Compliance and emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol: Rules for uncertain inventories

Nahorski, Z., Horabik, J., & Jonas, M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1269-4145 (2007). Compliance and emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol: Rules for uncertain inventories. Water, Air, & Soil Pollution: Focus 10.1007/s11267-006-9112-8.

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

A solution is proposed for proving compliance with emission targets and for emissions trading in the event of uncertainties in reported emission inventories. The solution is based on the undershooting concept, from which the mathematical conditions for both proving compliance with a risk a and calculating effective emissions for trading are derived. Based on the reported emission units, the number of permits granted is reduced in proportion to the uncertainty in the inventory. A country whose inventory has higher uncertainty is thereby allotted fewer permits than a country with the same inventory but smaller uncertainty.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	greenhouse gas inventory uncertainty; compliance with Kyoto Protocol; risk of noncompliance; undershooting; emissions trading; effective tradable permits
Research Programs:	Forestry (FOR)
Bibliographic Reference:	Water, Air, & Soil Pollution: Focus; 7(4-5):539-558 [2007]
Depositing User:	IIASA Import
Date Deposited:	15 Jan 2016 08:39
Last Modified:	27 Aug 2021 17:19
URI:	https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/8214

Actions (login required)

View Item