Game Theoretical Treatment of Material Accountability Problems

Avenhaus, R. & Frick, H. (1974). Game Theoretical Treatment of Material Accountability Problems. IIASA Research Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: RR-74-002

Preview

Text RR-74-002.pdf Download (633kB) | Preview

Abstract

In this paper, the problem of material accountability in industrial plants is analyzed. For this purpose a reference time is considered which contains a sequence of n inventory periods, i.e. during this reference time a physical inventory is performed n times and compared with the book inventory at that time. A decision problem arises if all necessary measurements can only be performed with limited accuracy as in this case one has to decide if a book-physical inventory difference is caused by missing material or simply by measurement errors.

In case it has to be assumed that there exists one party which may intend to divert material, the problem can be formulated as a two-person zero-sum inspection game, the payoff of which is the probability of detection. In the first part of this paper the game theoretical model is established and the sets of strategies of both parties are given. In the second part the solutions of the game, i.e. saddlepoints, are analyzed: sufficient conditions in the form of systems of equations are given which also can be used for numerical calculations.

Actions (login required)

View Item