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Brandt, H. & Sigmund, K. (2005). Punishing and Abstaining for Public Goods. IIASA Interim Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-05-071
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Abstract
The evolution of cooperation within sizeable groups of non-related humans offers many challenges for our understanding. Current research has highlighted two factors boosting cooperation in public goods interactions, namely costly punishment of defectors, and the option to defer from the joint enterprise. A recent modeling approach has suggested that the autarctic option acts as a catalyzer for the ultimate fixation of altruistic punishment. We present an alternative, more micro-economically based model which yields a bistable outcome instead. Evolutionary dynamics can either lead to a Nash equilibrium of punishing and non-punishing cooperators, or to an oscillating state without punishers.
| Item Type: | Monograph (IIASA Interim Report) |
|---|---|
| Research Programs: | Adaptive Dynamics Network (ADN) |
| Depositing User: | IIASA Import |
| Date Deposited: | 15 Jan 2016 02:18 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Aug 2021 17:19 |
| URI: | https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/7771 |
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