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Kersten, G.E. & Mallory, G.R. (1998). Rational Inefficient Compromises in Negotiation. IIASA Interim Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-98-024
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Abstract
It has often been assumed that rational negotiators who achieve inefficient compromises should accept Pareto improvements suggested by some external party, such as an expert mediator, or a computer system. Following this assumption an argument is made to give legitimacy to efficient compromises generated by a negotiation support system or to entice a partymove to a Pareto improvement. The simplificatons made in model construction on the one hand and the very narrow and limited considerations of rationality in present negotiation support systems on the other, suggest a different approach to support. This approach is based on engaging users to a sound process confronting them with their inconsisencies rather than providing solutions or promoting improvements.
| Item Type: | Monograph (IIASA Interim Report) |
|---|---|
| Research Programs: | Decision Analysis and Support (DAS) |
| Depositing User: | IIASA Import |
| Date Deposited: | 15 Jan 2016 02:10 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Aug 2021 17:16 |
| URI: | https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/5624 |
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