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Kryazhimskiy, A.V. & Sonnevend, G. (1996). Central Paths and Selection of Equilibria. IIASA Working Paper. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: WP-96-039
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Abstract
For two populations of players playing repeatedly a same bimatrix game, a dynamics associated with the method of analytic centers for linear programming is described. All populations' evolutions converge to static equilibria. All evolutions starting in a same connected set converge to a same equilibrium. If a starting time is sufficiently large, "almost all" evolutions end up at a single equilibrium representing all populations' pure strategy groups (phenotypes) with nonzero proportions. The dynamics is interpreted as populations' rule to learn best replying.
| Item Type: | Monograph (IIASA Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Research Programs: | Dynamic Systems (DYN) |
| Depositing User: | IIASA Import |
| Date Deposited: | 15 Jan 2016 02:08 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Aug 2021 17:15 |
| URI: | https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/4987 |
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