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Young, H.P. & Levenglick, A. (1977). A Consistent Extension of Condorcet's Election Principle. IIASA Research Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: RR-77-015
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Abstract
Condorcet's principle of choosing the majority alternative whenever one exists is violated not only by Borda's rule but also by any scoring method; nevertheless, the essential property of scoring functions -- "consistency" of the outcome under aggregation of subgroups -- is shown to be compatible with Condorcet's principle. Moreover, these two properties, suitably interpreted, together with neutrality and the Pareto property, determine a unique rule known as Kemeny's rule.
| Item Type: | Monograph (IIASA Research Report) |
|---|---|
| Research Programs: | System and Decision Sciences - Core (SDS) |
| Depositing User: | IIASA Import |
| Date Deposited: | 15 Jan 2016 01:44 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Aug 2021 17:08 |
| URI: | https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/700 |
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