A Consistent Extension of Condorcet's Election Principle

Young, H.P. & Levenglick, A. (1977). A Consistent Extension of Condorcet's Election Principle. IIASA Research Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: RR-77-015

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Condorcet's principle of choosing the majority alternative whenever one exists is violated not only by Borda's rule but also by any scoring method; nevertheless, the essential property of scoring functions -- "consistency" of the outcome under aggregation of subgroups -- is shown to be compatible with Condorcet's principle. Moreover, these two properties, suitably interpreted, together with neutrality and the Pareto property, determine a unique rule known as Kemeny's rule.

Item Type: Monograph (IIASA Research Report)
Research Programs: System and Decision Sciences - Core (SDS)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 01:44
Last Modified: 27 Aug 2021 17:08
URI: https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/700

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