Verifying the absence of undeclared activities

Canty, M. & Avenhaus, R. (1996). Verifying the absence of undeclared activities. Journal of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 36-43.

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The resource distribution problem posed to arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation regimes by the extension of the rights of inspectorates to look for undeclared, illegal activities is analyzed in terms of noncooperative game theory. A general solution for the inspection of locations within a State subject to verification is derived, which relates quantitative, optimal inspection probabilities to a subjective assessment of the importance of the locations.

Item Type: Article
Research Programs: Processes of International Negotiation Network (PIN)
Bibliographic Reference: Journal of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management; XXV(1):36-43 [1996]
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 02:06
Last Modified: 27 Aug 2021 17:15

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