Game Theoretical Treatment of Material Accountability Problems: Part II

Avenhaus, R. & Frick, H. (1974). Game Theoretical Treatment of Material Accountability Problems: Part II. IIASA Research Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: RR-74-021

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Abstract

In a previous paper, the optimal strategy for an inspection authority which has to safeguard material on the basis of material accountability principles has been determined with game theoretical methods: Sets of reasonable inspection and diversion strategies have been defined, and a saddlepoint of the overall probability of detection for n inventory periods during the reference time under consideration has been determined.

In this paper the problem of the appropriate choice of the number of inventory periods per reference time has been analyzed: it has been shown that the overall probability of detection in the case of one inventory period per reference time is always larger than that in the case of n inventory periods for n>1, and further it has been shown in which way this result is reflected in the expected detection time.

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