A note on efficient solutions for the linear bilevel programming problem

Soismaa, M. (1999). A note on efficient solutions for the linear bilevel programming problem. European Journal of Operational Research 112 (2) 427-431. 10.1016/S0377-2217(97)00405-0.

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Abstract

The solutions of linear bilevel programming problems frequently are non-Pareto-optimal. The potential increase in payoffs generated by Pareto improvements makes it worthwhile to consider methods with which to move the solution to the efficient frontier. Bargaining models offer one class of solutions, which, contrary to the original non-cooperative, sequential decision-making situation, however, assume cooperation. We make an attempt to maintain the original power structure by introducing the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Bilevel programming; Decision theory; Efficient solution; Bargaining
Research Programs:	Decision Analysis and Support (DAS)
Bibliographic Reference:	European Journal of Operational Research; 112(2):427-431 [1999]
Depositing User:	IIASA Import
Date Deposited:	15 Jan 2016 02:10
Last Modified:	27 Aug 2021 17:36
URI:	https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/5690

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