

# Working Paper

## The Emergence of Cooperative Playing Routines: Optimality and Learning

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WP-96-22  
March 1996



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## **EEL: A Brief Presentation**

The Laboratory of Experimental Economics was created in 1991 within the Department of Economics of the University of Trento. Its initial purpose was to conduct experiments in analysis of organisational behaviour – which is still its principal area of interest although others have recently been added, most notably study of the formation of choice behaviour in demand for consumer goods and decision making in the fiscal and distributive area.

The original idea was to develop models of ‘organisational learning’ which describe the growth of organisational and informational structures in firms and institutions, and to conduct analysis and empirical verification utilizing recent techniques developed in the field of Experimental Economics. This purely experimental work is now flanked by analysis in the theoretical area of the organisation and the firm. Particular emphasis has been placed on the development of models of information structures in firms and on the representation and simulation of the multiactor decision processes that unfold within them, at the managerial and planning level and also from the point of view of consensus formation. The work of the Laboratory has fully borne out the decision to conduct research from three different disciplinary points of view: (a) that of the cognitive sciences, in order to deepen understanding of learning processes by means of laboratory experiments and in order to model the knowledge transfer mechanisms that characterize organisational learning; (b) that of the theory of decision support for the understanding and formulation of the preferences leading to the decision; (c) that of organisational analysis in order to study the emergence of different forms of cooperation and the solution of cognitive and decisional conflicts; (d) that of institutional economics, to move into the direction of explaining the rise of economic institutions on the basis of new micro-foundations.

One indirect aim of the project is to develop a research agenda in a coordinate way with various groups sharing the same methodological approach. Among these groups several Italian universities are involved (Cà Bembo at Venice, Political Science at Turin, the University of Genoa, the Bocconi University of Milan, the Universities of Modena and Trento). The Laboratory is also cooperating in systematic manner with a number of international research centres, in particular with the following groups: BACH (University of Michigan), CSOM (University of Amsterdam), Dynamics of Computation Group (Palo Alto), SCANCOR (Stanford University), CCE (University of California, Los Angeles).

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More information on Laboratory’s research is available on INTERNET at the location: <http://black.cs.unitn.it>.

## Preface

The research project on *Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics* at IIASA is concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the broader economic developments that are associated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes by which economic agents – first of all, business firms – acquire and develop the capabilities to generate, imitate and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate dynamics – at the levels of single industries and whole economies – engendered by the interactions among agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and expectations. The central purpose is to develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. However, the basic philosophy is that such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when attention is paid to the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims to address: therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the ‘stylized facts’ concerning corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the ‘demography’ of firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade.

From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential and difference equations, and some of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and economic dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago.

During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about the similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is some understanding of the key variables that lie behind those differences. A number of studies have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In addition to empirical work at the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance at the level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded.

As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that successful theory and useful modeling techniques ought to address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical work has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that needed to be explained. The list of these ‘facts’ is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the persistence of particular sets of problem-solving routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and size-distributions – approximately log-normal – all the way to the evidence regarding the time-series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project is that the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who understand the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work.

In particular, the project is meant to pursue an ‘evolutionary’ interpretation of technological and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisations learn, search, adapt; second, the economic analogues of ‘natural selection’ by which interactive environments – often markets – winnow out a population whose members have different attributes and behavioural traits; and, third, the collective emergence of statistical patterns, regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes.

Together with a group of researchers located permanently at IIASA, the project coordinates multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops

and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems.

The research focuses upon the following three major areas:

1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence.
2. Technological and Industrial Dynamics
3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics

# The emergence of cooperative playing routines: optimality and learning \*

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## Abstract

We investigate the emergence of (optimal and suboptimal) behavioural routines in the context of a cooperative game. In particular we construct a search model of the gradient descent type for the optimization of 'static' and 'dynamic' playing routines. That optimality study sets the basis for the analysis of the dynamics and modelling of routine learning. In the last part of the paper we propose a learning heuristics for the development of routinized behaviour on the basis of a simple network model of the subject player.

**Keywords:** optimal cooperative routines, discrete optimization and search, routine learning, network models, bounded rationality, game theory

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\*The two authors have elaborated together every part of this research. However, as far as legal requirements are concerned, R.A. Marques Pereira takes responsibility for sections 1,2,5 and P. Patelli takes responsibility for sections 3,4.

# 1 Introduction

The questions of bounded rationality, behavioural routines and procedural learning [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [18] play a crucial role in modern theories of evolutionary economics. In this research project we analyse the emergence of behavioural routines in the context of a simple experimental setting, that of a cooperative card game [6]. Our ultimate goal is to characterize the type of routines that emerge and understand the nature of the learning process.

The game involves two players - colourkeeper and numberkeeper - and the six cards  $2,3,4 \heartsuit$  and  $2,3,4 \clubsuit$ . The board on which the game is played is as shown in figure 1.




Figure 1: The board

The cards in positions  $u$  and  $t$  (target) are face-up, the others are face-down. As a result, each player sees its own card and the two cards in positions  $u, t$ . Neither player sees the other player's card.

The states of the game with  $2 \heartsuit$  in the target position are called terminal states. Once the cards are dealt the two players are supposed to cooperate in order to transform the given initial state into a terminal state. Each player, in turn, modifies the state of the game by applying one of the following transformation operators,

$$\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{N} \text{ or } \mathcal{P}(\text{pass}).$$

The four transformation operators  $\mathcal{T}$ ,  $\mathcal{U}$ ,  $\mathcal{C}$ ,  $\mathcal{N}$  exchange the card in the player's hand with the card in position  $t, u, c, n$  respectively. The use of the operator  $\mathcal{T}$  is constrained: the colourkeeper can play  $\mathcal{T}$  only if his card and the one in position  $t$  have the same colour; a similar rule applies to the numberkeeper, with reference to numbers instead of colours.

In the laboratory study of Cohen & Bacdayan [6] and Egidi [8] [9] the two players are encouraged not only to complete the game but also to play in an efficient manner. An incentive system is used which rewards the two players (in equal measure) in proportion to the number of hands successfully completed within a given amount of time. Moreover, a fixed cost per move is subtracted from the final payoff in order to discourage unnecessary moves. For a detailed discussion of the experimental setting see the original references indicated above.

In their original experiment Cohen & Bacdayan recorded the performances of 32 pairs of subjects playing two separate game sessions of 40 minutes each. Naturally, the sequence of hands played during each session was the same for all pairs. In our analysis of the resulting data the main goal is to study whether or not subjects do develop behavioural routines for cooperative playing and, if they do, identify which routines emerge and how.

The report is organized as follows: in the next section we introduce a special state representation based on the modular structure of the game. The modular representation suggests a set of simple static routines which codify good cooperative playing in a large number of cases. As a result we consider those routines as appropriate templates for our analysis of the development of cooperative routines. In the third and fourth sections we define the static and dynamic playing paradigms plus a search algorithm (based on a discrete gradient descent scheme) for the extraction of the optimal routine set. Finally, in the last section, we propose a learning model [10] [12] [13] [15] based on the adaptive performance of a neural network architecture [1] [2] [11] [14] [17].

## 2 The modular representation

The card game conceived by Cohen & Bacdayan has a natural modular structure. Any global solution to a particular hand decomposes into a sequence of local solutions associated with target transitions. This crucial property is



best illustrated by means of the structural graph in figure 2 (see [8] [9] [16]),




Figure 2: The structural graph

where the six nodes indicate the card in target and the arrows indicate positive target transitions (i.e. those that come closer to game completion). The negative target transitions are those obtained by inverting the arrows and the indifferent target transitions are the ones between 3 and 4 ♥, or 3 and 4♣. Next to each target transition shown in the graph we indicate which of the two players can produce it (recall that the constraints regarding the use of the operator  $\mathcal{T}$  are different for colourkeeper and numberkeeper).

We say that a game configuration is of level I if the card in target is either 3♥, 4♥ or 2♣. Instead, a game configuration is of level II if the card in target is either 3♣ or 4♣. With reference to the structural graph above, the geometrical meaning of the definition of level should be transparent.

In a game of level I there is only one interesting card to look for, the 2♥. In case 2♣ is in target, for instance, the numberkeeper has only to find the 2♥ to complete the game, while the colourkeeper should do nothing except reveal the 2♥ if he has it in hand (by playing  $\mathcal{U}$ ). The same happens if either 3♥ or 4♥ are in target, with colourkeeper and numberkeeper interchanged.

The cooperative structure of a level II game is more interesting. The reason is that either player can produce the first target transition, that which transforms the level II configuration into one of level I. Clearly, the actual target transition depends on which player produces it. Assume, for instance, that the card in target is 4♣. In that case (see the structural graph above) the colourkeeper can produce a positive target transition with the 2♣ while the numberkeeper can do as much with the 4♥. Once one of the two players

has produced the first target transition it is up to the other player to complete the game with the  $2\heartsuit$ .

There are thus three key cards [8] [9] [16] in a game of level II. From the point of view of player X (colourkeeper or numberkeeper) the key cards are

$\uparrow$  **flag** - the card with which player X can produce a +tt

$\downarrow$  **dual flag** - the card with which player Y can produce a +tt

$\updownarrow$  **double flag** - the  $2\heartsuit$ , i.e. the card with which to complete the game after player Y has produced the first +tt

where +tt stands for ‘positive target transition’. As an example suppose  $3\clubsuit$  is in target. From the numberkeeper’s point of view the key cards are

$$\uparrow = 3\heartsuit \quad \downarrow = 2\clubsuit \quad \updownarrow = 2\heartsuit$$

whereas from the point of view of the colourkeeper,

$$\uparrow = 2\clubsuit \quad \downarrow = 3\heartsuit \quad \updownarrow = 2\heartsuit.$$

The modular representation (in terms of flags) of level II states has several advantages: the most important of these is that it captures the essential aspects of the game dynamics, according to the structural graph mentioned before. In doing so it provides a universal description of all level II games - no matter whether in target is  $3\clubsuit$  or  $4\clubsuit$ , or whether the player considered is the colourkeeper or the numberkeeper - and thus opens the way to a universal characterization of the behavioural routines developed by subject players.

Moreover the universality of the modular representation leads to a finer and more reliable statistics of the experimental data and is also generalizable to complex games with more than two levels.

We now turn to the problem of routinized behaviour and, in particular, to the question of which rule templates are appropriate for its description. In this respect our strategy is to begin with the simplest possibility, i.e. that the subject players develop a pattern of cooperative playing depending solely on the visible state of the game. In other words, we assume a static routine paradigm in which the learning process leads to input-output rules where the input is constructed from the three visible cards -  $h$  (hand),  $u$  and  $t$  - and the output is the associated transformation operator -  $\mathcal{T}$ ,  $\mathcal{U}$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$ ,  $\mathcal{P}$ . The operator  $\mathcal{S}$  (search) stands for a random choice between  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $\mathcal{N}$ .

In this article we consider only games of level II for they are the most interesting from the point of view of cooperation. In those cases the modular representation suggests the set of reasonable behavioural routines illustrated in table 1. The first rule reads *if flag is in position  $h$  then play  $\mathcal{T}$* ; the second

Priority code	Condition	Action	
I	$h = \uparrow$	$\mathcal{T}$	
I	$u = \uparrow$	$\mathcal{U}$	
II	$h = \Downarrow$	$\mathcal{P}$	
II	$u = \Downarrow$	$\mathcal{U}$	
III	$h = \Downarrow$	$\mathcal{U}$	
III	$u = \Downarrow$	$\mathcal{S}$	search for $\Downarrow$
•	otherwise	$\mathcal{S}$	search for $\uparrow$ or $\Downarrow$

Table 1: Condition-Action routines

rule *if flag is in position  $u$  then play  $\mathcal{U}$* , etc. The last rule means *if none of the preceding rules applies then play  $\mathcal{S}$* .

The total number of static rules is 7. The first six rules are organized in three different groups (pairs) associated with priority codes from I to III. In each pair the first rule concerns the card in position  $h$  while the second rule regards the card in position  $u$ . Whereas the two rules in a pair are clearly mutually exclusive, the first and second rules from different groups are not necessarily so. As an example, it could happen that rules 1 and 4 are both applicable. In those cases dominates the rule with higher priority (lower priority code).

The applicability of each rule depends on the visible state of the game, as seen by either one of the two players. In other words, it depends on the cards in positions  $h$ ,  $u$  and  $t$ . Within the universal modular representation, however, the information regarding the card in  $t$  is used only to set the card-value of the various flags. In this respect it plays the role of a pre-processing mechanism. Once the card-values of the flags have been assigned the visible state of the game is fully specified by the two positions  $h$  and  $u$ .

Our set of static rules performs optimally in a large number of cases and only moderately sub-optimally in the few remaining ones. Moreover it is simple and reflects common sense intuition within the modular approach. For

these reasons we think that the static rule paradigm provides an appropriate framework for the study of cooperative routines in our card game. In what follows we introduce a search model designed to extract the optimal input-output routines of the static type.

### 3 Static routines

In the previous section we explained the modular representation and proposed to investigate the dynamics of procedural game playing within the static routine paradigm. In this section we introduce a search model in the space of static routines that looks for the optimal routine set of the static type.

The motivation is twofold: on one hand we wish to classify static routines according to their performance quality, as well as to establish whether our set of static routines is indeed the optimal one; on the other hand the search algorithm provides an opportunity to render explicit the limitations of the static routine paradigm, either for lack of efficiency or for poor cooperation.

A static routine table  $S$  is essentially an artificial player which responds in a predefined manner to each possible static configuration of the game. By static configuration we mean the present visible state of the game, i.e. the two cards in positions  $h$  and  $u$ .

The static routine tables are organized in 7 different rows, each of which concerns one of the possible static configurations as seen by the subject player. The game configurations are expressed in the modular representation: each of the two positions  $h$  and  $u$  can assume one of the following three values: flag, doubleflag or null (i.e. else).

The number of visible flag configurations is 7: 2 with two flags, 4 with one flag and 1 with no flags. The structure of a table  $S$  of static routines is thus as in table 2.

The input-output data flow of each of the 7 rows in the static rule table  $S$  is illustrated by the diagram in figure 3.

A static routine table assigns a definite response to each of the possible static configurations. The possible responses, or moves, are  $\mathcal{T}$ (target, only when  $h$  is flag),  $\mathcal{U}$ (up),  $\mathcal{S}$ (search) and  $\mathcal{P}$ (pass). The number of different static routine tables (static artificial players) is thus  $4 \cdot 4 \cdot 3 \cdot 3 \cdot 3 \cdot 3 \cdot 3 = 3888$ .

The modular representation is convenient due to its universality, i.e. it

Rule index	Condition	Action
1	$h = \uparrow \quad u = -$	$\longrightarrow ?$
2	$h = \uparrow \quad u = \updownarrow$	$\longrightarrow ?$
3	$h = - \quad u = \uparrow$	$\longrightarrow ?$
4	$h = - \quad u = -$	$\longrightarrow ?$
5	$h = \updownarrow \quad u = -$	$\longrightarrow ?$
6	$h = \updownarrow \quad u = \uparrow$	$\longrightarrow ?$
7	$h = - \quad u = \updownarrow$	$\longrightarrow ?$

Table 2: Static Routine Table




Figure 3: Input-output rule structure

is applicable to both players. The card-values of the flags, instead, depend on the actual card in target. They must be reset each time, for colourkeeper and numberkeeper in turn.

When written in the modular representation the number of possible distinct hands of level II reduces to 60: given the card in target, whose role is to define the card-values of the various flags, there remain 5 positions among which to distribute 3 flags, and thus  $5 \cdot 4 \cdot 3 = 60$ .

The search model is based on a cost function  $F = F(S)$  which assigns a numerical cost to each static routine table  $S$ . The cost  $F(S)$  associated to a static routine table is given by the convex combination of an efficiency cost  $effic(S)$  and a cooperative cost  $coop(S)$ ,

$$F(S) = (1 - \alpha) \cdot effic(S) + \alpha \cdot coop(S)$$

where the weighting coefficient  $\alpha$  is exogenous (i.e. fixed by the operator). Clearly, the optimal static rule table  $S$  is the one which minimizes the cost function  $F$ .

The efficiency cost  $effic(S)$  simply counts the number of moves necessary to complete the full set of 60 hands (of level II). If for a given hand the artificial player reaches the threshold of 10 moves the game is interrupted and that particular hand contributes 10 to the efficiency cost.

The cooperative cost  $coop(S)$  counts the total number of strategy changes occurred during playing. The strategy changes within one hand are detected by means of 8 strategy markers, 4 for strategy + (*'get flag'*) and 4 for strategy - (*'get double flag'*). The two sets of strategy markers are described in tables 3 and 4.

Each player has a three state (+1, 0, -1) strategy indicator which is updated every time the player's move coincides with a strategy marker. At the beginning of each hand both markers are set to null. Each 'reset' of the strategy indicator (after the first setting) is counted as a strategy change.

This completes the description of how to compute the cost  $F(S)$  of a given static routine table  $S$ . We now explain the structure of the search algorithm that looks for the optimal static routine table (the one with minimal cost):

1. Choose arbitrarily an initial static routine table  $S_0$  and compute  $F(S_0)$ . The algorithm is based on a type of gradient descent procedure: in each iteration each individual degree of freedom changes in the locally optimal direction.

$strategy_+$ (GET $\uparrow$ )
$h = \uparrow$ followed by move $\mathcal{T}$
$u = \uparrow$ followed by move $\mathcal{U}$
$h = \Downarrow$ not followed by move $\mathcal{P}$
$u = \Downarrow$ not followed by move $\mathcal{U}$

Table 3: Strategy markers for GET  $\uparrow$

$strategy_-$ (GET $\Downarrow$ )
$h = \Downarrow$ followed by move $\mathcal{P}$
$u = \Downarrow$ followed by move $\mathcal{U}$
$h = \uparrow$ not followed by move $\mathcal{T}$
$u = \uparrow$ not followed by move $\mathcal{U}$

Table 4: Strategy markers for GET  $\Downarrow$

2. Examine each of the 7 rows of the static routine table individually, keeping the remaining 6 rows fixed, and determine the (locally) optimal move for that row by computing the cost associated with each of the three/four possible responses.
3. When the (locally) optimal move for a given row has been determined update that row's response and move on to the following row.
4. Repeat the procedure until the algorithm converges.

In the case  $\alpha = 0$  we have found a global optimum plus a local optimum which disappears when  $\alpha = 0.5$ . The optimal and suboptimal static routine tables are presented in tables 5 and 6.

$h$	$u$	<b>action</b>
$\uparrow$	-	$\mathcal{T}$
$\uparrow$	$\updownarrow$	$\mathcal{T}$
-	$\uparrow$	$\mathcal{U}$
-	-	$\mathcal{S}$
$\updownarrow$	-	$\mathcal{P}$
$\updownarrow$	$\uparrow$	$\mathcal{P}$
-	$\updownarrow$	$\mathcal{U}$

Table 5: Optimal static routines

## 4 Dynamic routines

We now examine the dynamic playing paradigm, in which the artificial player responds not only to the static configuration of the game but also to the previous move by the other player. The dynamic model, therefore, corresponds to an artificial player with minimal memory: it remembers only the previous move.

In a dynamic routine table  $D$  the previous move is encoded in the  $(+1, 0, -1)$  representation for the other player's strategy indicator. Consistently



$h$	$u$	action
$\uparrow$	-	$\mathcal{T}$
$\uparrow$	$\Downarrow$	$\mathcal{T}$
-	$\uparrow$	$\mathcal{S}$
-	-	$\mathcal{S}$
$\Downarrow$	-	$\mathcal{P}$
$\Downarrow$	$\uparrow$	$\mathcal{P}$
-	$\Downarrow$	$\mathcal{U}$

Table 6: Suboptimal static routines

with the minimal memory principle, however, the strategy indicators are updated each time according to the actual move the other player has made. If that move does not coincide with any of the 8 markers then the strategy indicator is set to 0. The three cases ‘active’, ‘static’ and ‘passive’ are associated with the three strategy indicator values +1, 0 and -1.

The dynamic routine tables are therefore organized in 3 sets of 7 rows, one for each strategy indicator value (+1, 0, -1). The search algorithm operates essentially as before, visiting in turn the  $3 \cdot 7 = 21$  rows of the dynamic table. In this case there are no local optima. The (globally) optimal dynamic routine table is presented in tables 7 (static), 8 (active), 9 (passive).

Static			
$h$	$u$		action
$\uparrow$	-	$\rightarrow$	$\mathcal{T}$
$\uparrow$	$\Downarrow$	$\rightarrow$	$\mathcal{T}$
-	$\uparrow$	$\rightarrow$	$\mathcal{U}$
-	-	$\rightarrow$	$\mathcal{S}$
$\Downarrow$	-	$\rightarrow$	$\mathcal{P}$
$\Downarrow$	$\uparrow$	$\rightarrow$	$\mathcal{U}$
-	$\Downarrow$	$\rightarrow$	$\mathcal{U}$

Table 7: Dynamic table: no markers set

Active			
$h$	$u$		action
$\uparrow$	-	$\longrightarrow$	$\mathcal{S}$
$\uparrow$	$\updownarrow$	$\longrightarrow$	$\mathcal{U}$
-	$\uparrow$	$\longrightarrow$	$\mathcal{S}$
-	-	$\longrightarrow$	$\mathcal{S}$
$\updownarrow$	-	$\longrightarrow$	$\mathcal{P}$
$\updownarrow$	$\uparrow$	$\longrightarrow$	$\mathcal{P}$
-	$\updownarrow$	$\longrightarrow$	$\mathcal{U}$

Table 8: Dynamic table: active marker set

Passive			
$h$	$u$		action
$\uparrow$	-	$\longrightarrow$	$\mathcal{T}$
$\uparrow$	$\updownarrow$	$\longrightarrow$	-
-	$\uparrow$	$\longrightarrow$	$\mathcal{U}$
-	-	$\longrightarrow$	$\mathcal{S}$
$\updownarrow$	-	$\longrightarrow$	-
$\updownarrow$	$\uparrow$	$\longrightarrow$	-
-	$\updownarrow$	$\longrightarrow$	-

Table 9: Dynamic table: passive marker set

## 5 A learning model

After having established a normative standard of optimality with our static and dynamic routine tables we address the crucial issue of learning in the context of our cooperative game. In this section we propose a learning mechanism - architecture and heuristics - with which to model the emergence of cooperative routines among the subject players.

The idea is as follows: each subject player is modelled by an adaptive network as in figure 4. The network architecture models the decisional structure of the subject player and is therefore the same in all subjects. The network parameters, on the other hand, change from one subject to another, they are the distinctive individual labels of the various subject players.




Figure 4: The network model of the subject player

The sub-network dominated by node A is called the 'self' part of the network. Its role is to construct a strategy preference based only on the static inputs H (card in  $h$ ) and U (card in  $u$ ). The two input nodes H,U take values within the interval  $[-1, +1]$  according to the following 'self' flag representation,

$\uparrow=+1$        $\star=0$        $\Downarrow=-1$       ( $\star$  means 'else') .

On the basis of the inputs H,U the strategy node A constructs a strategy preference with the usual local network law ' $y = \sigma(\sum \omega_i x_i)$ ' as in figure 5. The sigma function  $\sigma$  is illustrated in the final section at the end of the report. The numerical semantics of node A is consistent with the 'self' flag representation characteristic of its sub-network,

A= +1	means strategy GET $\uparrow$
A= 0	means strategy UNCLEAR
A= -1	means strategy GET $\Downarrow$

At this point it is clear that the 'self' sub-network models the static part of the subject player. In the optimal case therefore the parameters  $a_1$  and  $a_2$  are such that the 'self' sub-network emulates the optimal static routine table (table 10).

H	U	A	$h$	$u$	action
+1	0	+1	$\uparrow$	$\star$	$\mathcal{T}$
+1	-1	+1	$\uparrow$	$\Downarrow$	$\mathcal{T}$
0	+1	+1	$\star$	$\uparrow$	$\mathcal{U}$
0	0	0	$\star$	$\star$	$\mathcal{S}$
-1	0	-1	$\Downarrow$	$\star$	$\mathcal{P}$
-1	+1	-1	$\Downarrow$	$\uparrow$	$\mathcal{P}$
0	-1	-1	$\star$	$\Downarrow$	$\mathcal{U}$

Table 10: Sub-network A (optimal)

In the optimal case the appropriate values for the parameters are  $a_1 = 2$  &  $a_2 = 1$  as can be seen from the linear separation diagram in figure 6.

The sub-network dominated by node B is called the 'dual' part of the network. Its role is to construct the strategy preference of the other player




Figure 5: The 'self' sub-network  $A = \sigma(a_1 \cdot H + a_2 \cdot U)$




Figure 6: Sub-network A (linear separation diagram)

based on the inputs  $V$  and  $U$ , where  $V$  stands for the card in position  $u$  before the previous move. As before, the two inputs take values within the  $[-1, +1]$  interval but this time according to the ‘dual’ flag representation,

$$\Downarrow=+1 \quad \star=0 \quad \Updownarrow=-1 \quad (\star \text{ means 'else'}) .$$

On the basis of the inputs  $V, U$  the strategy node  $B$  constructs the other player’s strategy preference (figure 7). The numerical semantics of node  $B$  is consistent with the ‘dual’ flag representation characteristic of its sub-network,

$B = +1$ means strategy GET $\Downarrow$ $B = 0$ means strategy UNCLEAR $B = -1$ means strategy GET $\Updownarrow$
--

The ‘dual’ sub-network models the dynamic part of the subject player. In the optimal case therefore the parameters  $b_1$  and  $b_2$  are such that the ‘dual’ sub-network emulates the following optimal dynamic routine table (table 11).

$V$	$U$	$B$	$v$	$u$	strategy
+1	0	+1	$\Downarrow$	$\star$	+
+1	-1	+1	$\Downarrow$	$\Updownarrow$	+
0	+1	-1	$\star$	$\Downarrow$	-
0	0	0	$\star$	$\star$	?
-1	0	-1	$\Updownarrow$	$\star$	-
-1	+1	-1	$\Updownarrow$	$\Downarrow$	-
0	-1	+1	$\star$	$\Updownarrow$	+

Table 11: Sub-network B (optimal)

In the optimal case the appropriate values for the parameters are  $b_1 = 1$  &  $b_2 = -2$  as can be seen from the linear separation diagram in figure 8.

The leading node  $C = -AB$  of the learning network plays a coordinating role with respect to the strategy preferences expressed by nodes  $A$  and  $B$ , as




Figure 7: The 'dual' sub-network  $B = \sigma(b_1 \cdot V + b_2 \cdot U)$




Figure 8: Sub-network B (linear separation diagram)

illustrated in figure 9. The optimally coordinated preferences are those with  $C = 1$ , the worse cases instead are those with  $C = -1$ .




Figure 9: The leading node

The learning heuristics of our network model is based on two principles: the *consistency principle* states that the four network parameters ‘learn’ maximal consistency and the *stability principle* states that the parameters ‘learn’ to stabilize (from one move to the next) the strategy preferences expressed by nodes  $A$  and  $B$ .

Our learning heuristics corresponds to an optimization algorithm based on a cost function  $F$  which is a convex combination of a consistency term and a stability term,

$$F = F(a_1, a_2, b_1, b_2) = (1 - \mu)(1 - C)^2 + \mu[(A - A^\dagger)^2 + (B - B^\dagger)^2]/2$$

where  $A^\dagger$  and  $B^\dagger$  stand for the previous  $A$  and  $B$  values. The resulting learning process is an iterative gradient descent mechanism with respect to the four parameters of the cost function  $F$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} a'_1 &= a_1 - \lambda \frac{\partial F}{\partial a_1} & a'_2 &= a_2 - \lambda \frac{\partial F}{\partial a_2} \\ b'_1 &= b_1 - \lambda \frac{\partial F}{\partial b_1} & b'_2 &= b_2 - \lambda \frac{\partial F}{\partial b_2} \end{aligned}$$

where  $\lambda$  is the so-called learning rate parameter.



## 6 Concluding remarks

The learning heuristics above acts on the network parameters on the basis of a learning table of selected examples of *good playing*, each of which corresponds to an optimal transition from one game configuration (H,U,U,V) to the next. The game configurations (input vectors for the network model) are extracted from the following combinatorial table regarding all possible distributions of the key cards  $\uparrow$ ,  $\downarrow$ ,  $\Downarrow$ ,

H	U	U	V				
*	*	*	*	$\uparrow$	$\downarrow$	$\Downarrow$	(4)
*	$\uparrow$	$\uparrow$	*	$\uparrow$	$\downarrow$	$\Downarrow$	(4)
*	$\downarrow$	$\downarrow$	*	$\uparrow$	$\downarrow$	$\Downarrow$	(4)
*	$\Downarrow$	$\Downarrow$	*	$\uparrow$	$\downarrow$	$\Downarrow$	(4)
$\uparrow$	*	*	*		$\downarrow$	$\Downarrow$	(3)
$\uparrow$	$\downarrow$	$\downarrow$	*		$\downarrow$	$\Downarrow$	(3)
$\uparrow$	$\Downarrow$	$\Downarrow$	*		$\downarrow$	$\Downarrow$	(3)
$\downarrow$	*	*	*	$\uparrow$		$\Downarrow$	(3)
$\downarrow$	$\uparrow$	$\uparrow$	*	$\uparrow$		$\Downarrow$	(3)
$\downarrow$	$\Downarrow$	$\Downarrow$	*	$\uparrow$		$\Downarrow$	(3)
$\Downarrow$	*	*	*	$\uparrow$	$\downarrow$		(3)
$\Downarrow$	$\uparrow$	$\uparrow$	*	$\uparrow$	$\downarrow$		(3)
$\Downarrow$	$\downarrow$	$\downarrow$	*	$\uparrow$	$\downarrow$		(3)

Table 12: Full combinatorial table for  $\uparrow$ ,  $\downarrow$ ,  $\Downarrow$  configurations (43)

Clearly, not all rows in table 12 are relevant for the construction of the learning table, since the ‘self’ part of the network disregards the key card  $\downarrow$  and the ‘dual’ part of the network, in turn, disregards the key card  $\uparrow$ . The description and results of the experimental testing (computer simulation) of the learning scheme will be presented elsewhere.

The sigma function  $\sigma$  mentioned in the previous section is given by

$$\sigma(x) = \frac{e^x - e^{-x}}{e^x + e^{-x}} \quad , \quad \sigma(x) \in (-1, +1)$$

$$\dot{\sigma}(x) = (1 - \sigma^2(x)) \quad , \quad \dot{\sigma}(0) = 1$$

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