The allocation of funds in lobbying and campaigning

Young, H.P. (1978). The allocation of funds in lobbying and campaigning. Systems Research 23 (1) 21-31. 10.1002/bs.3830230104.

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A model is presented to describe how a calculating lobbyist should allocate resources most effectively among voters in a legislature, given that there is no opposition lobbying effort. Equilibrium prices exist provided there is no veto player. When there is opposition, a different model and a different concept of equilibrium result. The outcome of this model is treated for a case when the opposing forces have unequal resources. This results in an equilibrium which is essentially the nucleolus. Application is made to us Presidential campaigning for the Electoral College, and to the setting of legislators' salaries. The models are also shown to lead to new concepts of measuring the relative power of voters. While these measures are related for the competitive and noncompetitive models, their differences also point to the importance of considering the context in which power is to be measured.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Simple game; Power; Lobbying; Presidential campaign; Electoral College
Research Programs: System and Decision Sciences - Core (SDS)
Bibliographic Reference: Systems Research; 23(1):21-31 (Published online 9 January 2007)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 01:44
Last Modified: 27 Aug 2021 17:35

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