Evolutionary Game Dynamics

Hofbauer, J. & Sigmund, K. (2003). Evolutionary Game Dynamics. IIASA Interim Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-03-078

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Evolutionary game dynamics is the application of population dynamical methods to game theory. It has been introduced by evolutionary biologists, anticipated in part by game theorists. In this survey, we present an overview of the many brands of the deterministic dynamical systems motivated by evolutionary game theory, including ordinary differential equations (and, in particular, the replicator equation), differential inclusions (the best response dynamics), difference equations (as, for instance, fictitious play) and reaction-diffusion systems. A recurrent theme (the so-called 'folk theorem of evolutionary game theory') is the close connection of the dynamical approach with the Nash equilibrium, but we show that a static, equilibrium-based viewpoint is, on principle, unable to always account for the long-term behavior of players adjusting their behavior to maximize their payoff.

Item Type: Monograph (IIASA Interim Report)
Research Programs: Adaptive Dynamics Network (ADN)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 02:15
Last Modified: 27 Aug 2021 17:18
URI: https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/7010

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