Negotiating Inefficient Compromises: Is Less Better than More?

Cray, D. & Kersten, G.E. (1999). Negotiating Inefficient Compromises: Is Less Better than More? IIASA Interim Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-99-022

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Abstract

Significant efforts are made to design and implement decision and negotiation support systems to identify efficient alternatives. The underlying assumption is that decision-makers prefer an efficient alternative over an inefficient one. Experimental studies indicate that people often accept inefficient compromises and are unwilling to improve them even if prompted to do so. This report presents preliminary results for the analysis of 605 bilateral negotiations in which only 20.8% of negotiators who achieved an inefficient compromise entered the post-settlement phase in an attempt to improve the compromise.

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