Learning in Potential Games

Ermoliev, Y.M. & Flam, S.D. (1997). Learning in Potential Games. IIASA Interim Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-97-022

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We consider repeated play of so-called potential games. Numerous modes of play are shown to yield Nash equilibrium in the long run. We point to procedures that can account for society-wide constraints concerning efficiency.

Item Type: Monograph (IIASA Interim Report)
Research Programs: Risk, Modeling, Policy (RMP)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 02:09
Last Modified: 27 Aug 2021 17:16
URI: https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/5269

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