





PROGRESS OF MAJOR EMITTERS TOWARDS CLIMATE TARGETS



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2025 update

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INTRODUCTION

The Paris Agreement is the primary mechanism for international cooperation and coordination in tackling climate change, providing a durable framework to guide the global effort on climate change mitigation and adaptation (UNFCCC, 2015; United Nations, 2025). The Agreement requires each signing Party to prepare, communicate, and maintain successive Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) that they intend to achieve by means of domestic mitigation measures.

year of publication of this report, 2025, is an important year for climate action, with Parties needing to submit their new NDCs which should contain more ambitious targets and measures for 2035. It is imperative that these targets mark an increase in ambition, and that this ambition is supported by forming and implementing the necessary respective climate policies. As of 15 October 2025, 62 Parties have submitted new NDCs (conditional and unconditional), covering approximately 31% of global emissions (World Resources Institute, 2025). However, many countries either lack the necessary policies to support their 2030 and 2035 NDC targets or fail to implement existing policies to meet them. This results in a global implementation gap, suggesting that emissions may exceed those projected by the NDC targets under current policies (den Elzen et al., 2022; UNEP, 2023).





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OVERVIEW OF METHODS

For this annual report, we estimate the effect of current policies on future greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) and assess select countries' progress towards their climate targets as established in their NDCs, consistent with our previous updates (Nascimento et al., 2024). Our current policies scenario assumes no further mitigation beyond currently adopted climate policies per country (Nascimento et al., 2022; Roelfsema et al., 2022). Our definition of policies includes legislative decisions, as well as executive orders or their equivalent but excludes publicly announced plans or strategies, that are not supported by additional policy instruments. We estimate absolute emissions associated with countries' NDC targets based on the information presented in the official documents.

We subsequently compare the projected emissions under the current policies scenario with the respective 2030 and 2035 emissions targets of the NDC scenario. In this report, we do not evaluate the ambition of the NDC targets themselves. Instead, we compare countries' policies to their self-determined NDC targets hence providing evidence of progress towards them. Emissions resulting from the new NDCs by 2035 are only included in the analysis if the NDC in question was submitted before October 15, 2025. All current policies emission level projections, as well as NDC targets in this report are reported in Global Warming Potential (GWP) consistent with the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (IPCC, 2021).

The NewClimate Institute current policies scenario for energy and industry sectors is informed by the Climate Action Tracker (Climate Action Tracker, 2022; Nascimento and Höhne, 2023). The calculations use existing scenarios from national and international studies, such as IEA's World Energy Outlook 2024 (IEA, 2024) and APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook (APERC, 2022). In addition, the projections include calculations of the effect of individual policies in different subsectors (Kuramochi et al., 2021) and the implications of policy cancellations, such as those recently enacted in the United States of America under the One Big Beautiful Bill.

PBL's current policies scenario is prepared using the IMAGE integrated assessment modelling framework (Stehfest et al., 2014), including a global climate policy model (FAIR), a detailed energy-system model (TIMER), and a land-use model (IMAGE land). The calculations use an SSP2 pathway as a baseline (no additional climate policy), as implemented in IMAGE (van Vuuren et al., 2021). Current climate and energy policies are identified in the service contract for DG CLIMA and the ELEVATE project (2025) and subtracted from the baseline (Roelfsema et al., 2022; Dafnomilis et al., 2023). For countries included as part of a larger IMAGE region (Australia, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation), we downscaled emission projections using the country's share of regional emissions in 2023 as a constant scaling factor. Policies until 2035 or beyond were considered per country, as identified in the Methodological Annex. In the case of a country not yet having adopted climate policies to 2035, the method used to extend projections followed two key assumptions: a) the policy remains in place post-2030, for example, a carbon price established to meet targets by 2030 is

maintained at the same level until 2035; and b) specific targets, such as a renewable energy mix by 2030, are treated as a minimum threshold in the IMAGE model. This means that the target cannot fall below those levels in the future, although future development is determined based on existing model dynamics such as technology cost and learning rate developments. Changes in policy projections in the absence of new policy adoption can also be attributed to a significant overhaul of the IMAGE model's internal assumptions and dynamics: historical energy data, renewable energy potentials, technology costs and learning rates were updated in preparation for IMAGE's scenario submission to the IPCC Seventh Assessment Report, thereby affecting regional emission projections as well. Finally, our USA projections take into account the rollback of climate policies under the One Big Beautiful Bill.

IIASA quantified land-use current policies scenario projections using the GLOBIOM-G4M modelling framework that includes the global land-use model GLOBIOM (Havlík et al., 2014) and global forest model G4M for all 25 economies analysed in this report (Gusti and Kindermann, 2011). IMAGE, GLOBIOM, and G4M use the SSP2 baseline (no additional climate policy) as a starting point for the projections (Fricko et al., 2017). However, bioenergy demand is based on the World Energy Outlook 2023 as published by IEA (IEA, 2023). The effect of individual policies is calculated by GLOBIOM and G4M using a country-specific carbon price, which is set at a level to ensure that the policies are successfully implemented by the target date (Kuramochi et al., 2021). The impact of climate change and natural disturbances is not accounted for in the land use projections.

We include a detailed description of models, methods, and assumptions in the Methodological Annex accompanying this report. It provides more information about historical emissions data sources and the harmonisation of emissions projections to the historical data (\rightarrow Annex A2), quantification of NDC emissions levels (\rightarrow Annex A3), general descriptions of calculation methods used by NewClimate Institute, PBL, and IIASA to quantify emissions projections under current policies (\rightarrow Annexes A4 to A6), countries' emissions per capita and per GDP (\rightarrow Annex A7) and a list of the main policies quantified in the projections (\rightarrow Annex A8).

/ \ 03

KEY FINDINGS

3.1 EMISSION PROJECTIONS UNDER CURRENT POLICIES

In this section, we provide aggregate emissions values and discuss general emissions trends for the 25 countries analysed in this report. Greenhouse gas emission trajectories serve as a useful, though as of yet incomplete, indicator of overall progress towards the global climate goal. This annual appraisal can therefore inform multilateral processes that aim to support global ambition-raising efforts.

GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS MAY PEAK BEFORE 2030—IF COUNTRIES FULLY IMPLEMENT POLICIES CURRENTLY IN FORCE

Together, the group of 25 countries analysed in this report emitted approximately 38.6 GtCO₂e in 2019. Although emissions dropped in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, they rebounded and surpassed the 2019 levels by 2021. However, the rate of increase has since then slowed down, largely due to projections that China will peak its GHG emissions before 2030. This suggests that, for the first time in recent years, the emissions trajectory of this group of countries might be starting to reverse.

Our analysis shows that total emissions under current policies could peak by 2026 at around 39.5 GtCO₂e (average of our projections range). We project that by 2030, aggregated emissions for the 25 countries will reach 36.3 to 40.1 GtCO2e. While the upper range of our projections remains at the same level as our last year's report, the lower end is approximately 1.5 GtCO2e higher. The revision in policies and methodological approaches (see also -> Section 2), and, mostly, the rollback of policies and regulations in the USA are responsible for this upwards shift in the short term. By 2035 however, while the upper range sees only a modest decline in emissions, our lower end of projections declines at a much higher rate: emissions under current policies are projected to reach 32.8 to 39.1 GtCO2e. This downward trend in our emission projections occurs despite the current policy rollbacks in the USA, where most of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) climate funding as well as Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations were repealed - due to the Trump administration's signing of the 'One Big Beautiful Bill' and other executive orders. If the situation reverses (and holds) this trend could imply a further reduction in our range of projections. According to our assessment, the difference in projected emission levels in the USA between the current situation and one where the rollbacks did not materialize is approximately an increase of 1 GtCO₂e by 2030 and 1.5 GtCO₂e by 2035.

EMISSION PROJECTIONS REMAIN ON A DOWNWARDS TREND, DESPITE A DECREASE IN THE USA EMISSION REDUCTION RATE

Tab. 1 Key metrics of our 2025 report update

Data refers to aggregated emissions and considers the 25 countries analysed Assuming full implementation of existing policies, our current policies scenario projects a reduction in emissions by 2035 in its lower projection, whereas it results in a 'plateauing' of the emission trajectory in its higher projection. The upper end of the projected emissions range shows a growth of 0.1% per year between 2021 and 2035, while the lower end projects a decrease of 1% per year.

| Comparison metric | 2024 report | 2025 report |
|------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| 2025 aggregated emissions | 37.9 to 41.4 GtCO₂e* | 38.8 to 40.2 GtCO₂e |
| 2030 aggregated emissions | 34.7 to 40.4 GtCO₂e* | 36.3 to 40.1 GtCO₂e |
| 2035 aggregated emissions | - | 32.8 to 39.1 GtCO₂e |
| Change between 2015 and 2035 | - | -14% to +3% |
| Change between 2019 and 2035 | - | -15% to +1% |


Corrected for GWP AR6.

→ Figure 2 shows emission projections under current policies for the main emitting countries. Emissions are projected to decrease or stabilise in 15 out of the 25 countries analysed. In nine of these, emissions are projected to decrease between 2021 and 2035. In the European Union (EU), emissions under current policies are projected to fall by almost 45% in this period. Projected emissions for Japan, the Republic of Korea and Australia show a decline between 35-40% in this period, while Brazil, Canada and the United Kingdom (UK) show emission reductions of 15-20%. The projected annual rates of emissions for certain countries in this category like the EU, Japan and the Republic of Korea (-> Sections 4.9,-> 4.13 and-> 4.16, respectively), are similar to our previous report however the same does not hold for China, the United States of America (USA) or Australia. For China, emissions are projected to decrease by 10 to 20% between 2021 and 2035, following a peak around 2025 and a period of stabilizing emissions up to 2030. China surpassed its 2030 target of 1,200 GW of installed wind and solar capacity by 2025, and according to our projection will achieve the 3,600 GW and the over 30% share of non-fossil fuels in total energy consumption targets by 2035. These achievements, along with revised forecasts of renewable energy costs, has led to declining emissions projections through 2035 (-> Section 4.5). In the USA, rollbacks on almost all IRA programs and several EPA regulations have led to higher emissions projections compared to last year, reducing the projected decline between 2021 and 2030 to 3%, compared to 12% in our previous report (-> Section 4.24). For Australia, a significant decrease in Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (LULUCF) projections contributes to a decline in emission levels compared to our previous report, with the lower end of the range reflecting an optimistic scenario in which the government's 82% renewable electricity target for 2030 is achieved (-> Section 4.2 for details).

Fig. 2
Overview of emissions projections (including land use) under current policies

Colours indicate the emissions trend between 2021 and 2035 Countries projected to **decrease** emissions towards 2035 Countries projected to **stabilise*** emissions towards 2035 Countries projected to **increase** emissions towards 2035

We consider that emissions stabilise when the percentage change based on the middle of the range falls within 10%.



In six of the twenty-five countries researched for this report, current policies are insufficient to curb emissions growth. These are Colombia, Mexico, Morocco, the Russian Federation, South Africa and Türkiye. These countries are, however, expected to result in a rough stabilization of emissions in the coming decade. Countries with stabilizing emissions can be economies that are projected to slow down or stall in the coming years (Russia, Mexico, South Africa) (IMF, 2025), or countries that despite projected economic growth have policies in places to counteract the projected emissions increase – even if these policies have not yet materialized (Colombia, Morocco and Türkiye – Sections 4.6, \rightarrow 4.15 and \rightarrow 4.21 in this report).

Emissions are projected to increase in the remaining ten countries. In Argentina, Ethiopia, Iran, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), emissions are projected to rise by 10 to 25% between 2021 and 2035. In Saudi Arabia and Indonesia emissions are projected to increase by approximately 30% during this period, while in Egypt and India the projected emissions increase is 40% and 47%, respectively, in the same timeframe. India, with revised policies regarding lower renewable deployment than previously assumed, is projected to remain on a continuously increasing emissions path until 2035 (—> Section 4.10). Finally, in Viet Nam, emissions are expected to grow by approximately 75% between 2021 and 2035. Therefore, since these ten countries are unlikely to effectively decrease emissions in the coming decade, supporting emissions reductions is key to keeping the global climate goal within reach.

Our findings show that, aggregated, these twenty-five countries we analysed, result in emission levels of -6 to +4% relative to 2019 levels by 2030. This indicates that they remain off track to meet the collective goal of the Paris Agreement, which requires global emissions to be 28% or 43% below 2019 levels by 2030 in order to limit global warming to well below 2°C or 1.5°C respectively (IPCC, 2023b). While aggregated emissions are on a downwards trend, policy revisions and rollbacks threaten to stall this reduction rate. To realise the emissions peak and decline we project for this group of twenty-five countries in the coming years, it is fundamental to ensure that adopted policies are also fully implemented.

It is important to note that methodological revisions in our models and underlying technological assumptions do affect our projections. Significant changes in the IMAGE model's internal assumptions for example, as discussed in \rightarrow Section 2, have led to changes in South Africa's policy projections, even though no new policies have been identified and implemented for this country. Such changes have impacts on all countries' projections, although the update of policies is the main driving factor for projection changes in the majority of the emitters discussed in this report.

3.2 STATUS OF THE 2035 NDCs

2025 is a pivotal moment in climate action, as it signifies the year where the 3rd round update of NDCs takes place. These 2035 NDCs not only reveal how much further global ambition has moved toward limiting global temperature rise and avoiding the worst climate impacts, but they are also expected to reflect the outcomes of the 2023 Global Stocktake, the first comprehensive assessment of global climate progress under the Paris Agreement (Srouji, 2025). The first Global Stocktake outcome recognized that progress has been made towards the Paris Agreement goals, reaching near-universal climate action. However, it also stated clearly that these efforts are insufficient and that the world is not on track to meet the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, with the window of opportunity to get back on track narrowing rapidly (UNFCCC, 2025b).

Tab. 2 Summary of new 2035 mitigation pledges of the major emitters that are presented in this report

As of 15 October 2025, 62 Parties have submitted new NDCs, covering approximately 31% of global emissions (World Resources Institute, 2025).

Table 2 below presents the mitigation pledges of the major emitters discussed in this report, including the announcements made from countries during the Climate Summit 2025.

| Country | 2030 NDC | 2035 NDC |
|---------------------|--|--|
| Australia | Reduce emissions by 43% below 2005 by 2030 | Reduce emissions by 62-70% below 2005 by 2035 |
| Brazil | Reduce emissions to 1.32 GtCO₂e by 2025 and 1.23 GtCO₂e by 2030 | Reduce emissions by 59–67% below 2005 by 2035 |
| Canada | Reduce emissions by 40–45% below 2005 by 2030 | Reduce emissions by 45–50% below 2005 by 2035 |
| China | Peak carbon dioxide emissions before 2030; lower carbon intensity by over 65% in 2030 from 2005 ; reduce the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 25% in 2030; increase forest stock volume by around 6 billion m3 in 2030 from 2005; and increase the installed capacity of wind and solar power to over 1,200 GW by 2030 | Reduce economy-wide net greenhouse gas emissions by 7% to 10% in 2035 from peak levels; increase share of non-fossil fuels in total energy consumption to over 30%; expand installed capacity of wind and solar power to over six times 2020 levels, striving to bring the total to 3,600 GW; and scale up total forest stock volume to over 24 billion m3 (announcement only) |
| Colombia | Limit emissions to 169 MtCO₂e in 2030 and to peak emissions by 2027 | Limit emissions to 160–165 MtCO₂e in 2035 (declarative version) |
| Ethiopia | Reduce emissions by 14% (unconditional) and by 68.8% (conditional) below a Business-as-Usual (BAU) scenario by 2030 | Reduce emissions by 40.7% (unconditional) and by 70.3% (conditional) below a revised BAU by 2035 |
| European Union (EU) | Reduce emissions by at least 55% below 1990 by 2030 | Reduce emissions by 66.25–72.5% below 1990 by 2035 (announcement only) |
| Japan | Reduce emissions by 46% below 2013 by 2030 | Reduce emissions by 60% below 2013 by 2035 |
| Morocco | Reduce emissions by 45.5% below BAU by 2030, of which 18.3% unconditional and 27.2% conditional reductions | Reduce emissions by 53% below BAU by 2035, of which 21.6% unconditional and 31.4% conditional reductions |

| Country | 2030 NDC | 2035 NDC |
|--------------------------|---|--|
| Russian Federation | Reduce emissions to 70% of 1990 levels by 2030 | Reduce emissions to 65–67% of 1990 levels by 2035 (announcement only) |
| Türkiye | Reduce emissions by 41% below BAU by 2030 | Reduce emissions by 465 MtCO₂e compared to BAU , to 640 MtCO₂e by 2035 (announcement only) |
| United Arab Emirates | Limit emissions to 182 MtCO₂e by 2030 | Reduce emissions by 47% below 2019 baseline by 2035 (105 MtCO₂e in 2035) |
| United Kingdom | Reduce emissions by 68% below 1990 by 2030 | Reduce emissions by 81% below 1990 by 2035 |
| United States of America | Reduce emissions by 50–52% below 2005 levels by 2030 | Reduce emissions by 61–66% below 2005 levels by 2035 |

On January 20th, 2025, President Trump signed an executive order mandating the USA's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, to take effect one year later. The NDC targets have been removed from the official USA government site but are still accessible in the UNFCCC database.

3.3 PROGRESS TOWARDS THE 2030 AND 2035 NDC TARGETS

The outcome of the first Global Stocktake—the mechanism aimed at assessing collective progress towards the Paris Agreement—in Dubai COP28, recognized that progress has been made towards the Paris Agreement goals, reaching near-universal climate action. However, it also restated that these efforts remain insufficient and that the world is not on track to meet the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2025a). It therefore called for countries that did not yet do so to strengthen their NDC 2030 targets before the end of 2024 to align with the climate goal of the Paris Agreement and provided direction for the next round of NDCs due in 2025 (UNFCCC, 2023). Before COP30 in 2025, all Parties to the Paris Agreement are expected to submit more ambitious NDCs with targets for 2035. Ideally, these NDCs should also include more ambitious targets for 2030, as these targets remain insufficient to align with the long-term climate goal of the Paris Agreement. Despite that, not all countries have submitted a 2035 NDC target, and, since our latest 2024 report, none of the 25 countries analyzed have updated their NDCs to include more ambitious targets for 2030.

However, adopting ambitious targets alone is insufficient to reduce emissions. Achieving the climate goal of the Paris Agreement requires not only setting higher targets but also implementing sufficient policies to support them (Nascimento et al., 2023). In this report, report, as stated in the introduction, we assess whether signing countries are making adequate progress towards their current NDC targets. Specifically, we compare countries' emissions projections based on current policies with their NDC targets for 2030 and 2035.

Due to uncertainty in the formulation of targets and the quantification of current policies, we cannot always state with certainty whether a country is on track to meet their targets (den Elzen et al., 2023). In some cases, this uncertainty is driven by a lack of transparency regarding the NDC target—for example, when a country does not specify the reference used in the formulation of its target. In other cases, this uncertainty is explained by different interpretations of the impact of a policy

Fig. 3


Comparison of economy-wide emissions projections under current policies and unconditional NDC targets in 2030 and 2035 for all 25 countries, except Egypt which only has a conditional target


The percentages are calculated by comparing the full range of the NDC target and current policies scenarios and presented as a share of the current policy value in 2030 and 2035

or varied assumptions regarding macroeconomic drivers. To account for some of this uncertainty, we estimate the effect of policies using different modelling approaches (-> Section 2).

We consider that a country is on track to meet its NDC target when the entire range of its current policies scenario falls below the NDC target (in blue in \rightarrow Figure 3). A country could be on track if part of its current policies scenario range is below the target (in yellow in \rightarrow Figure 3). In certain cases, when only a small share of the policy scenario is below the NDC target, we state that the country could be on track but is likely off track to meet its target. In this latter case, the country would only meet its targets if the implementation of its policies aligned with the most ambitious interpretation of their impact. The other countries are considered as being projected to miss their targets (in purple in \rightarrow Figure 3).

a) Countries that submitted 2030 NDC targets





b) Countries that submitted 2035 NDC targets

FIFTEEN COUNTRIES COULD BE ON TRACK TO MEET THEIR UNCONDITIONAL 2030 NDCs WITH EXISTING POLICIES

Based on our latest projections, fifteen countries are likely on track to meet their unconditional NDC targets (Figure 3a). Nine of these countries are clearly on track since they have the full range of the current policy scenario below the unconditional NDC targets (in blue in Figure 3a). This is true for Iran, Viet Nam, the Russian Federation, India, Indonesia, Türkiye, Morocco, Ethiopia and Australia. These countries are projected to meet their unconditional targets without adopting additional policies—although they still need to implement the ones already in place. These countries are well-positioned to substantially enhance their unconditional NDC targets and help close the global ambition gap. Morocco is classified in this category as its current policy projections falls within 2% of its declared NDC target.

Six additional countries could be on track as they have part of their current policies scenario range fall below their 2030 unconditional NDC targets (in yellow in → Figure 3a)—China, South Africa, the EU, Mexico, Thailand and Saudi Arabia. They are well-positioned to increase the ambition of their unconditional NDC targets but need to ensure that their current policies are fully implemented according to their most ambitious interpretation. For the EU, the range in our projections is explained by policies adopted at different governance levels (EU level for our lower limit of projections vs Member State level for our upper limit). The EU is classified in this

category as their current policy projections based on the EU-level falls within 2% of its declared NDC target. The range indicates that further action is necessary in member states to ensure the implementation of EU-level policies.


NINE COUNTRIES NEED TO EXPAND POLICY ADOPTION TO MEET THEIR UNCONDITIONAL NDCs

Fig. 4
Comparison of economy-wide emissions projections under current policies and conditional NDC targets in 2030 and 2035


The percentages are calculated by comparing the full range of the NDC target and current policies scenarios and presented as a share of the current policy value in 2030 and 2035

Based on our latest current policies projections, nine countries are off track to meet their unconditional NDC targets (in purple in \rightarrow Figure 3a). In these countries, the full range of emissions projected in the current policies scenario is higher than their unconditional NDC targets. This is the case in Colombia, Brazil, the UK, Canada, the Republic of Korea, Argentina, Japan, the UAE and the USA. These countries face a national implementation gap and need to adopt additional policies or substantially strengthen existing ones to meet their unconditional NDC targets for 2030. In Brazil and Colombia, the land use sector contributes significantly to emissions. Swift adoption and enforcement of policies in this sector will be crucial for closing the implementation gap.

a) Countries that submitted 2030 NDC targets



b) Countries that submitted 2035 NDC targets



CERTAIN COUNTRIES ARE ALSO ON TRACK TO MEET THEIR CONDITIONAL NDC TARGETS

Nine of the countries analysed have conditional NDC targets, with Egypt being the only country that has committed solely to a conditional target (-> Figure 4a). In all cases, the conditional NDC targets are more ambitious than the unconditional ones and are tied to specific requests for international support.

Among these countries, three are on track to meet their most ambitious conditional NDC targets, while five are projected to miss theirs. India, Iran, and Egypt are on track to meet their conditional NDC targets without adopting any additional measures. These countries could use the next ambition-raising cycle to reconsider the conditionality of their pledges or to substantially increase the ambition of their targets.

Indonesia could be on track to meet its 2030 conditional NDC target as almost 50% of its current policy projection range is below that target. In contrast, Ethiopia, Morocco, Mexico, Thailand, and Viet Nam are off track and need to adopt additional policies to meet their conditional targets. In these cases, international support will play an important role in supporting the adoption of more ambitious national climate policies. These countries could use the next NDC ambition-raising cycle to concretise the support needed to close the gap between their current policies and the conditional targets (Nascimento et al., 2023).

EIGHT COUNTRIES OFF TRACK TO MEET THEIR 2035 NDCs—BUT SIX COULD BE ON TRACK

Among the fourteen countries that have submitted or announced a 2035 NDC target, our projections indicate that eight are off track to meet said targets based on our projections (in purple in —> Figure 3b). This is the case for Canada, Brazil, Colombia, Ethiopia, Japan, the USA, the UAE and the UK, as the full range of their emissions projections under current policies is higher than their 2035 unconditional NDC targets.

Australia, the EU and Morocco could be on track to meet their unconditional NDC targets, if emissions follow the lower end of our current policies scenario (in yellow in → Figure 3b). For Australia, any uncertainties in the current policies scenario are partly driven by policies adopted at different governance levels, particularly those adopted by different subnational territories. As explained above, for the EU, projections under current policies adopted at the EU level reach the higher end of the 2035 NDC target, but those based on Member State policies do not, highlighting the need to ensure effective implementation at the national level. It should be noted as well that the post-2030 policy framework for the EU will follow an amendment of the European Climate Law, so current policies are not reflecting fully what the EU will do to reach its post-2030 targets.

Finally, three countries, China, the Russian Federation and Türkiye are on track to meet their 2035 unconditional NDC targets, since they have the full range of the current policy scenario below their unconditional NDC targets (in blue in -> Figure 3b).

Of the 25 countries analysed in this report, two countries, Ethiopia and Morocco, have published 2035 conditional NDC targets. In both cases, the conditional targets are more ambitious than the unconditional ones and depend on international support. Both countries are off track to meet their conditional targets (in purple in —> Figure 4b). Achieving these targets will require the adoption of additional policies, with international support playing a key role in enabling more ambitious national climate action.

Box 1

Comparing intensity indicators across scenarios

Absolute emissions vary substantially among scenarios and countries (Figure 2). As countries have vastly different populations and economies, making direct comparisons of absolute emissions – such as between China and Egypt – is less insightful. Therefore, we present an overview of emissions per capita and per gross domestic product (GDP) for the 25 countries analysed across different scenarios (Figure 5). In general, trends in per capita emissions and emissions intensity remain similar to our previous report of 2024.


The disparities in per capita emissions among countries are estimated to remain substantial by 2030 (\rightarrow Figure 5). The average per capita emissions in 2030 (calculated as the average of the per capita value for each country) are projected to reach 8.3 tCO₂e (range: 2.0 to 22.5 tCO₂e).

NDC targets do not necessarily translate into reductions in emissions per capita compared to historical values. In Iran and the Russian Federation, for example, emissions per capita based on their NDC targets are projected to almost double compared to 2019 levels. Alternatively, the NDC targets of many other countries, such as Colombia, Canada and the United Kingdom, result in emissions per capita that approximately halve between 2019 and 2030. Although this is positive, it is important to note that most of these countries depart from much higher per capita levels.

In both NDC and current policies scenarios, we project that the emissions intensity of the economy will almost halve in many countries: Australia, Canada, the EU, the Republic of Korea and the UK. In several cases, NDC targets imply that emissions intensity will be substantially lower than historical levels, as seen in Brazil, Colombia and Ethiopia.

Fig. 5 Emissions intensity per capita and GDP in 2030

Comparison between current policies, NDC targets and historical 2019 levels



The NDC target figures refer to unconditional targets, except for Egypt.

/ / O4

EMISSION PROJECTIONS PER COUNTRY

This chapter summarises the resulting greenhouse gas emission projections per country. We do not evaluate the ambition or adequacy of the NDC targets but rather assess countries' progress towards these targets based on their adopted policies. We will examine each country individually, looking at the targets, whether the country in question is on track or not, and any noticeable recent developments as part of our annual update.

In our report, we express CO₂ equivalent emission projections in terms of global warming potentials of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2023a). In the tables explaining the NDC targets or net-zero targets, we specify either "GHG" (which refers to all greenhouse gases) or "CO₂" (for carbon dioxide only) to clarify the official scope of the net-zero or NDC target. However, our projections and historical data always encompass all greenhouse gases.

The sectoral coverage for emission indicators in the factsheets is consistent with the NDC targets for 2030 and 2035 (where that is applicable). In other words, when the NDC target excludes land use, we exclude land use from our historical data and current policy projections. The term 'land use' in the figures refers to LULUCF emissions and removals

For the calculation of per capita emissions, we use population projections (median variant) from the UN population statistics (United Nations, 2024). For the calculation of emissions per Gross Domestic Product (GDP), we used the GDP projections (based on market exchange rates) from the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2025).

As stated in Section 2, changes in emission projection can be attributed, apart from updates in climate policies, to methodological updates, model assumption revisions and historical data re-assessments. Unless a significant update causes a visible change in our projection estimates, small changes in projections between our previous report and the current one can be attributed to these changes and are not referenced separately in each country's profile.

In the country assessment of this section, we consider a country is on/off track to meet its NDC targets if the projected current policy emissions are within 1-2% of its respective NDC targets, taking into account uncertainty in policy implementation in our models.

4.1 ARGENTINA


Argentina's NDC and net zero targets

| Pledge | Key targets | | |
|----------|--|--|--|
| NDC | Limit emissions to 355 MtCO₂e by 2030 | | |
| Net zero | Net zero by 2050 (GHG: LTS submitted) | | |


Argentina is **projected to miss its 2030 NDC target under current policies**. Overall emissions under current policies are projected to keep rising steadily to 2035 due to the significant growth in energy and industry-related emissions. Although land-use emissions are projected to decline slightly by 2035, revised historical emissions imply that the sector will not act as a net sink before then.

Impact of climate policies on emissions in Argentina

Including land use



2030 NDC | unconditional 355 Mt CO₂e



TARGETS

Argentina's NDC includes an absolute, economy-wide and unconditional goal of limiting emissions to 355 MtCO₂e by 2030 (Government of Argentina, 2021). As of October 2025, Argentina has not yet submitted its 2035 NDC to the UNFCCC.

In 2020, the government announced a long-term strategy (LTS) which stated their aim for greenhouse gas neutrality by 2050. Argentina's target covers all emissions and economic sectors but does not provide details on the expected contribution per sector nor the land use removals (Government of Argentina, 2022).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Under Javier Milei, in power since December 2023, there has been little progress on developing and implementing more ambitious climate policies. After Argentina's delegation's sudden exit from the COP29 in Baku, reports indicated that Milei's administration was actively considering withdrawing from the Paris Agreement altogether. For now, however, Argentina still remains in the Paris Agreement, but it is unclear whether it will submit a new NDC around the COP30 in Belém, Brazil (Nugent and Mooney, 2025).

There are several recent developments that are likely to affect greenhouse gas emissions in Argentina. A law adopted in 2024 introduced a new regime to incentivise large investments, particularly in the energy sector (KPMG, 2024). In that same year, Argentina recorded a substantial energy trade surplus of approximately USD 5.7 billion, marking its strongest balance since 2006. This surplus is expected to grow to USD 8 billion by 2025 (Reuters, 2025). Alongside its focus on exploiting its fossil fuel resources, in December 2024, President Milei launched the Argentine Nuclear Plan, creating a Nuclear Council. This plan aims to support modern nuclear power development and refers to the growing energy demands of artificial intelligence (Al) technologies. It prioritises the construction of four ACR-300 small modular reactors (SMRs) at the Atucha site near Buenos Aires (total 1.2 GW). The plan is backed by US private investment, with the first unit targeted for 2030 and with significant future export potential (Nugent, 2024).

2019 historical data and 2030 projections of key emissions indicators for Argentina

Emission values are rounded to the nearest five

Finally, Argentina is still considering the design and implementation of market mechanisms to trade emissions either internally (through an ETS) or internationally (for example through Article 6), but has not yet made any definitive announcements (ICAP, 2025; Mesa Argentina de Carbono, 2025).

| Indicator (incl. land use) | 2019 historical | | 2030 projections |
|----------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|---------------------|
| | | Current policies | NDC unconditional |
| Absolute emissions | 350 | 430 | 355 |
| (tCO2e/cap) | -13% vs 2010 | +24% vs 2019 | +2% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per capita | 7.8 | 9.3 | 7.7 |
| (tCO2e/cap) | -20% vs 2010 | +19% vs 2019 | -1% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per GDP | 0.79 | 0.77 | 0.64 |
| (tCO₂e/thousand USD) | -16% vs 2010 | -3% vs 2019 | -20% vs 2019 |


4.2 AUSTRALIA

Australia's NDC and net zero targets

| Pledge | Key targets | | |
|--|---|--|--|
| | 2030 | 2035 | |
| NDC | Reduce emissions by 43% below 2005 by 2030 | Reduce emissions by 62-70% below 2005 by 2035 | |
| Net zero Net zero by 2050 (GHG; LTS submit | | G; LTS submitted) | |


Impact of climate policies on emissions in Australia


Including land use



Source: PBL IMAGE model model (2025).

Australia is well on track to meet its 2030 NDC target and could be on track to meet the upper end of its 2035 NDC target, although the lower end is likely to be missed under current policies. Emissions decline through 2030, but this trend slows down towards 2035 at the upper end of our projections. The upper end is based on national policies, while the lower end reflects more ambitious state-level measures and assumes the Australian government achieves its 82% renewable electricity target by 2030 Land-use emissions are expected to decline, with the sink projected to increase steadily towards 2035, largely driven by afforestation. The sinks are projected to increase due to forest growth and building soil carbon in croplands and grasslands. This increase in sinks contributes to the significant differences in projections compared to our 2024 report.





TARGETS

Australia's first updated NDC commits to an unconditional target of reducing emissions by 43% below 2005 levels by 2030, alongside a long-term goal of net zero emissions by 2050. These targets were legislated in 2022 (Parliament of Australia, 2022). Australia's second NDC strives for a 62 to 70% reduction below 2005 levels by 2035 (Government of Australia, 2025).

350 Mt CO₂e

235-185 Mt CO₂e

Australia's Long Term Emissions Reduction Plan outlines the net zero roadmap for 2050, including the Technology Investment Roadmap Paper and the Low Emissions Technology Statements (DISER, 2020; Australian Government, 2021; Government of Australia, 2021). The plan relies on future technologies for 15% of reductions and a further 10% on international or domestic offsets.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In electricity, the government expanded the existing Capacity Investment Scheme (CIS), its main tool to reach 82% renewable electricity by 2030. The CIS aims to deliver 32 GW of new clean capacity—23 GW from variable renewables (wind, solar) and 9 GW from dispatchable sources including batteries (DCCEEW, 2024; OpenElectricity, 2025a, 2025b). However, the Climate Change Authority warns that the target will be missed without at least 8 GW of additional renewables (Climate Change Authority, 2024).

In 2024, the Australian government launched the "Future Made in Australia" plan, a ten-year, AUD 23 billion package to attract investment in strategic industries and establish Australia as a "renewable energy superpower." It targets renewable hydrogen, green metals, low-carbon fuels, critical minerals processing, and clean energy manufacturing such as batteries and solar panels. However, over half of the funding should only start in 2027 (Australian Treasury, 2025). To complement this, the government updated its National Hydrogen Strategy, now focusing on renewable-based hydrogen only (Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, 2024).

In transport, Australia introduced the long-awaited New Vehicle Efficiency Standard (NVES) in 2024, which, from 2025 onwards, applies to all new cars sold in the country. The standard also sets annual fleet-wide emissions intensity targets for vehicle suppliers. The NVES allows higher limits for heavier vehicles and requires emissions-intensive sales to be offset by more efficient vehicles or credits, with declining targets projected to reduce transport emissions (Office of Impact Analysis, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2024).

2019 historical data and 2035 projections of key emissions indicators for Australia

Emission values are rounded to the nearest five

Alongside this, the NVES also seeks to accelerate EV uptake by lowering production costs, improving affordability, and supporting charging infrastructure across regional areas (DCCEEW, 2023). However, both the NVES and the EV strategy stop short of setting strategies or targets for public transport, freight, and modal shift.

| Indicator (incl. land use) | 2019 historical | | 2035 projections | |
|----------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|----------------------|--|
| | | Current policies | NDC unconditional | |
| Absolute emissions | 490 | 190 to 325 | 235 to 185 | |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | -19% vs 2010 | -61% to -34% vs 2019 | -52% to -62% vs 2019 | |
| Emissions per capita | 19.4 | 6.6 to 11.1 | 8.0 to 6.3 | |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | -30% vs 2010 | -66% to -43% vs 2019 | -59% to -67% vs 2019 | |
| Emissions per GDP | 0.31 | 0.09 to 0.15 | 0.11 to 0.08 | |
| (tCO2e/thousand USD) | -36% vs 2010 | -72% to -53% vs 2019 | -66% to -73% vs 2019 | |


4.3 BRAZIL


Brazil's NDC and net zero targets

| Pledge | Key targets | | |
|----------|---|---|--|
| | 2030 | 2035 | |
| NDC | Reduce emissions to 1.32 GtCO ₂ e by 2025 and 1.23 GtCO ₂ e by 2030 | Reduce emissions by 59-67% below 2005 levels by 2035 | |
| Net zero | Net zero by 2050 (GHG; no LTS submitted) | | |


Brazil is **projected to miss its 2030 and 2035 NDC targets under current policies**. Our 2025 current policies scenario projects a gradual decline in economy-wide emissions to 2035, with the pace of reductions slowing after 2030. This trajectory is mainly driven by decreasing emissions from LULUCF from 2025 onwards, which contributes to the downward trajectory in projections compared to our 2024 report. Emissions excluding LULUCF are projected to plateau or slightly increase until 2035.

Impact of climate policies on emissions in Brazil





Excluding land use



(higher end); NewClimate Institute calculations (lower end); IIASA GLOBIOM/G4M model (2025)

TARGETS

In its 2030 NDC, Brazil sets an unconditional target to limit emissions to $1.32\,\mathrm{GtCO_{2}e}$ in 2025 and $1.23\,\mathrm{GtCO_{2}e}$ in 2030 (Government of Brazil, 2023). These targets are consistent with emission reductions of 48.4% below 2005 levels by 2025, and 53.1% below 2005 levels by 2030. The 2035 NDC targets a 59-67% reduction below 2005 levels across all sectors and gases, with a 59% domestic component and a 67% internationally supported component (the latter potentially involves carbon offsets under Article 6). Brazil also aims to end deforestation in the Amazon by 2030 and reaffirms in its NDC document to achieve national climate neutrality by 2050, although a long-term strategy has not yet been submitted (Government of Brazil, 2024).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Brazil has taken numerous steps to improve its climate action since the beginning of the Lula administration and ahead of COP30, as the country prepares to host it in Belém in November 2025. In 2023, nearly 90% of electricity production in Brazil came from renewables (Rangelova, 2024). Indeed, renewables are highly competitive there, with recent auctions primarily focused on awarding contracts to renewable projects (de Oliveira Bredariol, 2024). Brazil's Novo PAC, a USD 350 billion economic growth programme, targets 80% of new electricity capacity from renewables. The government is encouraging domestic industry growth, raising solar panel import taxes to 25%, despite imports currently covering 95% of the market (Instituto Talanoa, 2024).

Fossil fuel expansion, however, remains a significant challenge. Over 60% of the Novo PAC's "energy transition and security" budget is allocated to oil and gas (Casa Civil, 2023). The Decenal Energy Plan (PDE) projects continue to grow in oil and gas output through 2031, including new exploration in the Amazon Basin, with auctions for drilling rights held in June 2025 (Empresa de Pesquisa Energética (EPE), 2024; Magnani, 2025).

The recent Senate approval of Bill 2159/202, the "Devastation Bill", threatened environmental safeguards by planning to allow projects of 'national interest' to bypass full licensing procedures. This would potentially accelerate oil and gas expansion in sensitive areas (WWF-Brasil, 2025). Following pressure by environmental organisations, President Lula vetoed many provisions of the bill, including the key 'self-licensing' component (Al Jazeera, 2025a). While widely seen as a win for environmental protection, the law still streamlines processes favoured by agribusiness. It also remains up for debate whether Brazil's Congress will override any of the vetoes.

Deforestation in the Amazon has surged in the first half of 2025, mostly attributed to criminal activities including arson and illegal land clearing (Berti, 2025). In 2024, the Amazon experienced its largest recorded burned area since data collection began in 1985, impacting 15.6 million hectares (MapBiomas Brasil, 2025). Although deforestation rates considerably decreased in recent years under the Lula administration, this sharp rise underscores persistent challenges and enforcement gaps. In response, President Lula announced a USD 165 million allocation from the Amazon Fund to support the federal environmental agency's projects targeting illegal deforestation.

2019 historical data and 2035 projections of key emissions indicators for Brazil

Emission values are rounded to the nearest five

| Indicator (incl. land use) | 2019 historical | 2035 projections | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|----------------------|--|
| | | Current policies | NDC unconditional | |
| Absolute emissions | 1,735 | 1,715 to 1,830 | 1,075 to 865 | |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | +27% vs 2010 | -1% to +5% vs 2019 | -38% to -50% vs 2019 | |
| Emissions per capita | 8.4 | 7.9 to 8.4 | 4.9 to 4.0 | |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | +19% vs 2010 | -6% to -0% vs 2019 | -41% to -53% vs 2019 | |
| Emissions per GDP | 0.74 | 0.52 to 0.55 | 0.32 to 0.26 | |
| (tCO ₂ e/thousand USD) | +19% vs 2010 | -30% to -25% vs 2019 | -56% to -65% vs 2019 | |

4.4 CANADA

Canada's NDC and net zero targets

| Key targets | | |
|--|---|--|
| 2030 | 2035 | |
| Reduce emissions by | Reduce emissions by | |
| 40-45% below 2005 | 45-50% below 2005 | |
| by 2030 | by 2035 | |
| Net zero by 2050 (GHG; LTS submitted) | | |
| | 2030 Reduce emissions by 40-45% below 2005 by 2030 | |


Canada is **projected to miss its 2030 and 2035 NDC targets** with existing policies. Emissions in Canada have remained relatively stable over the past decade, aside from the temporary drop during the COVID-19 pandemic. Under current policies, emissions are projected to decline moderately toward 2030, although the recent adjustment of the carbon tax, which now applies only to the industry sector rather than economy-wide, slows the pace of reduction to 2030 compared to our report of last year. Beyond 2030, the emission reduction rate could either slow down or accelerate. The land-use sector remains a net source over the whole projection period.

Impact of climate policies on emissions in Canada


Including land use

end); IIASA GLOBIOM/G4M

model (2025).



Excluding land use



TARGETS

In its 2030 NDC, Canada commits to reducing its emissions by 40 to 45% below 2005 levels by 2030 (Government of Canada, 2021). Canada has submitted a new NDC for 2035, which aims to reduce emissions by 45 to 50% below 2005 levels (Government of Canada, 2025a). Canada's accounting uses a net-net approach, calculated as the difference between net emissions in the reporting year and net emissions in 2005 (→ Annex A3).

In 2022, Canada submitted an updated long-term strategy (LTS) including a net zero by 2050 target (Government of Canada, 2022). Canada has set out a series of exploratory scenarios towards net zero, most of which envision a substantial role

for land use sinks (up to -100 MtCO₂e) and technological Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) (up to -150 MtCO₂e).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Over the past year, Canada's progress on climate and energy policies has been somewhat uneven. The federal government has continued to implement elements of the 2030 Emissions Reduction Plan, including the national zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales mandate and the Clean Electricity Regulations. The ZEV mandate targets 60% of new passenger cars and light trucks to be zero-emissions by 2030 and 100% by 2035, signalling a step toward electrifying the transportation sector (ECCC, 2023). In a policy shift in September 2025, however, the government announced a 60-day review of the ZEV mandate, pausing its enforcement for 2026 models while leaving the 2030 target in place, creating uncertainty about the near-term trajectory of electric vehicle adoption (CBC News, 2025).

In electricity, the Clean Electricity Regulations and complementary programmes are promoting low-carbon power. These regulations set limits on emissions from fossil fuel electricity generation, encouraging the deployment of cleaner technologies. Nevertheless, exemptions for certain fossil gas generation units and ongoing investment in natural gas infrastructure mean Canada has pushed back its original target of a fully decarbonised electricity grid from 2035 to 2050 (Reuters, 2024a). Industrial carbon pricing provides incentives for emission reductions, though design flaws and political resistance limit its impact.

The consumer carbon price was removed in 2025, which represents a major setback, weakening one of Canada's most effective emission reduction tools (Government of Canada, 2025b). Prime Minister Carney has signalled support for new oil and gas infrastructure alongside carbon capture and storage (CCS) prioritisation, raising doubts about the government's willingness to phase out fossil fuels (Cognitud, 2025).

With a minority government in place and a pending update to the 2030 Emissions Reduction Plan in Autumn of 2025, crucial measures like strengthened methane regulations and the oil and gas emissions cap are still outstanding, leaving uncertainties about Canada's ability to meet its 2030 targets. Overall, Canada shows progress in electrification and low-carbon power but faces delays, rollbacks, and policy uncertainty that may undermine its climate commitments.

2019 historical data and 2035 projections of key emissions indicators for Canada

Emission values are rounded to the nearest five

| indicator (incl. land use) | 2019 nistorical | | 2035 projections | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|----------------------|--|
| | | Current policies | NDC unconditional | |
| Absolute emissions | 755 | 485 to 595 | 415 to 375 | |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | +3% vs 2010 | -36% to -21% vs 2019 | -45% to -50% vs 2019 | |
| Emissions per capita | 20.2 | 11.3 to 13.9 | 9.6 to 8.8 | |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | -6% vs 2010 | -44% to -31% vs 2019 | -52% to -57% vs 2019 | |
| Emissions per GDP | 0.39 | 0.19 to 0.24 | 0.16 to 0.15 | |
| (tCO ₂ e/thousand USD) | -15% vs 2010 | -50% to -38% vs 2019 | -57% to -61% vs 2019 | |
| | | | | |

2010 biotorical

4.5 CHINA

China's NDC and net zero targets

| Pledge | Key targets | |
|--------|--|--|
| | 2030 | 2035 |
| NDC | Peak carbon dioxide emissions before 2030; lower carbon intensity by over 65% in 2030 from 2005; reduce share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 25% in 2030; increase forest stock volume by around 6 billion m3 in 2030 from 2005; and increase the installed capacity of wind and solar power to over 1,200 GW by 2030 | peak levels; increase share of non-fossil fuels in total energy consumption to over 30%; expand installed capacity of wind and solar power to over |

Net zero before 2060 (CO₂; LTS submitted)

China is on track to meet the upper end of its 2030 NDC target, while the lower end could possibly be missed under current policies. China is also on track to meet its announced 2035 NDC targets. However, all the announced 2035 NDC targets are already met in our current policies projections and thus do not drive any additional emission reductions. China is well positioned to 'strive to do better', as indicated in their Climate Summit 2025 announcement. The calculation of the NDC target range is based on several assumptions about socio-economic and energy developments in China. These assumptions are consistent between the NDC and the current policies scenario of each organisation.


At its lower end, our 2025 current policies scenario shows a reduction in emissions right after peaking, reflecting positive developments on updates in energy policies, including a recent rapid expansion of renewables and policies to reduce the emissions intensity of coal-fired power plants before 2027, as well as new building standards. The upper end of our projections accounts for a continuation of fossil fuel use driven by strong growth in tech-intensive manufacturing, resulting in emissions peaking around 2025, stabilising around 2030 and starting a decline towards 2035.

Impact of climate policies on emissions in China

Net zero


Including land use

(middle of the projected range); NewClimate Institute calculation (lower and upper end); IIASA



2030 NDC | unconditional 13,780—13,225 Mt CO₂e

2035 NDC | unconditional 12,950—12,520 Mt CO₂e



2023

Excluding land use

TARGETS

China's NDC does not include an economy-wide absolute emissions target but does includes an economy-wide intensity and several sectoral targets (→ Table 2). China also has a target to become carbon-neutral before 2060 (Government of China, 2021b, 2021a). Both NDC and net zero targets do not clarify the role of non-CO₂ gases. China also does not specify the contribution of each sector to its carbon neutrality target.

During the Climate Summit in September 2025, President Jinping announced China's new NDC: China will, by 2035, reduce economy-wide net GHG emissions by 7% to 10% from peak levels, striving to improve; increase the share of non-fossil fuels in total energy consumption to over 30%; expand the installed capacity of wind and solar power to over six times the 2020 levels, striving for 3,600 GW; and scale up the total forest stock volume to over 24 billion cubic metres.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

China's domestic climate policy follows the "1+N" Policy Framework, which links long-term goals with near-term actions across governance levels. The "1" represents the Working Guidance for Carbon Dioxide Peaking and Carbon Neutrality outlining the overall strategy (NDRC, 2022). The "N" comprises specific policies and programs developed by ministries and local governments, led by the Action Plan for Carbon Dioxide Peaking Before 2030 (NDRC, 2021).

China is very much off track in meeting its emission intensity reduction targets under both its 14th Five-Year Plan for 2025 and its 2030 NDC. While the impacts of COVID-19 and slower economic growth have contributed to this, the main challenge lies in rapidly growing energy demand, with renewables not being integrated quickly enough to displace fossil fuels (Myllyvirta, 2025). In 2024, China continued to dominate global coal trends, with 94 GW of new construction, more than the rest of the world combined, alongside leading numbers of project commissioning (GEM et al., 2025).

Meanwhile, China remained a global leader in energy transition investment in 2024, accounting for 39% of the global total and two-thirds of the global increase (BloombergNEF, 2025). China overachieved its 2030 renewable energy capacity target of 1,200 GW ahead of schedule, reaching over 1,673 GW in June 2025 (NEA, 2025). China produces 70% of all EVs sold globally, with over 12 million new energy vehicles sold in the country, accounting for a 40.9% market share (Xinhua News Agency, 2025).

2019 historical data and 2035 projections of key emissions indicators for China

| Indicator (incl. land use) | 2019 historical | 2019 historical | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|----------------------|--|
| | | Current policies | NDC unconditional | |
| Absolute emissions | 12,535 | 10,330 to 12,175 | 12,950 to 12,520 | |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | +24% vs 2010 | -18% to -3% vs 2019 | +3% to -0% vs 2019 | |
| Emissions per capita | 8.8 | 7.5 to 8.8 | 9.4 to 9.1 | |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | +18% vs 2010 | -15% to +0% vs 2019 | +7% to +3% vs 2019 | |
| Emissions per GDP | 1.08 | 0.47 to 0.56 | 0.60 to 0.58 | |
| (tCO ₂ e/thousand USD) | -34% vs 2010 | -56% to -48% vs 2019 | -45% to -47% vs 2019 | |


4.6 COLOMBIA


Colombia's NDC and net zero targets

| Pledge NDC | Key targets | | |
|---------------|---|---|--|
| | 2030 | 2035 | |
| | Limit emissions to 169 MtCO₂e in 2030 and to peak emissions by 2027 | Limit emissions to 160–165 MtCO₂e in 2035 | |
| Net zero | Net zero by 2050 (GHG: LTS submitted) | | |


Colombia is **projected to miss its 2030 and 2035 NDC targets** under current policies. Emissions in industry and transport sectors are projected to increase towards 2035 and show no signs of peaking before 2027. The land use sector substantially affects Colombia's emission projections as it currently accounts for nearly half of the country's emissions and is expected to remain a net source up until 2035. Under current policy projections, emissions trend upward at the high end, whereas the low end suggests a plateau by 2035.

Impact of climate policies on emissions in Colombia





Excluding land use



TARGETS

Colombia's NDC sets an absolute emissions limit of 169 MtCO₂e (Government of Colombia, 2020). The target also indicates the intention to peak emissions by 2027 and to achieve a national deforestation rate of 50,000 hectares per year by 2030. This includes a complementary target – using Article 6.2 and other international mechanisms – to achieve zero deforestation in natural forests by 2030. In September 2025, Colombia submitted its declarative version of NDC 3.0, which sets a target to limit national greenhouse gas emissions to 160–165 MtCO₂e by 2035, while noting that the coverage of sectors, gases, and carbon sinks will only be specified in the final version (Government of Colombia, 2025).

In 2021, Colombia submitted an LTS including a net zero emissions target, later enshrined in domestic law. The target covers all sectors and emissions, with 90% expected to be reduced through sectoral mitigation measures and the remaining 10% removed via land-use sinks or technological carbon dioxide removal (Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible Colombia, 2021).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Since taking office in August 2022, the Petro administration elevated climate change to the forefront of its political agenda. The government has committed to reducing deforestation, halting new oil and gas exploration, ending fossil gas fracking, and accelerating the energy transition. Over the past three years, efforts have focused on aligning national strategies, institutional frameworks, and sectoral plans with climate objectives. President Petro became the first leader of a large fossil-fuel-producing country to endorse the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty (Rodríguez, 2023; Worland, 2023). In September 2023, Colombia joined the Powering Past Coal Alliance, committing to halting the development of new unabated coal power plants and phasing out existing plants (Powering Past Coal Alliance, 2023).

The country has made remarkable progress, with record sales of electric vehicles in 2024, increasing solar capacity to 2 GW (10% of total installed capacity) and reducing the deforestation rate to its lowest level in 2023 since 2000. Domestically, implementation is, however, slowed down by political instability, cabinet reshuffles, and the pursuit of multiple reforms at the same time. Social licensing issues have delayed renewable energy projects, notably in La Guajira, where world-class wind and solar resources co-exist with deep social inequalities.

Despite this progress, the Colombian economy remains dependent on fossil fuels for tax revenue, exports, royalties, foreign investment, and GDP. This dependence makes phasing out fossil fuels a difficult process that requires economic diversification and fiscal stability in a context where fiscal space is constrained by high debt burdens and rising interest rates. After Colombia announced its commitment to halt new oil and gas exploration projects, credit rating agencies downgraded its score, increasing financing costs and reducing fiscal space for transition investments, illustrating how current international financial architecture hinders the implementation of climate policies in developing economies.

2019 historical data and 2035 projections of key emissions indicators for Colombia

| Indicator (incl. land use) | 2019 historical | | 2035 projections |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | | Current policies | NDC unconditional |
| Absolute emissions | 275 | 290 to 320 | 165 to 160 |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | +21% vs 2010 | +6% to +17% vs 2019 | -39% to -42% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per capita | 5.5 | 5.1 to 5.6 | 2.9 to 2.8 |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | +9% vs 2010 | -8% to +1% vs 2019 | -48% to -50% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per GDP | 0.69 | 0.49 to 0.54 | 0.28 to 0.27 |
| (tCO ₂ e/thousand USD) | -12% vs 2010 | -29% to -22% vs 2019 | -59% to -61% vs 2019 |

4.7 EGYPT

Egypt's NDC and net zero targets


| Pledge | Key targets |
|----------|---|
| NDC | Sectoral targets to reduce emissions compared to BAU in 2030 : Electricity (-37%), Transport (-7%) and Oil & Gas (-65%) (BAU differs per sector) |
| Net zero | Net zero by 2050 (GHG; LTS submitted) |

Egypt is **on track to meet its 2030 NDC targets** with existing policies. This suggests that the country is well-positioned to increase the ambition of its targets in the 2025 NDC ambition-raising cycle. Egypt is the only country of those we analysed that presents only conditional targets in its 2030 NDC. The NDC targets are fully conditional on international support, do not cover all sectors and result in emissions above our estimates under current policies. Emissions under current policies are projected to increase steadily until 2035, with no sign of peaking.


Impact of climate policies on emissions in Egypt

Including land use

calculations; IIASA GLOBIOM/



2030 NDC | conditional 520—505 Mt CO₂e



TARGETS

Egypt's NDC includes emissions reduction targets for the electricity, transport, and oil and gas sectors. The NDC also includes non-quantified measures for the industry, tourism, buildings and waste sectors. Therefore, the quantifiable targets do not cover all sectors of the economy. They are also presented as reductions below BAU (Government of Egypt, 2022, 2023). As of October 2025, Egypt has not yet submitted its 2035 NDC, has no net-zero target, and has not submitted a long-term strategy to the UNFCCC.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

As of 2024, renewables comprised only around 11% of Egypt's electricity mix, a negligible increase in the past five years (Ember, 2025b). Natural gas still accounted for about 80% of electricity generation, with oil covering the remaining 20%. Despite reaffirming its 2030 target of 42% renewables at COP29, five years earlier than planned in its latest NDC, Prime Minister Madbouly warned that the target is at risk without greater international support (Reuters, 2024b). Through a performance-based grant backed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and other donors, Egypt aims to retire 5 GW of fossil power to enable 10 GW of renewables under the Nexus Water-Food-Energy (NWFE) Programme (Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 2025). Investments in grid upgrades and the 3 GW Saudi-Egypt electricity interconnection project, expected to be operational by early 2026, are key for improving grid flexibility but are insufficient on their own to enable a renewable transition without stronger policy alignment (Daily News Egypt, 2024).

Fossil fuel extraction remains a key pillar of Egypt's economy, and development continues to expand to reverse the production decline. Following power shortages in mid-2024 triggered by falling gas output and halted LNG exports, the government committed USD 7.2 billion to boost oil and gas exploration and plans to drill nearly 600 new wells by 2030 (Offshore Energy, 2024; S&P Global, 2024). Egypt continues to frame natural gas as a "bridge fuel" and positions it at the centre of its energy strategy, both as a domestic energy source and a key export commodity. These moves risk locking in high-carbon infrastructure, creating stranded assets, and undermining Egypt's climate targets.

In parallel, Egypt launched its National Strategy for Low-Carbon Hydrogen in 2024 to capture 5-8% of the global hydrogen market by 2040, supported by Law No. 2/2024 on Green Hydrogen Investment Incentives, which offers tax exemptions and streamlined permitting (Baker McKenzie, 2024). Over USD 33 billion in investment commitments for green hydrogen and ammonia facilities have been announced since (State Information Service (SIS), 2024). However, there remain significant credibility concerns due to the lack of a rapid scale-up of domestic renewable capacity, the inclusion of "blue" hydrogen produced from fossil gas, and the national strategy's strong orientation towards export, which could divert the (already limited) renewable electricity away from Egypt's own decarbonisation needs.

2019 historical data and 2030 projections of key emissions indicators for Egypt

| Indicator (incl. land use) | 2019 historical | 2019 historical | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | | Current policies | NDC conditional |
| Absolute emissions | 350 | 440 to 480 | 520 to 505 |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | +26% vs 2010 | +26% to +39% vs 2019 | +50% to +45% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per capita | 3.3 | 3.5 to 3.8 | 4.1 to 4.0 |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | +4% vs 2010 | +7% to +17% vs 2019 | +26% to +22% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per GDP | 1.08 | 0.85 to 0.94 | 1.01 to 0.98 |
| (tCO ₂ e/thousand USD) | -10% vs 2010 | -21% to -14% vs 2019 | -7% to -10% vs 2019 |

4.8 ETHIOPIA


Ethiopia's NDC and net zero targets

| Pledge | Key targets | |
|----------|--|---|
| | 2030 | 2035 |
| NDC | Reduce emissions by 14% (unconditional) and by 68.8% (conditional) below BAU by 2030 | Reduce emissions by 40.7% (unconditional) and by 70.3% (conditional) below BAU by 2035 |
| Net zero | Net zero by 2050 at tl submitted) | he latest (GHG; LTS |


Ethiopia is projected to miss its conditional 2030 and both its 2035 NDC targets, but is on track to meet its unconditional 2030 NDC target with existing policies. The 2030 NDC relies heavily on the land sector for emissions reductions, yet our projections show only modest declines in land-use emissions by 2035, which are insufficient to offset rising energy- and industry-related emissions. Economywide emissions under current policies are projected to steadily increase through 2035, with no indication of peaking beforehand. The significant change in the emission levels between the 2030 and 2035 unconditional targets can be partly attributed to a revision of Ethiopia's BAU scenario.

Impact of climate policies on emissions in Ethiopia

Including land use



Excluding land use



TARGETS

Ethiopia's NDC includes an unconditional target to reduce emissions by 14% below BAU and a conditional target of 68.8% by 2030, mostly through land-use emission reductions (Government of Ethiopia, 2021). In 2024, the government announced a 2030 NDC implementation plan with sector-specific strategies (NDC Partnership, 2024). In September 2025, Ethiopia submitted its 2035 NDC, with an unconditional target of 40.7% and a conditional target of 70.3% below BAU (Government of Ethiopia, 2025).

G4M model (2025).

In 2015, Ethiopia announced its intention to become carbon-neutral (Government of Ethiopia, 2016). In July 2023 In July 2023, it submitted a long-term strategy targeting net-zero emissions by 2050. It covers all gases, yet it does not specify offsets or carbon dioxide removal, nor does it include aviation and shipping emissions. It emphasizes reforestation and land-based carbon sinks by 2050. Ethiopia's net-zero target is not yet enshrined in law (Government of Ethiopia, 2023).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The 'Climate Resilient Green Economy' (CRGE) strategy, launched in 2011 to support Ethiopia's goal of middle-income status by 2025, is the basis of the country's climate action approach. An implementation review in 2020 found no evidence of emission reductions since its introduction, with challenges linked to a lack of representative national data (Ministry of Planning and Development, 2020). As of September 2025, the CRGE remains under revision and no updated version has been published. The 2021–2030 Ten-Year Development Plan aims to sustain high growth while supporting a climate-resilient green economy and includes targets to enhance emissions reduction capacity (Government of Ethiopia, 2020).

Ethiopia has advanced major hydropower projects, with hydropower accounting for 96.5% of electricity in 2023 (Ember, 2025d). The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (5GW), completed in July 2025, will double renewable capacity (Al Jazeera, 2025b). The country also aims to electrify transport and banned all internal combustion engine (ICE) imports in 2024. As part of this transition, a 2022 tax reform incentivized electric vehicles and discouraged ICE vehicles ahead of the 2024 import ban (Fana Media Corporation, 2022; CNN, 2024). EV registrations tripled between early 2023 and mid-2025 (FurtherAfrica, 2025). In 2023, Ethiopia and Kenya agreed to construct the 3,000 km Lamu-Addis Ababa electrified Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) for sustainable transport (Preston, 2023).

Agriculture and LULUCF are Ethiopia's largest emission sources. To address this, the government introduced the 2024 Climate Smart Agriculture Investment Plan (CSAIP) to enhance sustainability, resilience, and productivity (Tesfaye et al., 2024), and launched a reforestation project restoring 12,000 ha of native forest, expected to sequester 7.26 MtCO₂ over 30 years. However, the project is registered for carbon credits and does not directly contribute to Ethiopia's NDC (Green Earth, 2024; Wambua, 2024).

2019 historical data and 2035 projections of key emissions indicators for Ethiopia

Emission values are rounded to the nearest five

| Indicator (incl. land use) | 2019 historical | | | 2035 projections |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| | | Current policies | NDC unconditional | NDC conditional |
| Absolute emissions | 260 | 315 to 345 | 145 | 75 |
| (tCO₂e/cap) | +42% vs 2010 | +22% to +31% vs 2019 | -44% vs 2019 | -72% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per capita | 2.3 | 1.9 to 2.0 | 0.9 | 0.4 |
| (tCO₂e/cap) | +11% vs 2010 | -18% to -11% vs 2019 | -62% vs 2019 | -81% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per GDP | 4.28 | 1.84 to 1.99 | 0.84 | 0.42 |
| (tCO ₂ e/thousand USD) | -37% vs 2010 | -57% to -53% vs 2019 | -80% vs 2019 | -90% vs 2019 |

4.9 EUROPEAN UNION (EU)

EU's NDC and net zero targets


| Pledge | Key targets | |
|----------|---|--|
| | 2030 | 2035 |
| NDC | Reduce emissions by at least 55% below | Reduce emissions by 66.25-72.5 % |
| | 1990 by 2030 | below 1990 by 2035 |
| | | (announcement only) |
| Net zero | Net zero by 2050 at tl submitted) | he latest (GHG; LTS |

Impact of climate policies on emissions in the EU*


considering EU-level policies but **could be off track** considering Member State level policies. Similarly, while the EU is **likely on track to meet the lower end of the 2035 NDC target range** at the EU-level, it is **off track to meet the full 2035 NDC target range** at the Member State level. Achieving both targets would require full implementation of existing policies under their most ambitious interpretation. EU-level measures, including the Fit for 55 package, are sufficient in principle, but some have not yet been fully transposed into national legislation, contributing to the higher end of our emissions projections. This highlights the need for Member States to take further action to ensure effective implementation of EU-level policies. The post-2030 policy framework enabling the EU to achieve its post-2030 targets will follow after the 2040 target has been amended into law.

The EU is likely on track to meet its 2030 NDC target





2030 NDC | unconditional 2,100 Mt CO₂e **2035** NDC | unconditional 1,580—1,300 Mt CO₂e



cies); IIASA TARGETS

In 2023, the EU submitted an updated NDC, reaffirming the goal of reducing domestic emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels, but increased its land sector target to -310 MtCO₂e.

In 2024, the European Commission presented a communication on a 2040 climate target, which included the recommendation of a 90% net GHG emissions reduction below 1990 levels. The European Climate Law will be amended to include a 2040 climate target, which will be the guide for the formulation of the next EU NDC.

*The Emissions Trading Scheme target of reducing emissions from electricity and industry to 62% below 2005 levels by 2030 is unable to be met in the lower end of our model projections, which shows only an almost 50% reductions by 2030. The -62%

target is instead projected to be

achieved by 2033.

In September 2025 the Council adopted a non-binding "statement of intent", suggesting a 2035 reduction range between 66.25% and 72.5%. By the time of writing, no formal 2035 or 2040 targets has been adopted yet. At the Climate Summit 2025, President von der Leyen confirmed this range and announced that the EU will formally submit their NDC ahead of COP30.

The EU has set a legal objective to become climate neutral by 2050 under the 2021 European Climate Law (Regulation (EU) 2021/1119). The EU's 2050 climate neutrality target includes all economic sectors and covers all emissions.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The EU launched the Clean Industrial Deal (CID) in February 2025, a new policy framework with the aim to boost Europe's industrial competitiveness while transitioning to net-zero emissions (European Commission, 2025e). Some of the headline objectives of the CID include lowering energy prices through investments in clean energy and electrification, boosting the demand for "clean products" through public procurement and mobilising 100 billion Euros to support EU-based clean tech manufacturing.

As part of the CID, the European Commission also adopted its new Clean Industrial State Aid Framework (CISAF), which should make it easier for Member States to financially support renewable energy rollout, clean tech manufacturing, and additional measures to further decarbonise industry (European Commission, 2025b).

In July 2025, the European Commission put forward proposals for the EU's 2040 emissions reduction target (amending the European Climate Law) and its next long-term budget for the period 2028-2034 (European Commission, 2025d, 2025a). The Commission recommends setting a 90% net emissions reduction target below 1990 levels by 2040. The proposal is in line with the lower end of the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change's (ESABCC) recommendation for a 90-95% net reduction (European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change, 2025).

2019 historical data and 2035 projections of key emissions indicators for the EU

| 2019 historical | | 2035 projections |
|-----------------|---|--|
| | Current policies* | NDC unconditional |
| 3,355 | 1,440 to 2,010 | 1,580 to 1,300 |
| -12% vs 2010 | -57% to -40% vs 2019 | -53% to -61% vs 2019 |
| -28% vs 1990 | -69% to -57% vs 1990 | -66% to -72% vs 1990 |
| 7.5 | 3.3 to 4.6 | 3.6 to 3.0 |
| -14% vs 2010 | -56% to -39% vs 2019 | -52% to -61% vs 2019 |
| -32% vs 1990 | -71% to -59% vs 1990 | -68% to -73% vs 1990 |
| 0.20 | 0.07 to 0.10 | 0.08 to 0.06 |
| -24% vs 2010 | -65% to -51% vs 2019 | -61% to -68% vs 2019 |
| -57% vs 1990 | -85% to -79% vs 1990 | -83% to -86% vs 1990 |
| | 3,355 -12% vs 2010 -28% vs 1990 7.5 -14% vs 2010 -32% vs 1990 0.20 -24% vs 2010 | Current policies* 3,355 1,440 to 2,010 -12% vs 2010 -57% to -40% vs 2019 -28% vs 1990 -69% to -57% vs 1990 7.5 3.3 to 4.6 -14% vs 2010 -56% to -39% vs 2019 -32% vs 1990 -71% to -59% vs 1990 0.20 0.07 to 0.10 -24% vs 2010 -65% to -51% vs 2019 |

^{*}Although some EU-level policies are not yet translated into national law, resulting in the higher end of our current policies scenario, their rollout is mandatory.

4.10 INDIA

India's NDC and net zero targets

| Pledge | Key targets |
|----------|---|
| NDC | Reduce emissions intensity by 45% below 2005 by 2030; increase the share of nonfossil fuel in primary electricity production to 50% (conditional); and create additional (cumulative) carbon sink of 2.5–3 GtCO ₂ e by 2030 |
| Net zero | Net zero by 2070 (gas coverage unclear; LTS submitted) |


India is well on track to meet its unconditional 2030 NDC target and likely on track to meet its conditional 2030 NDC target with existing policies. This suggests that India is well positioned to increase the ambition of its targets in the 2025 NDC ambition-raising cycle. However, although India is projected to meet its targets, emissions under current policies are expected to increase until 2035 roughly at the same rate as in the last decade. Emissions in India show no signs of peaking before 2035.

Impact of climate policies on emissions in India

Including land use

(lower end); NewClimate Institute calculations (upper end); IIASA GLOBIOM/G4M model (2025).

Excluding land use



TARGETS

India's NDC aims to decrease emissions intensity by 45% below 2005 levels and increase the share of non-fossil energy capacity in the power sector to 50%, both by 2030 (Government of India, 2022b). Targets related to land-use aim to create an additional (cumulative) carbon sink of 2.5–3 GtCO $_2$ e by 2030. As of October 2025, India has not yet submitted its 2035 NDC to the UNFCCC.

In 2021, India announced its net zero by 2070 target, which was confirmed in its 2022 LTS submission. India has not clarified which gases are covered in its LTS, or to what extent the target is expected to be achieved through land-use sinks (Government of India, 2022a).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In the power sector, India's recently launched scheme PM Surya Ghar Yojana provides subsidies and collateral-free loans for rooftop solar PV installations. It achieved over 1 million installations in its first year, with the eventual goal of connecting 10 million households by March 2027 (Government of India, 2024). In addition to renewables, the country is pursuing nuclear energy as part of its long-term strategy, with a target of 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047 and a total budgetary allocation of INR 200 billion (USD 2.3 billion) in the latest Union Budget (Department of Atomic Energy, 2025). In the first half of 2025, India's coal-fired electricity generation fell by 22 TWh (3.1%), coinciding with a 24.4% increase in renewable power output, the fastest growth since 2022 (The Economic Times, 2025).

In terms of industry, India has launched a Carbon Credit Trading System (CCTS), featuring a compliance market for the highest-emitting sectors and a voluntary offset mechanism for broader industries, replacing the earlier Perform, Achieve, Trade (PAT) scheme for industries (Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 2025), yet it remains based on emissions intensity, rather than an absolute cap. For medium, small, and micro enterprises, the government launched the ADEETIE Scheme to provide financial and technical assistance for the adoption of clean and energy efficient technologies (Anand, 2025).

In addition, the Indian government announced new policies under the National Green Hydrogen Mission, namely the Green Hydrogen Certification Scheme for hydrogen made from renewable energy and the Green Steel Taxonomy for low-carbon steel produced using green hydrogen or other clean technologies, ensuring both are verifiably produced with greenhouse gas emissions under specified thresholds (ETEnergyWorld, 2024).

In the transport sector, the PM Electric Drive Revolution in Innovative Vehicle Enhancement (PM E-DRIVE) scheme has replaced the erstwhile FAME scheme to promote electric vehicle (EV) adoption in India. PM E-DRIVE allocates a total of INR 109 billion (USD 1.29 billion) to promote battery-powered two-wheelers, three-wheelers, ambulances, trucks, and other advanced EVs, by providing incentives for electrifying public transport, building charging infrastructure, and promoting EV manufacturing (Rao, 2024).

2019 historical data and 2030 projections of key emissions indicators for India

| Indicator (incl. land use) | 2019 historical | | | 2030 projections |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | | Current policies | NDC unconditional | NDC conditional |
| Absolute emissions | 2,860 | 3,790 to 4,015 | 4,770 to 4,285 | 4,265 to 4,030 |
| (tCO2e/cap) | +38% vs 2010 | +33% to +40% vs 2019 | +67% to +50% vs 2019 | +49% to +41% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per capita | 2.1 | 2.5 to 2.6 | 3.1 to 2.8 | 2.8 to 2.7 |
| (tCO2e/cap) | +23% vs 2010 | +21% to +28% vs 2019 | +52% to +36% vs 2019 | +36% to +28% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per GDP | 0.98 | 0.69 to 0.73 | 0.87 to 0.78 | 0.77 to 0.73 |
| (tCO ₂ e/thousand USD) | -21% vs 2010 | -29% to -25% vs 2019 | -11% to -20% vs 2019 | -21% to -25% vs 2019 |

4.11 INDONESIA


Indonesia's NDC and net zero targets

| Pledge | Key targets |
|----------|--|
| NDC | Reduce emissions by 32% (unconditional) and by 43% (conditional) below BAU by 2030 |
| Net zero | Indicative net zero by 2060 (gas coverage unclear; LTS submitted) |


Impact of climate policies on emissions in Indonesia*

Indonesia is well on track to meet its unconditional 2030 NDC target under current policies, but is likely to miss its conditional target, especially when considering the upper end of the current policy range. Achieving the unconditional target would require the full implementation of existing policies in their most ambitious form. Emissions are projected to rise until 2030 and then slow in growth until 2035 at the upper end of the range. At the lower end, emissions are expected to peak around 2025, plateau to 2030, and then decline slightly towards 2035. This trajectory is largely driven by decreasing emissions from LULUCF, whereas emissions excluding LULUCF are projected to continue increasing until 2030 before stabilising modestly thereafter. This stabilization is mainly due to a reduction in deforestation, a decline in forest and land fires, and an expansion of planted forest cover.

Including land use



2030 NDC | unconditional 2,025 Mt CO₂e 2030 NDC | conditional 1,690 Mt CO₂e



TARGETS

*Land use emission projections do not account for the impact of natural disturbances and peat fires.

(lower end); NewClimate Institute

Indonesia's NDC sets an unconditional target to reduce emissions by 32% below BAU and a conditional target to reduce emissions by 43% below BAU by 2030 (Government of Indonesia, 2022). In 2024, Indonesia released a draft updated NDC, including updated 2030 and new 2035 climate targets (Salsabila and Wong, 2024). While more ambitious than the current NDC, they still imply rising emissions, with peaks only in 2050 (unconditional) or 2035 (conditional). The government plans to submit the final version before COP30.

Indonesia submitted a long-term strategy (LTS) to the UNFCCC, including a scenario that reaches net zero emissions by 2060 (Government of Indonesia, 2021). Indonesia has not communicated an explicit net zero target but is exploring scenarios that could lead to net zero by 2060 or sooner in its upcoming updated NDC.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Indonesia's power sector is dominated by coal and gas, which supplied over 80% of the country's electricity in 2023 (Ember, 2025f). The Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL 2025-2034), frontloads fossil expansion by adding 3.4 GW of coal and 9.3 GW of gas by 2029, plus another 3.9 GW by 2034. In contrast, 70% of the planned 42.6 GW in renewables and 10.3 GW storage are delayed until after 2030 (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM), 2025b, 2025a). This pathway risks emissions lock-in, prolongs fossil dependence, and exacerbates oversupply, given the Prabowo administration's 8% annual GDP growth assumption (Karyza, 2025). The plan also envisions nuclear power from 2033, despite Indonesia's seismic risks and vast potential for renewable energy (IEEFA, 2021; Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM), 2024). Renewable competitiveness in Indonesia is hindered by heavy coal subsidies and minimal carbon pricing with slow implementation (IESR, 2024).

Simultaneously, the National Electricity Master Plan (RUKN 2024-2060) enables over 20 GW of additional captive coal capacity to power nickel and mineral processing industries (Ember, 2025a). While the JETP Secretariat plans to publish a separate captive coal study, there is likely limited appetite for decarbonisation given the government's "downstreaming" focus on domestic resource processing over raw exports. Compounding these issues is the long-awaited New and Renewable Energy Bill, which remains delayed due to PLN's reticence over power wheeling provisions (Tempo Magazine, 2025).

Forestry underpins Indonesia's mitigation strategy through the FOLU Net Sink 2030 target, which aims for net negative emissions of 140 MtCO2e (Ministry of Environment and Forestry (KLHK), 2025). Deforestation remains below historic highs but has shown an uptick in recent years (Global Forest Watch, 2025). Forest loss could accelerate amid competing development priorities, including food estate projects and large-scale bioenergy expansion (Timorria, 2025), backed by a master plan to convert up to 20 million hectares of forest (MADANI Berkelanjutan, 2025). Transparency concerns further undermine confidence, as Indonesia revised its 2019 LULUCF baseline from 925 to 221 MtCO₂e in the draft 2035 NDC without explanation (Climate Action Tracker, 2025).

2019 historical data and 2030 projections of key emissions indicators for Indonesia

Emission values are rounded to the nearest five

| 2019 historical | | | 2030 projections |
|-----------------|--|---|--|
| | Current policies | NDC unconditional | NDC conditional |
| 1,805 | 1,530 to 1,930 | 2,025 | 1690 |
| +48% vs 2010 | -15% to +7% vs 2019 | +12% vs 2019 | -7% vs 2019 |
| 6.7 | 5.2 to 6.5 | 6.9 | 5.7 |
| +33% vs 2010 | -22% to -2% vs 2019 | +3% vs 2019 | -14% vs 2019 |
| 1.50 | 0.81 to 1.02 | 1.07 | 0.89 |
| -7% vs 2010 | -46% to -32% vs 2019 | -29% vs 2019 | -41% vs 2019 |
| | 1,805 +48% vs 2010 6.7 +33% vs 2010 1.50 | Current policies 1,805 1,530 to 1,930 +48% vs 2010 -15% to +7% vs 2019 6.7 5.2 to 6.5 +33% vs 2010 -22% to -2% vs 2019 1.50 0.81 to 1.02 | Current policies NDC unconditional 1,805 1,530 to 1,930 2,025 +48% vs 2010 -15% to +7% vs 2019 +12% vs 2019 6.7 5.2 to 6.5 6.9 +33% vs 2010 -22% to -2% vs 2019 +3% vs 2019 1.50 0.81 to 1.02 1.07 |

4.12 IRAN

Iran's NDC and net zero targets


| Pledge | Key targets |
|----------|--|
| NDC* | Reduce emissions by 4% (unconditional) and 12% (conditional) below BAU by 2030 |
| Net zero | No target (no LTS submitted) |

^{*}Land use emission projections do not account for the impact of natural disturbances and peat


Iran is well **on track to meet both its unconditional and conditional 2030 NDC targets** with existing policies. Our projections suggest that Iran is well positioned to substantially increase the ambition of its targets in the 2025 NDC ambition-raising cycle. Iran has not ratified the Paris Agreement and is one of the few countries in the world with emissions above 1,000 MtCO₂e per year. As it stands, emissions under current policies are projected to steadily increase until 2035, driven by emissions in energy and industry sectors, and show no sign of peaking before 2035.

Impact of climate policies on emissions in Iran

Including land use



Excluding land use



TARGETS

Of the countries that have not ratified the Paris Agreement, as mentioned above, Iran is the largest emitter. The current Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) state that Iran's climate targets and mitigation efforts are conditional on the imposition of international economic sanctions or not (Department of Environment of Iran, 2015), which were reimposed in 2018, when the USA withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal.

Iran has not set a net-zero target nor communicated a long-term strategy to the UNFCCC.

G4M model (2025).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Investments in mitigation measures – renewable energy deployment in particular – have significantly slowed down in the past couple of years, as the government has been prioritising Iran's economic recovery. This is best exemplified by the bill of the Seventh Five-Year Development Plan (2023-2027), a strategic document which serves as a guiding framework for annual budgets and policy developments (The Islamic Republic of Iran, 2023). Unlike the previous edition, the new plan, announced in May 2023, is exclusively focused on addressing Iran's pressing economic challenges and does not include any mitigation measures or renewable energy targets. The government has left out the section on environmental policy, as its priorities appear to lie elsewhere.

Iran's power sector remains dominated by fossil fuels, which accounted for around 92% of its electricity mix in 2024. Renewable energy has seen minimal growth in recent years. In 2024, Iran only had around 1.2 GW of installed capacity from wind and solar, which generated around 0.5% of its electricity (Ember, 2025g). Nuclear energy continues to play a small role in Iran's electricity mix, with just 0.9 GW of installed capacity. Another 1.1 GW reactor is currently under construction—initially set to start operation in 2024 but is now delayed until 2028 (World Nuclear Association, 2024).

2019 historical data and 2030 projections of key emissions indicators for Iran

| 2019 historical | | | 2030 projections |
|-----------------|--|--|---|
| | Current policies | NDC unconditional | NDC conditional |
| 1,030 | 1,195 to 1,255 | 2,030 | 1,860 |
| +17% vs 2010 | +16% to +22% vs 2019 | +97% vs 2019 | +80% vs 2019 |
| 11.9 | 12.5 to 13.2 | 21.3 | 19.5 |
| +4% vs 2010 | +5% to +11% vs 2019 | +79% vs 2019 | +64% vs 2019 |
| 1.86 | 1.61 to 1.70 | 2.74 | 2.51 |
| +10% vs 2010 | -13% to -9% vs 2019 | +47% vs 2019 | +35% vs 2019 |
| | 1,030 +17% vs 2010 11.9 +4% vs 2010 1.86 | Current policies 1,030 1,195 to 1,255 +17% vs 2010 +16% to +22% vs 2019 11.9 12.5 to 13.2 +4% vs 2010 +5% to +11% vs 2019 1.86 1.61 to 1.70 | Current policies NDC unconditional 1,030 1,195 to 1,255 2,030 +17% vs 2010 +16% to +22% vs 2019 +97% vs 2019 11.9 12.5 to 13.2 21.3 +4% vs 2010 +5% to +11% vs 2019 +79% vs 2019 1.86 1.61 to 1.70 2.74 |

4.13 JAPAN


Japan's NDC and net zero targets

| Pledge | Key targets | | | |
|----------|---|---|--|--|
| | 2030 | 2035 | | |
| NDC | Reduce emissions by 46% below 2013 by 2030 | Reduce emissions by 60% below 2013 by 2035 | | |
| Net zero | Net zero by 2050 (GHG; LTS submitted) | | | |

Impact of climate policies on emissions in Japan*

Including land use


do not account for the impact of



Japan is **projected to miss its NDC target under current policies**. Although emissions are projected to continue to decline, this is not sufficient to meet the country's targets for 2030 and 3035. Japan uses a gross-net approach to account for the land use sector in its NDC. This means that it excludes the land use sector in the base year of its NDC target but does include it in the target year. Since the land use sector is a sink, this approach makes it easier for Japan to reach its target.

The downwards trend in emissions is supported by the updated policy targets for renewables, nuclear and fossil electricity by 2040, according to Japan's Seventh Strategic Energy Plan which underpins its NDC 3.0 (The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ), 2025). However, we also observe a stronger downward trend towards 2035 due to lower projected renewable cost forecasts.

Excluding land use



TARGETS

Japan's 2030 NDC, submitted in 2021, sets an emission reduction target of 46% below 2013 levels (Government of Japan, 2022). The updated Plan for Global Warming Countermeasures and the updated long-term strategy under the Paris Agreement were adopted simultaneously (MOEJ, 2021). In its 2025 submission, Japan introduced its new NDC, aiming for a 60% reduction below 2013 levels by 2035. The new NDC also contains a 73% reduction target below 2013 levels for 2040 (Government of Japan, 2025).

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Japan's 2050 net zero target covers all emissions and economic sectors and is enshrined in domestic law. However, it does not report the expected share of emissions removed through land use sinks, technological CDR, and other removal options such as carbon credits (Government of Japan, 2019).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In 2024, as part of the Green Transformation (GX) Basic Policy, the Japanese government issued the world's first sovereign transition bonds called the Japan Climate Transition Bonds. The first tranche was auctioned in February 2024.

Japan moved to restart its currently idled nuclear reactors with an extended lifetime and plans to build new generation reactors, as part of the GX Basic Policy (METI, 2023). Despite this reversal, many regulatory and political hurdles remain, and it also remains uncertain if nuclear power would significantly contribute to Japan's 2030 target (Renewable Energy Institute, 2023).

On the energy demand side, a significant policy development is the amendment of the Building Energy Efficiency Act in June 2022 (ECCJ, 2022). As of April 2025, all new buildings are now required to meet the minimum energy efficiency standards (not the case before). The potential impact of this policy update is, however, not quantified in this year's analysis due to time constraints.

2019 historical data and 2035 projections of key emissions indicators for Japan

| Indicator (incl. land use) | 2019 historical | | 2035 projections |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | | Current policies | NDC unconditional |
| Absolute emissions | 1,155 | 605 to 820 | 565 |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | -6% vs 2010 | -48% to -29% vs 2019 | -51% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per capita | 9.1 | 5.2 to 7.1 | 4.9 |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | -5% vs 2010 | -43% to -22% vs 2019 | -47% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per GDP | 0.19 | 0.09 to 0.12 | 0.08 |
| (tCO ₂ e/thousand USD) | -13% vs 2010 | -51% to -34% vs 2019 | -54% vs 2019 |

4.14 MEXICO

Mexico's NDC and net zero targets


| Pledge | Key targets |
|----------|---|
| NDC | Reduce emissions by 35% (mostly unconditional) and by 40% (conditional) below BAU by 2030 |
| Net zero | No target (LTS submitted) |

Impact of climate policies on emissions in Mexico


Based on our analysis, Mexico could be on track to meet its unconditional 2030 NDC target, but is projected to miss its conditional 2030 NDC target with existing policies. Our current policy projections show a wide emissions range considering the uncertainty in the implementation of Mexico's policies under the new government, especially as it relates to the deployment of renewables. This contributes to the uncertainty of Mexico reaching its unconditional target. The land use sector is currently an emissions sink, which is projected to increase moderately towards 2035.

Our 2025 current policies scenario's upper end has not been updated, but in the lower end, we consider a revision of Mexico's renewables targets, as well as removed policies and modelling updates. Historical data (incl. LULUCF data) have also been revised upwards.

Including land use



2030 NDC | unconditional 675 Mt CO₂e 2030 NDC | conditional 580 Mt CO₂e



TARGETS

Mexico's NDC includes a target to reduce emissions by 35% below BAU by 2030 (including a statement that 5% of the 35% would be met with "previously agreed international support"), and a 5% further reduction conditional on international finance. As of October 2025, Mexico has not yet submitted its 2035 NDC to the UNFCCC, though it has announced that the next NDC submission will make the 2030 target unconditional and introduce a 2035 target aligned with net zero by 2050 (Government of Mexico, 2025).

Mexico remains the only G20 country without a net zero target. The country submitted a long-term strategy (LTS) to the UNFCCC in 2016. This LTS does not include a net-zero target and has not been updated since. At COP29, Mexico formally announced a national net zero target for 2050 (Government of Mexico, 2024).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Since our last update, Mexico has advanced with the implementation of several policies that can impact emissions. In May 2025, the government launched an updated National Climate Change Strategy, targeting emission reductions by 2030 through renewable energy, reforestation, circular economy initiatives, mangrove restoration, and sustainable agriculture (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, 2025).

In 2024, the Electric Industry Law reform, meant to prioritise state-owned fossil fuel power plants was partly reversed. Then, in January 2025, a Power Sector Law was introduced (and approved in March 2025), allowing public-private energy projects only if the state retains a minimum 54% stake, thereby reinforcing state-driven energy control (Barrera, 2025). In Mexico's most recent power sector plan PRODESEN 2024-2038, fossil fuel installed capacity additions represent nearly 30% of total additions between 2024-2027 (SENER, 2024). For renewables, the plan aims to integrate nearly 94 GW of new capacity by 2038 across solar PV, distributed generation, wind, hydrogen-powered combined cycles, and battery storage. In the short term (2024–2027), around 18 GW of this will be renewable, including ~5 GW in solar PV, ~5 GW in wind, ~2.9 GW in distributed solar, and ~5.5 GW in battery storage systems (Energy News Pro, 2024).

2019 historical data and 2030 projections of key emissions indicators for Mexico

| Indicator (incl. land use) | 2019 historical | | | 2030 projections |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| | | Current policies | NDC unconditional | NDC conditional |
| Absolute emissions | 550 | 620 to 755 | 675 | 580 |
| (tCO2e/cap) | +10% vs 2010 | +13% to +38% vs 2019 | +23% vs 2019 | +5% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per capita | 4.4 | 4.6 to 5.5 | 4.9 | 4.2 |
| (tCO2e/cap) | -1% vs 2010 | +4% to +26% vs 2019 | +13% vs 2019 | -3% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per GDP | 0.41 | 0.40 to 0.49 | 0.44 | 0.38 |
| (tCO ₂ e/thousand USD) | -8% vs 2010 | -3% to +18% vs 2019 | +6% vs 2019 | -9% vs 2019 |


4.15 MOROCCO

Morocco's NDC and net zero targets

| Pledge | Key targets | | | |
|----------|---------------------------|---|--|--|
| | 2030 | 2035 | | |
| NDC | 3 | Reduce emissions by 53% below BAU by 2035, of which 21.6% unconditional and 31.4% conditional reductions | | |
| Net zero | No target (LTS submitted) | | | |

Morocco is **projected to miss its conditional 2030 and 2035 NDC target, but is likely on track to meet its unconditional 2030 and 2035 NDC target** with existing policies. This suggests that Morocco is well positioned to increase the ambition of its unconditional target in the 2025 NDC ambition-raising cycle. Our current policies scenario shows that emissions in Morocco are highly uncertain. Moreover, while Morocco has ambitious targets, especially for renewables, policy implementation progress remains slow.

Impact of climate policies on emissions in Morocco



TARGETS

Morocco's NDC sets an emission reduction target to reduce emissions by 45.5% below BAU by 2030, of which 18.3% unconditional reductions and 27.2% conditional reductions (Government of Morocco, 2021a). In September 2025, Morocco submitted its 2035 NDC to the UNFCCC, which includes an unconditional target to reduce emissions by 21.6% and a conditional target of 31.4% below BAU by 2035, for a total of 53% emission reductions below BAU by 2035 (Government of Morocco, 2025).

G4M model (2025).

In its long-term strategy, Morocco announced its intention to reach net zero within the century, but did not commit to a specific year for net zero or provide any further details regarding the gas coverage, sector scope, role of land use sinks, technological CDR, or international carbon credits of this target (Government of Morocco, 2021b).

Mexico remains the only G20 country without a net zero target. The country submitted a long-term strategy (LTS) to the UNFCCC in 2016. This LTS does not include a net-zero target and has not been updated since. At COP29, Mexico formally announced a national net zero target for 2050 (Government of Mexico, 2024).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Renewable energy is central to Morocco's emission reduction efforts. After missing its 2020 target of 42% renewable capacity, the country now aims for 52% by 2030. In 2024, renewables accounted for 40% of installed electricity capacity and 27% of generation, mainly from wind, while solar deployment remains constrained by regulatory and financial barriers (Ember, 2025h, 2025i).

Morocco also aims to become a global green hydrogen leader, targeting 4% of global demand by 2050 (Kingdom of Morocco, 2021). This was followed by the launch of Morocco's first green hydrogen production system in 2022. As intermediary target, by 2030, Morocco aims to generate 3,500 GWh of hydrogen powered by 3 GW of renewable energy projects, primarily from photovoltaics (PV) (80%) and wind power (20%) (CMS, 2024).

Coal, however, which accounted for 59% of Morocco's electricity mix in 2024, remains a significant obstacle to the full decarbonisation of the electricity sector. Although its share in the power mix has slightly declined, actual coal-based generation has remained relatively stable (Ember, 2025i). Morocco has no official coal phase-out year, and the country recently extended the operational life of its largest coal plant to 2044, indicating a continuation of this trend (Moroccan Ministry of Finance, 2020).

While the government outlined numerous mitigation policies for industry and agriculture in its 2021 NDC, many of which are already underway, the waste and transport sectors are noticeably lagging behind. Morocco's efforts to decarbonise the transport sector have focused mainly on expanding public transit, with few measures targeting actual road emissions. The waste sector remains largely underdeveloped, held back by limited infrastructure, a lack of targeted regulations, and insufficient financial incentives.

2019 historical data and 2035 projections of key emissions indicators for Morocco

Emission values are rounded to the nearest five

Indicator (incl. land use)

Emissions per GDP (tCO₂e/thousand USD)

Current policies NDC | unconditional NDC | conditional 80 **Absolute emissions** 100 90 to 130 130 (tCO₂e/cap) +33% vs 2010 -10% to +35% vs 2019 +33% vs 2019 -20% vs 2019 **Emissions per capita** 2.7 2.1 to 3.2 1.9 3.2 (tCO₂e/cap) +19% vs 2010 -30% vs 2019 -21% to +18% vs 2019 +17% vs 2019

0.41 to 0.62

-43% to -14% vs 2019

2019 historical

0.72

-2% vs 2010

0.36

-49% vs 2019

2035 projections

0.61

-15% vs 2019


4.16 REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Republic of Korea's NDC and net zero targets


| Pledge | Key targets |
|----------|---|
| NDC | Reduce emissions by 40% below 2018 by 2030 |
| Net zero | Net zero by 2050 (gas coverage unclear; LTS submitted) |

Impact of climate policies on emissions in Republic of Korea* The Republic of Korea is **projected to miss its 2030 NDC target** with existing policies. Emissions are projected to decline towards 2030, but not at a sufficient pace to meet the NDC target. Most of the uncertainty in our projections relates to the impact of the Korean Emissions Trading Scheme (K-ETS) on emissions after 2025. The Republic of Korea uses a gross-net approach to account for the land use sector in its NDC. This means that it does not include the land use sector in the base year of its NDC target but does include it in the target year. Since the land use sector is a sink, this approach makes it easier for the Republic of Korea to achieve its target.

Including land use



2030 NDC | unconditional 440 Mt CO₂e



Source: PBL IMAGE model (lower end); NewClimate Institut calculations (upper end); IIASA GLOBIOM/G4M model (2025).

*See our methodological annex (A3) on the consideration of land use for the NDC quantification.

TARGETS

The Republic of Korea's NDC includes an economy-wide target to reduce emissions by 40% below 2018 levels by 2030 (Republic of Korea, 2021). The NDC includes emission reductions from land use and international credits. As of October 2025, the Republic of Korea has not yet submitted its 2035 NDC to the UNFCCC.

The Republic of Korea's long-term strategy includes a carbon neutrality target, which has already been enshrined in law. It is unclear whether the 2050 target includes all emissions or only carbon dioxide. The Republic of Korea's plan specifies that the carbon neutrality target will be achieved without the use of international carbon credits, and it also specifies the role expected for land use sinks, as well as the individual contributions from specific sectors towards the target (Republic of Korea, 2020).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The Republic of Korea's energy and climate policies face uncertainty following the impeachment of the Yoon administration, which had continued the shift away from the 30% renewables target in its 2021 NDC to instead revitalise the nuclear power industry. The 11th Basic Electricity Plan, approved in February 2025, reiterated the new renewable energy generation target of 21.8% in 2030 and the growing share of nuclear power, while slightly expanding fossil gas and reducing coal's contribution compared to the 10th Plan (General Committee on the Basic Plan on Electricity Supply and Demand, 2024). The incoming Lee Jae Myung administration has signalled a stronger renewables push and possible coal-phase out measures (Hwang, 2025).

In June 2024, the Yoon administration approved an exploratory drilling project off the east coast, targeting potential reserves of up to 14 billion barrels oil and gas, aiming to reduce dependence on imported liquefied natural gas (LNG) (Szymczak, 2024). Meanwhile, reforms to the Korea Emissions Trading Scheme (K-ETS) were weakened due to industry pressure, which has resulted in higher emissions caps, generous free allowances, and a carbon price well below the levels recommended by the IPCC (InfluenceMap, 2025).

2019 historical data and 2030 projections of key emissions indicators for Republic of Korea

Emission values are rounded to the nearest five

The Constitutional Court ruled in August 2024 that the absence of legally binding emissions targets between 2031 and 2049 imposes an excessive burden on the future. It therefore ordered the Korean government to amend the Framework Act on Carbon Neutrality to include long-term annual reduction targets by February 2026.

| Indicator (incl. land use) | 2019 historical | | 2030 projections | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|---------------------|--|
| | | Current policies | NDC unconditional | |
| Absolute emissions | 670 | 465 to 540 | 440 | |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | +9% vs 2010 | -31% to -19% vs 2019 | -35% vs 2019 | |
| Emissions per capita | 13.0 | 9.1 to 10.5 | 8.6 | |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | +3% vs 2010 | -30% to -19% vs 2019 | -34% vs 2019 | |
| Emissions per GDP | 0.43 | 0.24 to 0.28 | 0.23 | |
| (tCO ₂ e/thousand USD) | -17% vs 2010 | -43% to -34% vs 2019 | -47% vs 2019 | |

4.17 RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Russian Federation's NDC and net zero targets

| Pledge | Key targets | | | |
|----------|--|---|--|--|
| | 2030 | 2035 | | |
| NDC | Reduce emissions to 70% of 1990 levels by 2030 | Reduce emissions to 65-67% of 1990 levels by 2035, with caveats on LULUCF sinks and socioeconomic developments in the country | | |
| Net zero | Net zero by 2060 at the latest (GHG; LTS submitted) | | | |

of the previously reported sink to approximately 1,200 MtCO₂e. This increase is mainly attributed to enhanced carbon uptake by managed forests, reduced forest fires, reforestation and restoration activities, and greater soil organic carbon accumulation. For our projections, these model adjustments did not lead to equally large increases in the sink. However, after post-model harmonization, initial values were adjusted, maintaining sink levels of around 1,200 MtCO₂e for both 2030 and 2035. Nonetheless, an upward trend in emissions persists due to potential forest fires and other disturbances. The lower end of our emission projections indicates that emissions have already started to decline before 2025, but the upper end of our projections shows emissions continuing to increase in the coming years.


The Russian Federation is **on track to meet its 2030 and 2035 NDC target** with existing policies. However, both targets are significantly above current emission levels and

do not drive any further emission reductions. It is important

to note that for its First BTR, Russia recalculated its historical


Impact of climate policies on emissions in Russian Federation*

Including land use



2030 NDC | unconditional 1,710 Mt CO₂e

2035 NDC | unconditional 1,635—1,585 Mt CO₂e



Source: PBL IMAGE model (upper end); NewClimate Institute calculations (lower end); IIASA GLOBIOM/G4M model (2025).

*Ine calculations of the 2030 and 2035 NDC levels were based on the updated 1990 historical values provided in the Russian Federation's NDC 3.0 submission

TARGETS

The Russian Federation's NDC includes a target to reduce emissions to 70% of 1990 levels by 2030 aligning with the lower bound of its original 70-75% target range (Government of the Russian Federation, 2020). In September 2025, the Russian

Federation submitted its 2035 NDC to the UNFCCC, targeting a reduction of emissions to 65-67% of 1990 levels by 2035 (Government of the Russian Federation, 2025c).

The Russian Federation announced it would set a 2060 net zero target. This was followed by government approval of the 'Strategy of socio-economic development of the Russian Federation with low emissions levels by 2050' which formalised this target. It also included an additional target of reaching an 80% reduction in emissions below 1990 levels by 2050. The long-term strategy reiterating these targets was submitted to the UNFCCC in September 2022 (Government of the Russian Federation, 2022).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Developments in Russian climate policy and ambition remain limited. In late 2023, the Russian Federation renewed its 2009 Climate Doctrine, which still acknowledges human-induced climate change and Russia's goal to reach net zero by 2060, but they removed any references to the role of fossil fuels in driving the crisis (Presidential Executive Office, 2023; Asia Pacific Energy Portal, 2024). Meanwhile, the international climate impact of Russia's war on Ukraine persists, and the associated rise in military spending, particularly in Europe, will lead to increased military emissions worldwide (Parkinson, 2025).

Russia's economy is heavily dependent on fossil fuel revenues, and recent policy documents reinforce its vision of a "fossil fuel-intensive" future. The Energy Strategy to 2050, released in 2025, projects fossil fuel to account for over 85% of total primary energy consumption, while accompanying power sector strategies limit wind and solar electricity generation to just over 3% by 2042 (Government of the Russian Federation, 2025b, 2025a). Government forecasts anticipate growing demand for Russian fossil fuels, despite contrasting market trends and projections from Russia's own Central Bank and other international agencies (Vasilenko et al., 2024).

In 2024, Russia revised its historical LULUCF data, nearly doubling reported carbon absorption by including unmanaged "reserve" forests in its GHG inventory (Light, 2021; UNFCCC / Russian Federation, 2024). This change allows Russia to claim that it has already achieved its 2050 LULUCF target without any further action. However, this approach conflicts with IPCC guidelines, which restrict carbon accounting to managed forests. Other aspects of LULUCF data have also faced scrutiny, with independent analyses challenging the accuracy of official forest fire data (Novaya Gazeta Europe, 2023).

2019 historical data and 2035 projections of key emissions indicators for Russian Federation

| Indicator (incl. land use) | 2019 historical | | 2035 projections |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | | Current policies | NDC unconditional |
| Absolute emissions | 1,150 | 725 to 1,195 | 1,635 to 1,585 |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | +411% vs 2010 | -37% to +4% vs 2019 | +42% to +38% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per capita | 7.9 | 5.2 to 8.5 | 11.7 to 11.3 |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | +402% vs 2010 | -34% to +9% vs 2019 | +49% to +44% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per GDP | 0.61 | 0.31 to 0.51 | 0.69 to 0.67 |
| (tCO ₂ e/thousand USD) | +339% vs 2010 | -50% to -17% vs 2019 | +14% to +11% vs 2019 |

4.18 SAUDI ARABIA

Saudi Arabia's NDC and net zero targets


| Pledge | Key targets |
|----------|--|
| NDC | Reduce emissions by 278 MtCO2e annually by 2030 (unclear reference) |
| Net zero | Net zero by 2060 (gas coverage unclear; no LTS submitted) |

Saudi Arabia is **likely on track to meet its 2030 NDC target** with existing policies. The lack of official estimates for the reference of its NDC target, however, increases the uncertainty of our analysis. We assume that the NDC target refers to reductions below a baseline scenario of 990-1240 MtCO₂e in 2030 (Climate Action Tracker, 2020). Emissions under current policies are projected to increase until 2035. Although the growth does slow down post-2027 in the upper end of our scenario, emissions show no clear sign of peaking before 2035.


Impact of climate policies on emissions in Saudi Arabia

Including land use

Source: NewClimate Institute



2030 NDC | unconditional 980—730 Mt CO₂e



TARGETS

Saudi Arabia's NDC includes a target to cut emissions by 278 MtCO₂e by 2030. Due to uncertainty about the reference for the target calculation, the quantification of the NDC target leads to a broad emissions range. Our estimates result in absolute emissions between 730 and 980 MtCO₂e in 2030. Other studies interpret Saudi Arabia's target differently and instead show emissions ranging between 310 and 800 MtCO₂e in 2030 (Meinshausen et al., 2021; Climate Action Tracker, 2022). As of October 2025, Saudi Arabia has not yet submitted its 2035 NDC to the UNFCCC.

The net zero by 2060 target was announced in 2021 but has not been submitted to the UNFCCC as part of Saudi Arabia's long-term strategy. Sectoral and gas coverage of the target remains unclear, as well as the role of land use sinks, technological CDR and international carbon credits for achieving the target (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2021a).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The Saudi Green Initiative lists several measures to reach the updated NDC target (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2021a). These include increasing the share of renewable energy to 50% by 2030, installing 100–130 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2030, enhancing energy efficiency, producing hydrogen, using carbon capture for methanol and improving waste management.

Saudi Arabia has made very little progress in deploying renewables and decarbonising its power sector. In 2024, renewables generated around 2% of electricity, and Saudi Arabia still had around 6 GW of installed renewable capacity in 2025 (Ember, 2025j; Saudi Green Initiative, 2025). In contrast, it had 100 GW of oil and gas plants in operation along with a pipeline of more than 8 GW of fossil plants under construction as of early 2024 (Global Energy Monitor, 2025b). At the current pace, the 50% renewable electricity target by 2030 likely remains out of reach.

Despite diversification plans away from fossil fuels, Saudi Arabia remains highly reliant on fossil revenues (KPMG, 2022). The government is relying on carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies to reach its climate goals while simultaneously sustaining its extensive fossil fuel production and exports (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2021b). In January 2024, the Saudi national oil company, Aramco, abandoned its plan to increase oil production capacity to 13 million barrels per day by 2027 from currently 12 million barrels per day. However, this decision appears largely driven by strategic considerations rather than a commitment to phase out fossil fuels, reflecting changes in the global oil market, including slowing demand growth and increased production from non-OPEC countries (Financial Times, 2024).

2019 historical data and 2030 projections of key emissions indicators for Saudi Arabia

| Indicator (incl. land use) | 2019 historical | | 2030 projections |
|----------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | | Current policies | NDC unconditional |
| Absolute emissions | 730 | 830 to 840 | 980 to 730 |
| (tCO2e/cap) | +29% vs 2010 | +14% to +15% vs 2019 | +34% to +0% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per capita | 24.2 | 22.4 to 22.6 | 26.3 to 19.6 |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | +5% vs 2010 | -8% to -7% vs 2019 | +9% to -19% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per GDP | 0.99 | 0.85 to 0.86 | 1.00 to 0.74 |
| (tCO2e/thousand USD) | -8% vs 2010 | -14% to -14% vs 2019 | +1% to -25% vs 2019 |
| | | | |


4.19 SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa's NDC and net zero targets

| Pledge | Key targets |
|----------|---|
| NDC | Limit emissions to 355–425 MtCO₂e by 2030 |
| Net zero | Net zero by 2050 (CO ₂ ; LTS submitted) |

Impact of climate policies on emissions in South Africa


Including land use



(lower end); NewClimate Institute calculations (upper end); IIASA GLOBIOM/G4M model (2025).

South Africa is **likely on track to meet the upper end of its 2030 NDC target** under an ambitious interpretation of current policies. Our analysis suggests that emissions will likely fall within the NDC's target range, although achieving the lower end of the target appears unlikely. However, we project substantial uncertainty in the country's emissions, especially considering the magnitude of emissions related to Eskom's, South Africa's public utility, coal-fired power plants. Emissions in South Africa could plateau towards 2030 or continue to decline, based on the lower end of current policy projections. Towards 2035 emissions are projected to further decline only marginally under current policies.

Excluding land use



TARGETS

South Africa's NDC sets an economy-wide target of 355–425 MtCO₂e by 2030 (Republic of South Africa, 2021). We assume this target is unconditional. The country notes that "implementation of these ambitious mitigation targets will require substantial multilateral support" referring to the Paris Agreement's general support provisions for developing countries rather than target conditionality. As of October 2025, South Africa has not yet submitted its 2035 NDC to the UNFCCC. In its long-term strategy, South Africa commits to "moving towards a goal of net zero carbon emissions by 2050" (Government of South Africa, 2020). South Africa is still in the process of developing its 2050 target, thus all elements on scope, architecture and transparency, such as reliance on land use sinks and international carbon credits to achieve its target, remain unclear.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In November 2022, South Africa launched the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) investment plan, mapping out nearly USD 100 billion in required financing between 2023 and 2027 (European Commission, 2022a; Government of South Africa, 2022; Presidential Climate Commission South Africa, 2023). The JET-P has progressed from planning to implementation, with several ongoing projects reported by the government. (South African Government, 2024e). In early 2025, the USA withdrew from the partnership and rescind its committed funding. However, this withdrawal still leaves South Africa with USD 12.8 billion in funding and the government is actively seeking new partnerships (South African Government, 2025).

South Africa is undertaking major reforms to its electricity system as the government attempts to stabilise supply and reduce load-shedding. In 2024, the South African government passed the Electricity Regulation Amendment Act to establish an independent state-owned transmission network and operator, a role previously held by Eskom alongside its role as the country's largest electricity generator (South African Government, 2024d). Simultaneously, South Africa is adding significant generating capacity to the grid. Several public auctions have been held in recent years to facilitate the deployment of privately operated wind and solar farms, with the most recent auction having closed in December 2024 (South African Government, 2024b). However, South Africa also continues to add new fossil fuel generation to the system, with two large capacity additions made to existing coal plant in 2024 and 2025 (Eskom, 2024, 2025).

The Climate Change Act was adopted by the South African government in July 2024. Under the legislation, the government must set sectoral emission targets for each GHG emitting sector in line with the national emission target every five years. Carbon budgets will also be allocated to large-scale GHG emitting companies, intended to place a cap on emissions and make it mandatory for companies to constrain their emissions (South African Government, 2024c). The framework Act should be operationalised through additional legislation in the near term, with the first meaningful follow on legislation opened for public consultation in late 2025 (South African Government, 2024a).

2019 historical data and 2030 projections of key emissions indicators for South Africa

| Indicator (incl. land use) | 2019 historical | 2019 historical | |
|----------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | | Current policies | NDC unconditional |
| Absolute emissions | 485 | 400 to 470 | 425 to 355 |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | -7% vs 2010 | -17% to -4% vs 2019 | -13% to -27% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per capita | 8.2 | 5.9 to 6.9 | 6.3 to 5.2 |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | -18% vs 2010 | -28% to -16% vs 2019 | -24% to -37% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per GDP | 1.01 | 0.75 to 0.87 | 0.79 to 0.66 |
| (tCO₂e/thousand USD) | -8% vs 2010 | -14% to -14% vs 2019 | +1% to -25% vs 2019 |

4.20 THAILAND


Thailand's NDC and net zero targets

| Pledge | Key targets |
|----------|---|
| NDC | Reduce emissions by 30% (unconditional) and by 40% (conditional) below BAU excluding land use by 2030 |
| Net zero | Net zero CO₂ by 2050 and net zero GHG by 2065 (LTS submitted) |


Thailand is **likely off track but could be on track to meet its unconditional 2030 NDC target**, if existing policies are fully implemented under their most ambitious interpretation. However, it is **projected to miss its conditional 2030 NDC target** under current policies. Thailand's emissions are projected to increase and show no signs of peaking before 2035. The land use sector is projected to remain a major emissions sink up to 2035.

Impact of climate policies on emissions in Thailand

Including land use



2030 NDC | unconditional 395 Mt CO₂e 2030 NDC | conditional 340 Mt CO₂e



TARGETS

Thailand's current NDC (2.0) includes an unconditional target of reducing emissions by 30% below BAU by 2030, and a conditional target of reducing emissions by 40% below BAU by 2030. Both targets and the BAU excluded the land use sector. The BAU emissions are expected to reach 555 MtCO₂e by 2030 (Government of Thailand, 2022a). As of October 2025, Thailand has not yet submitted its 2035 NDC to the UNFCCC.

Thailand submitted targets to reach carbon neutrality by 2050 and net zero emissions by 2065 to the UNFCCC before COP27. Thailand plans to use considerable land use sinks and carbon capture and storage to reach those targets (Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning, 2022). Neither target is codified in law, and independent observers noted implementation as critically insufficient.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Since announcing its net zero target in 2022, Thailand has been working on integrating this long-term target into its national strategies, institutional frameworks and sectoral plans. Thailand established the Department of Climate Change and Environment (DCEE) within the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment in 2023, to drive climate policymaking and planning. As of 2025, several major climate policy documents are awaiting approval by the government, slowed by the political turbulence experienced throughout 2024 and 2025. Climate and environmental issues nonetheless featured prominently in the new Prime Minister's inaugural statement, which pledged accelerated clean energy and industry transitions, stronger land-based mitigation, and the establishment of an emissions trading system, though delivery remains uncertain given political constraints (The Nation Thailand, 2025).

Thailand's landmark Climate Change Act (CCA) has been in the final stages of legislative review for a year, and was submitted for approval by the newly appointed Cabinet in September 2025. The draft CCA proposes several new measures the support emissions reductions in line with above targets, including carbon pricing, a carbon tax, an emissions trading system, a monitoring and evaluation framework, a domestic CBAM, and a climate fund feeding into a comprehensive climate investment plan, backed by the Thai Board of Investment. (Department of Climate Change and Environment, 2025).

The land and energy sectors are the focus of Thailand's climate change mitigation strategies (Government of Thailand, 2022b). The draft NEP 2024 lays out a roadmap for the energy sector to support Thailand's development and climate objectives, doubling electricity capacity by 2037 with over half of the total capacity targeted to be from renewable sources (Ministry of Energy, 2024). The National Energy Plan (NEP) 2024, and its sub-plans, the Alternative Energy Development Plan (AEDP), the Energy Efficiency Plan (EEP), the Gas Plan and the Oil Plan, are all in the final stages of development and review, expected in 2025.

2019 historical data and 2030 projections of key emissions indicators for Thailand

| Indicator (incl. land use) | 2019 historical | | | 2030 projections |
|----------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| | | Current policies | NDC unconditional | NDC conditional |
| Absolute emissions | 385 | 390 to 425 | 395 | 340 |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | +9% vs 2010 | +2% to +11% vs 2019 | +3% vs 2019 | -11% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per capita | 5.4 | 5.5 to 6.0 | 5.6 | 4.8 |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | +5% vs 2010 | +2% to +11% vs 2019 | +4% vs 2019 | -11% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per GDP | 0.85 | 0.75 to 0.81 | 0.76 | 0.65 |
| (tCO₂e/thousand USD) | -17% vs 2010 | -12% to -4% vs 2019 | -10% vs 2019 | -23% vs 2019 |

4.21 TÜRKIYE

Türkiye's NDC and net zero targets


| Pledge | Key targets | |
|----------|--|---|
| | 2030 | 2035 |
| NDC | Reduce emissions by 41% below BAU by 2030. Peaking date at the latest in 2038 | Reduce emissions by 465 MtCO ₂ e compared to BAU, to 640 MtCO ₂ e by 2035 (announcement only) |
| Net zero | Net zero by 2053 (gas LTS submitted) | coverage unclear; no |

Impact of climate policies on emissions in Türkiye


Türkiye is **on track to meet its 2030 and 2035 NDC targets** under current policies. However, both targets are significantly above current emission levels and do not drive any further emission reductions. We project substantial uncertainty as emission projections in Türkiye are highly dependent on socio-economic assumptions. Emissions under current policies are projected to plateau and slightly decline at the lower end or steadily increase until 2035 without any sign of peaking.

The LULUCF sector remains a net sink, consistent with 2024 historical data; however, a decline in the trend from 2019 to 2022 is observed due to intensive wood harvesting from salvage logging, increased demand from Türkiye's expanding wood industry, and large-scale forest fires and other climate-related disturbances.





Excluding land use



TARGETS

Türkiye's NDC sets an unconditional target to reduce economy-wide emissions by 41% below BAU by 2030 (Government of Türkiye, 2023) and indicates an intention to peak emissions no later than 2038. During the Climate Summit 2025, Türkiye announced its intention to achieve 465 MtCO₂e emission reduction by 2035 (from un unspecified BAU) and reduce emissions to 640MtCO₂e (Türkiye Today, 2025).

Türkiye aims to reach net zero by 2053 (Government of Türkiye, 2021). Its long-term strategy, released at COP29, reaffirms this target and sets specific reductions in a few subsectors, such as cement, iron and steel, aluminium, and fertilisers

(Government of Türkiye, 2024). However, most sectors lack clear targets, and the use of offsets, CDR, and the inclusion of aviation and shipping remain unspecified.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Türkiye's efforts focus on energy security and efficiency, as the country faces the fastest rising energy demand among OECD countries. The National Energy Plan 2022–2035 sets long-term targets, including 120 GW of solar and wind capacity by 2035, part of a 160 GW renewable energy goal with hydro and biomass (Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2022). Achieving this requires annual additions of 7.5–8 GW. Implementation has fluctuated: 2023 saw the lowest wind additions in 13 years, while 2024 wind installations recovered to 1.1 GW and solar reached a record 8.6 GW (Ember, 2025c). To reduce dependence on electricity imports, Türkiye's 2030 Energy Efficiency Strategy and Action Plan sets a target of cutting primary energy consumption by 16% by 2030, supported by a USD 20 billion investment program in energy efficiency (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2024).

Coal and gas remain central to the economy, with no scheduled phase-out. In 2024, Türkiye became Europe's largest coal-fired electricity producer (Reuters, 2024c). In recent years, most proposed coal projects have faced local resistance and legal blocks, and the widespread cancellations represent a positive trend, though a committed coal phase-out is still needed (Carbon Brief, 2024; Global Energy Monitor, 2025a). Türkiye also plans to expand gas production and develop a regional hub, including 270 new drilling operations in 2025 (Türkiye Today, 2024).

In July 2025 Türkiye's Parliament passed the country's first national Climate Law, establishing a legally binding Emissions Trading System (ETS), clarifying institutional roles with a Climate Change Directorate, and creating a Carbon Market Board to regulate and enforce carbon pricing (Government of Türkiye, 2025). The ETS will limit emissions intensity from major polluters, with a planned pilot phase by 2026. The law also mandates local adaptation planning and promotes clean energy support.

In transport, the Transport and Logistics Master Plan 2053 envisages USD 298 billion investment, scaling rail passenger share to 5% and freight to 20% by 2035 (Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, 2023). Complementary policies promote domestic EV production, notably through the Togg electric vehicle program, and the expansion of high-speed electric rail (Ministry of Industry and Technology, 2022; Kasapovic and Knowles, 2024; Railway Gazette International, 2024; Railway Supply, 2024).

2019 historical data and 2035 projections of key emissions indicators for Türkiye

| Indicator (incl. land use) | 2019 historical | | 2035 projections |
|----------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | | Current policies | NDC unconditional |
| Absolute emissions | 455 | 465 to 580 | 640 |
| (tCO2e/cap) | +35% vs 2010 | +3% to +28% vs 2019 | +41% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per capita | 5.3 | 5.2 to 6.4 | 7.1 |
| (tCO2e/cap) | +16% vs 2010 | -3% to +21% vs 2019 | +33% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per GDP | 0.36 | 0.20 to 0.25 | 0.27 |
| (tCO2e/thousand USD) | -17% vs 2010 | -45% to -31% vs 2019 | -24% vs 2019 |
| | | | |

4.22 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE)


UAE's NDC and net zero targets

| Pledge | Key targets | |
|----------|--|---|
| | 2030 | 2035 |
| NDC | Limit emissions to 182 MtCO₂e by 2030 | Reduce emissions by 47% below 2019 baseline by 2035 (105 MtCO₂e in 2035, incl. LULUCF) |
| Net zero | Net zero by 2050 (GHG; LTS submitted) | |


The UAE is **projected to miss its 2030 and 2035 NDC target**. Emission projections are highly uncertain under current policies and are expected to plateau towards 2030 and beyond at the lower end of our projections.

Impact of climate policies on emissions in the UAE

Including land use



Excluding land use



TARGETS

The UAE NDC the unconditional target of reducing emissions to 182 MtCO₂e by 2030 (Government of the UAE, 2023a). The NDC includes sectoral measures to support this economy-wide target. In November 2024, the UAE published their updated NDC, targeting a 47% reduction compared to 2019 levels by 2035, reaching an emissions level of 105 MtCO₂e.

The government also announced a 2050 net zero target and has released several official communications on its net zero plans since (Government of the UAE, 2021). The UAE also submitted an LTS to the UNFCCC in 2024 (United Arab Emirates, 2024).

The strategy aligns the NDC and net zero targets and presents sectoral pathways and mitigation measures by sector and their expected impact. The net zero target aims to reduce emissions to 13 MtCO₂e by 2050 while increasing LULUCF sinks to 3.5 MtCO₂e and removing 9.5 MtCO₂e through technical removal options.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

After a few years of exponential growth, the UAE's wind and solar capacity has remained almost constant between 2023 and 2024 (Ember, 2025k). With current plans, it will reach 9 GW of installed capacity of wind and solar by 2030, up from around 6 GW in 2024 (Tollast, 2022; Government of the UAE, 2023b).

Major targets and policies expected to impact emissions in the UAE remain unchanged from last year. For the period between 2030 and 2050, the UAE plans to reduce its emissions to 3.5 MtCO₂e. Most of the emissions reductions will come from the industry and power sectors. In the industry sector, which includes oil and gas production, 32% of the reductions will be met through carbon capture and storage (CCS), which translates to roughly 43.5 MtCO₂e. In the power sector, natural gas is scheduled to account for 50% of total installed capacity in 2050, but with a 0 tCO₂/MWh grid coefficient. This implies an equally extensive use of CCS in the power sector (United Arab Emirates, 2024).

Alongside its plans to reduce emissions, the UAE continues to invest in oil and gas, with no clear plan to phase down production in the foreseeable future. Indeed, the UAE is planning investments of USD 150 billion to support oil and gas expansion, and it recently brought its oil production target up from 2030 to 2027 (The Guardian, 2023).

2019 historical data and 2035 projections of key emissions indicators for the UAE

Emission values are rounded to the nearest five

In May 2025, the UAE enacted a climate law requiring all public and private entities to measure, report, and reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. The law also mandates the development of climate adaptation plans and the establishment of systems for emissions monitoring and verification (UAE Government, 2024).

| Indicator (incl. land use) | 2019 historical | | 2035 projections |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | | Current policies | NDC unconditional |
| Absolute emissions | 225 | 245 to 310 | 105 |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | +2% vs 2010 | +9% to +39% vs 2019 | -53% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per capita | 23.8 | 19.0 to 24.3 | 8.1 |
| (tCO2e/cap) | -26% vs 2010 | -20% to +2% vs 2019 | -66% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per GDP | 0.54 | 0.33 to 0.43 | 0.14 |
| (tCO ₂ e/thousand USD) | -26% vs 2010 | -38% to -21% vs 2019 | -74% vs 2019 |

4.23 UNITED KINGDOM (UK)


UK's NDC and net zero targets

| Pledge | Key targets | | |
|----------|---|---|--|
| | 2030 | 2035 | |
| NDC | Reduce emissions by 68% below 1990 by 2030 | Reduce emissions by 81% below 1990 by 2035 | |
| Net zero | Net zero by 2050 (GHG; LTS submitted) | | |


The UK is **projected to miss both its 2030 and 2035 NDC targets** under current policies, despite emissions being on a downward trend up to 2035. However, the declining trend could slow down substantially and result in emissions plateauing towards 2035. The upper end of the range only includes those policies where there are proven delivery mechanisms, a credible combination of public/private financing, and clear timelines in place. The lower end of the range includes policies which display some risks related to delivery mechanisms, financing, or implementation timelines.

Impact of climate policies on emissions in the UK

Including land use



Excluding land use



TARGETS

The UK's 2030 NDC commits to reducing emissions by 68% below 1990 levels by 2030 (UK Government, 2022). The 2035 NDC sets a target of 81% emissions reductions below 1990 levels and includes information on the NDC process and implementation plan (UK Government, 2025). The 2035 submission does not alter the ambition of the 2030 target.

The UK enshrined its 2050 net zero emissions target in law in 2019 and has introduced multiple policies and sectoral plans since that support emissions reductions in the aftermath. Based on these policies, the UK government released a Net Zero Strategy

in October 2021 and submitted it to the UNFCCC (Government of the UK, 2021). The updated Strategy, called the "Carbon Budget Delivery Plan", was published in March 2023, and clarifies how government measures will reduce emissions.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The new Labour government has been busy trying to get the UK back on track to meet its NDC and net zero targets. The government has made significant progress removing policy barriers to spur the rollout of renewables, EVs, and heat pumps.

Continued growth in renewables, particularly wind power, enabled the complete phase-out of coal power by October 2024, and is now displacing gas from the power supply (Ember, 2025e). In the Clean Power 2030 Action Plan, published in December 2024, the government lays out pathways to further scale renewables to fully supply national power demand with clean sources in just five years' time (UK Government, 2024).

In the transport sector, the government reinstated the 2030 phase-out of new fossil fuel cars and has continued to see a doubling of new EVs on the road each year (UK Climate Change Committee, 2025). Some concerns have been raised about the revision of the Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) mandate, which leaves room for manufacturers to underestimate emissions from hybrid vehicles and to convert non-ZEV improvements to ZEV credits, effectively weaking their EV sales targets.

Government interventions to remove planning barriers, introduce the Clean Heat Market Mechanism, and increase funding for the Boiler Upgrade Scheme, all led to a significant increase in heat pump installations in 2024 and 2025 (UK Climate Change Committee, 2025). The Labour government has decided not to pursue the 2035 phase-out of new fossil fuel boiler installations proposed by the former Tory government. However, these may be effectively precluded by the Future Homes Standards for energy efficiency, expected Q3 2025 (UK Parliament, 2024).

2019 historical data and 2035 projections of key emissions indicators for the UK

Emission values are rounded to the nearest five

| Indicator (incl. land use) | 2019 historical | | 2035 projections | |
|----------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|---------------------|--|
| | | Current policies | NDC unconditional | |
| Absolute emissions | 450 | 285 to 385 | 155 | |
| (tCO₂e/cap) | -27% vs 2010 | -37% to -15% vs 2019 | -66% vs 2019 | |
| Emissions per capita | 6.8 | 3.9 to 5.3 | 2.1 | |
| (tCO₂e/cap) | -31% vs 2010 | -42% to -22% vs 2019 | -68% vs 2019 | |
| Emissions per GDP | 0.15 | 0.08 to 0.11 | 0.04 | |
| (tCO2e/thousand USD) | -38% vs 2010 | -48% to -30% vs 2019 | -71% vs 2019 | |

4.24 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)

USA's NDC and net zero targets


| Pledge | Key targets |
|----------|--|
| NDC | The Trump Administration withdrew the USA from the Paris Agreement, effectively nullifying the NDC targets to reduce emissions by 50–52% below 2005 levels by 2030 and by 61–66% below 2005 levels by 2035 |
| Net zero | No net zero target; the Trump Administration is not pursuing the Biden Administration's LTS and its net zero target by 2050 (GHG; LTS submitted) |

The USA has begun the process of withdrawing from the Paris Agreement and, as a result, **annulling its NDC targets**. The Trump Administration is pursuing an executive and legislative agenda to repeal targets, policies, and funding for climate change mitigation, therefore effectively reversing the Biden Administration's course on climate action.


In a significant shift from last year's projections, following the signing into law of the Trump Administration's 'One Big Beautiful Bill' on July 4, 2025, the USA projections have been adjusted to reflect the repeal of several Inflation Reduction Act schemes and programmes relating to renewable energy deployment, electric vehicle adoption, and more (Council on Foreign Relations, 2025; Thomson Reuters, 2025). Additionally, several Environmental Protection Agency regulations relating to vehicle emission and power plant standards have been rolled back, and our policy projections reproduce that impact (The Guardian, 2025; The New York Times, 2025). As a result, the emission decline rate for the USA according to our projections decreases by almost 10% compared to our last year's report, though it does not plateau or reverse.

Impact of climate policies on emissions in USA*

Including land use



Excluding land use



(upper end); NewClimate Institute calculations (lower end); IIASA GLOBIOM/G4M model (2025).

*NDC targets are still presented, as still operational. The USA withdrawal from the Paris Agreement (effective January 27, 2026) means the NDC will no longer be operative

TARGETS

The Trump Administration has initiated the USA's exit from the Paris Agreement, voiding the USA's existing NDC targets for 2030 and 2035, which the Biden Administration had submitted in April 2021 and December 2024, respectively (The White House, 2025). The Biden Administration's targets aimed for a 50–52% reduction

below 2005 levels by 2030 and a 61–66% reduction by 2035 (U.S. Government, 2021b, 2024). It is important to note that the USA was likely to miss the NDC target already under the Biden Administration (Nascimento et al., 2024).

Under the Trump Administration, the USA no longer plans to reach net zero emissions by 2050; a target which the Biden Administration had established in its 2021 LTS (U.S. Department of Energy, 2025). The Biden Administration expected land use sinks to reach up to -1,400 MtCO $_2$ e in 2050, while technological CDR could reach up to -500 MtCO $_2$ e (U.S. Government, 2021a).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In July 2025, President Trump signed into law the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBB), rolling back most tax credits for clean electricity, fuels, vehicles, and industry introduced by the 2022 IRA, and revoking most unobligated federal funding for climate and clean energy programmes (U.S. Congress, 2025). The OBBB will significantly slow the deployment of renewable energy and clean energy technologies. Prior to the OBBB's passage, the IRA had mobilised historic public and private investment in the USA energy transition, accelerating the buildout of renewable energy and the production and adoption of clean energy technologies (Jenkins et al., 2025; King et al., 2025).

In July 2025, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed to rescind the 2009 Endangerment Finding, which serves as the EPA's legal basis for regulating GHG emissions (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2025b). If the EPA revokes the finding, all GHG regulations for light-, medium-, and heavy-duty vehicles will be removed. The EPA also proposed to repeal all GHG emissions standards for fossil fuel-fired power plants in June 2025 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2024a). Independently of the Endangerment Finding's proposed revocation, the EPA, in March 2025, initiated the process to reconsider its vehicle emissions standards for passenger cars, light- and medium-duty vehicles for 2027 until 2032 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2025a). The standards were made more stringent in 2024 and would have resulted in auto manufacturers producing battery-electric vehicles for 30-56% of new light-duty vehicle sales by 2032 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2024b).

2019 historical data and 2030 projections of key emissions indicators for the USA

Emission values are rounded to the nearest five

The USA was the world's largest producer of crude oil and fossil gas under the Biden Administration. The Trump Administration is projected to increase oil and gas production to new record levels in 2025. The USA is also poised to increase liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports by 25% in 2025 relative to 2024 (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2025).

| Indicator (incl. land use) | 2019 historical | 2030 projections | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|----------------------|--|
| | | Current policies | NDC unconditional | |
| Absolute emissions | 5,765 | 4,770 to 5,040 | 2,595 to 2,265 | |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | -7% vs 2010 | -17% to -13% vs 2019 | -55% to -61% vs 2019 | |
| Emissions per capita | 17.1 | 13.2 to 13.9 | 7.2 to 6.2 | |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | -15% vs 2010 | -23% to -19% vs 2019 | -58% to -64% vs 2019 | |
| Emissions per GDP | 0.31 | 0.18 to 0.20 | 0.10 to 0.09 | |
| (tCO ₂ e/thousand USD) | -25% vs 2010 | -40% to -37% vs 2019 | -68% to -72% vs 2019 | |

4.25 VIET NAM


Viet Nam's NDC and net zero targets

| Pledge | Key targets |
|----------|--|
| NDC | Reduce emissions by 15.8% (unconditional) and by 43.5% (conditional) below BAU by 2030 |
| Net zero | Net zero by 2050 (GHG; no LTS submitted) |


Viet Nam is well on track to meet its unconditional 2030 NDC target but is projected to miss its conditional target. Both targets are well above 2020 emission levels. The land use sector is currently a sink of emissions, which is expected to increase up to 2030 and slow down overall emissions growth in the country. However, total emissions are projected to increase substantially up to 2035, driven by an increase in the energy and industry sectors. They show no sign of peaking before 2035.

Impact of climate policies on emissions in Viet Nam

Including land use



Excluding land use



TARGETS

Viet Nam's NDC includes an economy-wide unconditional target to reduce emissions by 15.8% by 2030 below BAU and a conditional target to reduce emissions by 43.5% by 2030 below BAU. As of October 2025, Viet Nam has not yet submitted its 2035 NDC to the UNFCCC.

Viet Nam also targets to reach net-zero emissions by 2050. This target covers all emissions and economic sectors and is enshrined in Viet Nam's National Strategy on Climate Change (Government of Viet Nam, 2022). This strategy estimates that emissions in 2050 will be around 185 MtCO₂e or a 90% emissions reduction compared to the BAU level in 2050; this indicates the expected role of land use sinks, technological carbon dioxide removal, and international credits.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In November 2023, Viet Nam presented its Resource Mobilization Plan (RMP), detailing how it will utilise USD 15.5 billion in Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) funds to support low-emission and climate-resilient development (Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, 2023). These funds are expected to help Viet Nam peak its power sector emissions at 170 MtCO₂e by 2030 and increase the share of renewable power generation from 25% in 2020 to at least 47% by 2030 (European Commission, 2022b). By July 2025, Viet Nam had mobilised over USD 7 billion under the JETP through three major energy infrastructure projects: a EUR 67 million credit agreement to construct a 500 kV power transmission line; a EUR 480 million credit package for the Bac Ai Pumped Storage Hydropower Project; and a EUR 65 million loan for upgrades to the Tri An Hydropower Plant (VietnamPlus, 2025).

Viet Nam's Eighth Power Development Plan (PDP8), released in May 2023, outlines energy development to 2030 (Barnes, 2023; Vu and Guarascio, 2023; Wengel, 2023). Coal remains significant at 20% of the mix, rising to over 30 GW by 2030. LNG power plants, using both domestic and imported gas, will reach 37 GW (15% of total), a fourfold increase since 2020. Renewables are expected to meet 48% of energy needs by 2030, contingent on the full implementation of JETP partner pledges. Viet Nam revised the PDP8 in April 2025, setting more ambitious targets to increase the share of renewables excluding hydropower to 28–36% by 2030 and then to 75% by 2050. The revised plan also restricts the approval of new coal-fired power plants after 2030 and promotes the transition of existing coal facilities. Nuclear power was reintroduced, targeting 4,000–6,400 MW by 2030–2035 and 10,500–14,000 MW by 2050 (Hanh, 2025a; VnEconomy, 2025).

Viet Nam approved a project in January 2025 to establish and develop its carbon market, launching a pilot Emissions Trading System (ETS) in June targeting key sectors such as steel and cement. Detailed implementation rules were issued to guide the pilot phase, with the aim of officially launching domestic carbon trading platforms from 2029 onwards (Hanh, 2025b; S&P Global, 2025).

2019 historical data and 2030 projections of key emissions indicators for Viet Nam

Emission values are rounded to the nearest five

| Indicator (incl. land use) | 2019 historical | | | 2030 projections |
|----------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| | | Current policies | NDC unconditional | NDC conditional |
| Absolute emissions | 435 | 605 to 710 | 795 | 535 |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | +63% vs 2010 | +39% to +63% vs 2019 | +83% vs 2019 | +23% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per capita | 4.5 | 5.8 to 6.8 | 7.7 | 5.1 |
| (tCO ₂ e/cap) | +46% vs 2010 | +30% to +52% vs 2019 | +70% vs 2019 | +14% vs 2019 |
| Emissions per GDP | 1.71 | 1.38 to 1.61 | 1.81 | 1.21 |
| (tCO₂e/thousand USD) | -8% vs 2010 | -19% to -6% vs 2019 | +6% vs 2019 | -29% vs 2019 |

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