Evaluation and regional synthesis of national assessments of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change SPREP*, vi.
- Hirsch, T. (2019). *Climate finance for addressing loss and damage. How to mobilize support for developing countries to tackle loss and damage*. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ClimateFinance_LossDamage.pdf
- ICJ (International Court of Justice). (2023). *Obligations of states in respect of climate change (request for advisory opinion)*. <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/187/187-20230420-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf>
- IIED & ICCCAD. (2021). *Climate change loss and damage – 1st deliberative dialogue*. Event report. <https://pubs.iied.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/2021-11/20346iied.pdf>
- ILO. (2021). Progress in organizing the informal economy in the Pacific. <https://www.ilo.org/resource/project-document/project-organizing-informal-economy-pacific>.
- INC. (1991). *Vanuatu: Draft Annex Relating to Article 23 (Insurance) for Inclusion in the Revised Single Text on Elements Relating to Mechanisms (A.AC.237/WG.II/Misc.13)* Submitted by the Co-chairmen of Working Group II A/AC.237/WG.II/CRP.8. <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/a/wg2crp08.pdf>
- IPCC. (2018). *Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change*. <https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/download/>
- IPCC. (2019). *Intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC) special report on oceans and the cryosphere in a changing climate*. World Meteorological Organization.
- James, R., Otto, F.E.L., Parker, H.R., Boyd, E., Cornforth, R.J., Mitchell, D., & Allen, M.R. (2014). Characterizing loss and damage from climate change. *Nature Climate Change*, 4(11), 938–939. <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2411>
- Jolly, M. (2018). Engendering the Anthropocene in Oceania: Fatalism, resilience, resistance. *Cultural Studies Review*, 25(2), 172–175.
- Jones, P. (2016). *The emergence of Pacific urban villages: Urbanization trends in the Pacific Islands*. Asian Development Bank.
- Kabutaulaka, T. (2021). Mapping the blue Pacific in a changing regional order. In G. Smith & T. Wesley-Smith (Eds.), *The China alternative: Changing regional order in the Pacific Islands* (pp. 41–69). ANU Press.
- Kitara, T., & Farbotko, C. (2023). *This is not climate justice: The Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union*. Toda Peace Institute. <https://toda.org/global-outlook/2023/this-is-not-climate-justice-the-australia-tuvalu-falepili-union.html>
- Klock, C., & Nunn, P.D. (2019). Adaptation to climate change in small Island developing states: A systematic review of academic research. *The Journal of Environment & Development*, 28(2), 196–218. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1070496519835895>
- LDC Climate Change. (2019). *Submission by Bhutan on behalf of the Least Developed Countries Group on possible elements to be included in the terms of reference for the review of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM)*. 22–25. [https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/201902181022—LDC submission on ToRs for review of the WIM.pdf](https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/201902181022—LDC%20submission%20on%20ToRs%20for%20review%20of%20the%20WIM.pdf)
- Leweniqila, I., & Vunibola, S. (2020). Food security in COVID-19: Insights from Indigenous communities. *Oceania; A Journal Devoted To the Study of the Native Peoples of Australia, New Guinea, and the Islands of the Pacific*, 90(1), 81–88. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ocae.5270>
- Maldonado, F., & Gallagher, K. P. (2022). Climate Change and IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis. The Task Force on Climate, Development and the International Monetary Fund (TCD IMF). https://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2022/02/TF_WP_005_FIN.pdf
- McAdam, J. (2020). Displacing evacuations: A blind spot in disaster displacement research. *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 39(4), 583–590. <https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdaa017>
- McDougall, D. (2008). *Religious institutions as alternative structures in post-conflict Solomon Islands? Cases from Western Province* (Discussion Paper 2008/5, State, Society and Governance in Melanesia, Australian National University).
- McDougall, Debra (2020) ‘Beyond rupture: Christian culture in the Pacific’ 31(2) *The Australian Journal of Anthropology* 203-209, 204 <https://doi.org/10.1111/taja.12364>
- McKay, B. (2023). *National Indigenous Times, Pacific doubts on Australia’s Tuvalu Pact*. <https://nit.com.au/14-11-2023/8614/pacific-doubts-on-australias-tuvalu-pact>
- McNamara, K.E., & Jackson, G. (2019). Loss and damage: A review of the literature and directions for future research. *WIREs Climate Change*, 10(2), 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.564>
- McNamara, K., & Westoby, R. (2011). Solastagia and the gendered nature of climate change: An example from Erub Island, Torres

- Strait. *EcoHealth*, 8(2), 233–236. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10393-011-0698-6>
- McNamara, K.E., Westoby, R., Clissold, R., & Chandra, A. (2021). Understanding and responding to climate-driven non-economic loss and damage in the Pacific Islands. *Climate Risk Management*, 33, 100336. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2021.100336>
- Mechler, R., Bower, L., Schinko, T., Surminski, S., & Linnerooth-Bayer, J. (2019). *Loss and damage from climate change: Concepts, principles and policy options*. Springer Open.
- Mechler, R., Singh, C., Ebi, K., Djalante, R., Thomas, A., James, R., Tschakert, P., Wewerinke-Singh, M., Schinko, T., Ley, D., Nalau, J., Bouwer, L. M., Huggel, C., Huq, S., Linnerooth-Bayer, J., Surminski, S., Pinho, P., Jones, R., Boyd, E., & Revi, A. (2020). Loss and Damage and limits to adaptation: recent IPCC insights and implications for climate science and policy. *Sustainability Science*, 15(4), 1245–1251. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-020-00807-9>
- Monson, R. (2014). Unsettled explorations of law's archives: The allure and anxiety of solomon islands' court records. *Australian Feminist Law Journal*, 40(1), 35–50. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13200968.2014.931882>
- Monson, R. (2022). Property, climate change and relocation. In Nicole Graham, Margaret Davies, & Lee Godden (Eds.), *The Routledge handbook of property, law and society* (pp. 86–98). Taylor & Francis.
- Monson, R. (2023). *Gender, property and politics in the Pacific: Who speaks for land?* Cambridge University Press.
- Monson, R., Allen, M., Maetala, R., Cox, J., Oakeshott, D., Sandy, M., & Bird, K. (2024). 18 Planning for climate mobility: Developing a relational approach to planned community relocation in Solomon Islands. In A. Neef, N. Pauli, & B. Salami (Eds.), *De Gruyter handbook of climate migration and climate mobility justice* (pp. 385–406). De Gruyter.
- Monson, R., Camacho, K. L., & Foukona, J. D. (2023). Re-storying law and development in Oceania. In R. Buchanan, L. Eslava, & S. Pahuja (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of international law and development, Oxford handbooks*. Oxford University Press.
- Monson, R., Camacho, K., & Foukona, J.D. (2023). The Pacific. In S. Pahuja, L. Eslava, & R. Buchanan (Eds.), *Oxford handbook on international law and development* (pp. 285–305). Oxford University Press.
- Monson, R., & Foukona, J. (2014). Climate-related displacement and options for resettlement in Solomon Islands. In S. Leckie (Ed.), *Land solutions for climate displacement* (pp. 291–316). Routledge.
- Mora, C., McKenzie, T., Gaw, I.M., Dean J.M., von Hammerstein, H., Knudson, T.A., Setter, R.O., Smith, C.Z., Webster, K.M., Jonathan A. Patz, J.A., & Franklin, E.C. (2022). Over half of known human pathogenic diseases can be aggravated by climate change. *Nature Climate Change*. <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-022-01426-1>
- Morrissey, J., & Oliver-Smith, A. (2013). *Perspectives on non-economic loss and damage: Understanding values at risk from climate change*. International Centre for Climate Change and Development.
- Nand, M.M., & Bardsley, D.K. (2020). Climate change loss and damage policy implications for Pacific Island Countries. *Local Environment*, 25(9), 725–740. DOI: 10.1080/13549839.2020.1825357
- NAP Global Network. (2017). *Strengthening gender considerations in Kiribati's national adaptation plan (NAP) process*. <http://napglobalnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/napgn-en-2017-strengthening-gender-considerations-kiribatis-nap-process.pdf>
- Naupa, A., Ackman, M., & Tuimaleaifano, P. (2018, October 3). Boe Declaration: Navigating an uncertain Pacific. *The Interpreter*. <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/boe-declaration-navigating-uncertain-pacific>
- NSO & ICF. (2019). *Papua New Guinea demographic and health survey 2016-2018* (p. 41). National Statistical Office.
- Oppenheimer, M., Glavovic, B.C., Hinkel, J., van de Wal, R., Magnan, A.K., Abd-Elgawad, A., Cai, R., Cifuentes-Jara, M., DeConto, R.M., Ghosh, T., Hay, J., Isla, F., Marzeion, B., Meyssignac, B., & Sebesvari, Z. (2019). Sea level rise and implications for low lying islands, coasts and communities. In H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, V. Masson-Delmotte, P. Zhai, M. Tignor, & E. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegria, M. Nicolai, A. Okem, J. Petzold, B. Rama, & N.M. Weyer. (Eds.), *IPCC special report on the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate*. World Meteorological Organization. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/3/2019/09/SROCC_FinalDraft_Annex1_Glossary.pdf
- Pacific Elders Voice. (2023, April 16). *AUKUS: Climate Security Overtaken by Defense*. Statement. <https://pacificelders.org/statement/aukus/>
- Pacific Islands Forum. (2018). *Boe declaration on regional security*.
- Pacific Islands Forum. (2022). *Communiqué of the 51st Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting 11–14 July 2022*.
- Ratuva, S., & Lawson, S. (Eds.). (2016). *The people have spoken: The 2014 elections in Fiji*. ANU Press.
- Roberts, E., & Huq, S. (2015). Coming full circle: The history of loss and damage under the UNFCCC. *International Journal of Global Warming*, 8(2), 141–157. <https://doi.org/10.1504/IJGW.2015.071964>
- Roberts, J.T., Natson, S., Hoffmeister, V., Durand, A., Weikmans, R., Gewirtzman, J., & Huq, S. (2017). How will we pay for loss and damage? *Ethics, Policy & Environment*, 20(2), 208–226. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2017.1342963>
- Roberts, E., & Pellings, M. (2019). Loss and damage: An opportunity for transformation? *Climate Policy*, 20(0), 758–771. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2019.1680336>
- Rodó, X., Adrià San-José, A., Kirchgatter, K., & López, L. (2021). Changing climate and COVID-19 pandemic: more than just heads or tails. *Nature Medicine*, 27(4), 576–579. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-021-01303-y>
- Ryle, J. (2005). Roots of land and Church: The Christian state debate in Fiji. *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church*, 5(1), 58–78. DOI: 10.1080/14742250500078071
- Samoa - Government of Samoa. (2016). *Samoa socio-economic atlas 2016* (p. 28). Division of Census-Surveys and Demography (Samoa).
- Schäfer, L., & Künzel, V. (2019). *Steps towards closing the Loss & Damage finance gap*. https://germanwatch.org/sites/germanwatch.org/files/Policy_Briefing_Steps_towards_closing_the_Loss_%26_Damage_finance_gap_0.pdf
- Schinko, T., Mechler, R., & Hochrainer-Stigler, S. (2019). The risk and policy space for loss and damage: Integrating notions of distributive and compensatory justice with comprehensive climate risk management. In R. Mechler, L. Bouwer, T. Schinko, S. Surminski, & J. Linnerooth-Bayer (Eds.), *Loss and damage from climate change* (pp. 83–110). Springer International Publishing.
- Serdeczny, O., & Lissner, T. (2023). Research agenda for the loss and damage fund. *Nature Climate Change*, 13(5), 412. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-023-01648-x>
- Serdeczny, O.M., Waters, E., & Chan, S. (2016). *Non-economic loss and damage: Understanding the challenges* (discussion paper 2016/3). https://climateanalytics.org/media/dp_neld_3.2016.pdf
- Slatter, C. (2012). Gender and custom in the South Pacific. *Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence*, 13-14, 89.
- Solomon Islands. (2022, July 2022). *Planned relocation guidelines 2022 (draft) Solomon Islands Government and International Organization for Migration*. 12 Ways ADB is Climate-Proofing Transport in the Pacific. <https://www.adb.org/news/features/12-ways-adb-climate-proofing-transport-pacific>
- SPREP (Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme). (n.d.). *SPREP paper on current approaches to adaptation and requirements for implementing loss and damage measures in the Pacific Island Region*. No pub details. https://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/cancun_adaptation_framework/loss_and_damage/application/pdf/sprep_paper_on_approaches_to_loss_and_damage.pdf
- Sultana, F. (2022). The unbearable heaviness of climate coloniality. *Political Geography*, 99, 102638.
- Talakai, M. (2015, June). *Loss and damage gap analysis from climate change vanuatu country report*. Secretariat of the Pacific Environmental Programme (SPREP) and GIZ.
- Teaiwa, T. (1996). Review: A new Oceania: Rediscovery our Sea of Islands by Eric Waddell, Vijay Naidu and Epeli Hau'ofa. *The Contemporary Pacific*, 8(1), 214–217.
- Teaiwa, K. (2014). *Consuming Ocean Island: Stories of people and phosphate from Vanava*. Indiana University Press.
- Teaiwa, K. (2018). Our rising sea of Islands: Pan-Pacific regionalism in the age of climate change. *Pacific Studies*, 41(1/2), 26.

- Teaiwa, K. (2020). On decoloniality: A view from Oceania. *Postcolonial Studies*, 23(4), 601–603. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13688790.2020.1751429>
- Thomas, A., & Benjamin, L. (2018). Management of loss and damage in small island developing states: Implications for a 1.5 °C or warmer world. *Regional Environmental Change*, 18(8), 2369–2378. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-017-1184-7>
- Thomas, A., Serdeczny, O., & Pringle, P. (2020). Loss and damage research for the global stocktake. *Nature Climate Change*, 10, 700. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0807-z>
- Titifanue, J., Kant, R., Finau, G., & Tarai, J. (2017). Climate change advocacy in the Pacific: The role of information and communication technologies. *Pacific Journalism Review*, 23(1), 133–149.
- Tomlinson, M., & McDougall, D. (Eds.). (2012). *Christian politics in oceania*. Berghahn Books.
- Tomlinson, M., & McDougall, D. L. (Eds.). (2013). *Christian politics in Oceania* (p. 3). Berghahn Books.
- Tonga - Government of Tonga. (2018). *Tonga labour force survey report: Analytical report* (Tonga Statistics Department, ILO and Statistics for Development Division of SPC).
- Tonga - Kingdom of Tonga. (2015). *Intended nationally determined contributions towards achieving the objective of the United Nations framework convention on climate change*. Tonga. <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Tonga%20First/Tonga%20INDC.pdf>
- UNFCCC. (2015). *Paris Agreement*. https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf
- US State Department. (2022). *Report on international religious freedom: Fiji*. <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/fiji/>
- Vanhala, L., Calliari, E., & Thomas, A. (2023). Understanding the politics and governance of climate change loss and damage. *Global Environmental Politics*, 23(3), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_e_00735
- Vanhala, L., & Hestbaek, C. (2016). Framing climate change loss and damage in UNFCCC negotiations. *Global Environmental Politics*, 16(4), 111–129.
- Verheyen, R. (2012). Loss and damage: Tackling loss and damage – A new role for the climate regime? *Loss and Damage in Vulnerable Countries Initiative*, 1–12. <https://www.lossanddamagecollaboration.org/publication/tackling-loss-damage-a-new-role-for-the-climate-regime>
- Wallimann-Helmer, I. (2015). Justice for climate loss and damage. *Climatic Change*, 133(3), 469–480. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-015-1483-2>
- Walsh, K.J.E., Camargo, S.J., Knutson, T.R., Kossin, J., Lee, T.-C., Murakami, H., & Patricola, C. (2019). Tropical cyclones and climate change. *Tropical Cyclone Research and Review*, 8(4), 240–250. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcr.2020.01.004>
- Warner, K., van der Geest, K., Soenke, K., Huq, S., Harmeling, S., Koen, K., & de Sherbinin, A. (2012). *Evidence from the frontlines of climate change: Loss and damage to communities despite coping and adaptation*’ Loss and Damage in Vulnerable Countries Initiative. Policy Report No 9. United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security.
- Warner, K., & van der Geest, K. (2013). Loss and damage from climate change: Local-level evidence from nine vulnerable countries. *International Journal of Global Warming*, 5(4), 367–386. <https://doi.org/10.1504/IJGW.2013.057289>
- Warrick, O., Aalbersberg, W., Dumar, P., McNaught, R., & Teperman, K. (2017). The ‘Pacific Adaptive Capacity Analysis Framework’: Guiding the assessment of adaptive capacity in Pacific island communities. *Regional Environmental Change*, 17(4), 1039–1051. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-016-1036-x>
- Weir, T., Dovey, L., & Orcherton, D. (2017). Social and cultural issues raised by climate change in Pacific Island countries: an overview. *Regional Environmental Change*, 17(4), 1017–1028. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-016-1012-5>
- Westoby, R., Clissold, R., McNamara, K.E., Latai-Niusulu, A., & Chandra, A. (2021). Cascading loss and loss risk multipliers amid a changing climate in the Pacific Islands. *Ambio*, 51, 1239–1246. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-021-01640-9>
- Williams, E. (2020). Attributing blame?—Climate accountability and the uneven landscape of impacts, emissions, and finances. *Climatic Change*, 161(2), 273–290. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02620-5>
- WIM (Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage). (2013). *Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate change impacts*. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/769470>
- World Bank. (2019). *Enhancing the economic participation of vulnerable young women in Solomon Islands: Community access and urban services enhancement project*. The World Bank Group.
- WPF & PC (World Food Program and Pacific Community). (2018). Food security in vulnerable islands: A regional food security atlas of the Pacific. WFP/PC. [chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000071751/download/](https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000071751/download/)
- Yates, O. E. T., Manuela, S., Neef, A., & Groot, S. (2022). Reshaping ties to land: A systematic review of the psychosocial and cultural impacts of Pacific climate-related mobility. *Climate and Development*, 14(3), 250–267. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2021.1911775>
- Zorn, J.C., & Corrin Care, J. (2008). ‘Barava Tru’: Judicial approaches to pleading and proof of custom in the South Pacific. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 51(3), 611–639. <https://doi.org/10.1093/iclq/51.3.611>