Public goods with punishment and abstaining in finite and infinite populations

Hauert, C., Traulsen, A., De Silva, H., Nowak, M.A., & Sigmund, K. (2008). Public goods with punishment and abstaining in finite and infinite populations. Biological Theory 3 (2) 114-122. 10.1162/biot.2008.3.2.114.

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The evolution and maintenance of cooperation in human and animal societies challenge various disciplines ranging from evolutionary biology to anthropology, social sciences, and economics. In social interactions, cooperators increase the welfare of the group at some cost to themselves whereas defectors attempt to free ride and neither provide benefits nor incur costs. The problem of cooperation becomes even more pronounced when increasing the number of interacting individuals. Punishment and voluntary participation have been identified as possible factors to support cooperation and prevent cheating. Typically, punishment behavior is unable to gain a foothold in a population, while volunteering alone can efficiently prevent deadlocks in states of mutual defection but is unable to stabilize cooperation. The combined effects of the two mechanisms have surprisingly different consequences in finite and infinite populations. Here we provide a detailed comparison of the two scenarios and demonstrate that driven by the inherent stochasticity of finite populations, the possibility to abstain from social interactions plays a pivotal role, which paves the way for the establishment of cooperation and punishment.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: cooperation, evolutionary game theory, public goods games, punishment, social dilemmas, voluntary participation
Research Programs: Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
Bibliographic Reference: Biological Theory; 3(2):114-122 (Spring 2008) (Published online 26 November 2008)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 08:41
Last Modified: 27 Aug 2021 17:38

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