The dynamics of public goods

Hauert, C., Haiden, N., & Sigmund, K. (2004). The dynamics of public goods. Discrete and Continuous Dynamical Systems - Series B 4 (3) 575-587. 10.3934/dcdsb.2004.4.575.

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We analyze the replicator equation for two games closely related with the social dilemma occurring in public goods situations. In one case, players can punish defectors in their group. In the other case, they can choose not to take part in the game. In both cases, interactions are not pairwise and payoffs non-linear. Nevertheless, the qualitative dynamics can be fully analyzed. The games offer potential solutions for the problem of the emergence of cooperation in sizeable groups of non-related individuals - a basic question in evolutionary biology and economics.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Public goods games; Replicator dynamics
Research Programs: Adaptive Dynamics Network (ADN)
Bibliographic Reference: Discrete and Continuous Dynamical Systems - Series B; 4(3):575-587 (August 2004) (Published online May 2004)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 02:16
Last Modified: 27 Aug 2021 17:18

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