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Hauert, C., Haiden, N., & Sigmund, K. (2004). The Dynamics of Public Goods. IIASA Interim Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-04-086
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Abstract
We analyze the replicator equation for two games closely related with the social dilemma occurring in public goods situation. In one case, players can punish defectors in their group. In another case, they can choose not to take part in the game. In both cases, interactions are not pairwise and payoffs are nonlinear. Nevertheless, the qualitative dynamics can be fully analyzed. The games offer potential solutions for the problem of the emergence of cooperation in sizeable groups of non-related individuals - a basic question in evolutionary biology and economics.
| Item Type: | Monograph (IIASA Interim Report) |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Evolutionary game theory; Public goods games; Replicator dynamics |
| Research Programs: | Adaptive Dynamics Network (ADN) |
| Depositing User: | IIASA Import |
| Date Deposited: | 15 Jan 2016 02:16 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Aug 2021 17:18 |
| URI: | https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/7364 |
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