Negotiations on national security risks: The case of U.S.-Soviet Relations

Kremenyuk, V.A. (2009). Negotiations on national security risks: The case of U.S.-Soviet Relations. In: Negotiated Risks: International Talks on Hazardous Issues. Eds. Avenhaus, R. & Sjoestedt, G., Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. ISBN 978-3-540-92992-5 10.1007/978-3-540-92993-2_8.

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The more sophisticated and destructive the weaponry that was introduced into the arsenals of United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the ColdWar years, the closer both sides came-advertently or inadvertently-to the brink of hot war. Too many arms meant too high the risk of a showdown, even one that was unwanted. Both superpowers began subscribing to this maxim somewhere around the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. Since then it has been an important component of their strategic relationship and of the theory and practice of deterrence (George and Smoke, 1974). It was also an integral part of the negotiations agenda when strategic dialog finally opened between the superpowers in the early 1970s.

Item Type: Book Section
Research Programs: Processes of International Negotiation Network (PIN)
Bibliographic Reference: In: R. Avenhaus, G. Sjoestedt (eds); Negotiated Risks: International Talks on Hazardous Issues; Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, Germany pp.161-180
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Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 08:42
Last Modified: 17 Feb 2016 12:31

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