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Palokangas, T. (2010). International emission policy with lobbying and technological change. In: Dynamic Systems, Economic Growth, and the Environment. Eds. Cuaresma, J. Crespo, Palokangas, T., & Tarasyev, A., Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. ISBN 978-3-642-02131-2 10.1007/978-3-642-02132-9_8.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
I examine emission policy in a union of countries when production in any country incurs emissions that pollute all over the union, but efficiency in production is improved by research and development (R&D). I compare four cases: Laissez-faire, Pareto optimal policy, and the case of a self-interested central planner that decides on nontraded or traded emission quotas. I show that with nontraded quotas, the growth rate is socially optimal, but welfare sub-optimal. Trade in quotas speeds up growth from the initial position of laissez-faire, but slows down growth from the initial position of nontraded quotas.
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Research Programs: | Dynamic Systems (DYN) |
| Bibliographic Reference: | In: J. Crespo Cuaresma, T. Palokangas, A. Tarasyev (eds); Dynamic Systems, Economic Growth, and the Environment; Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, Germany pp.161-181 |
| Related URLs: | |
| Depositing User: | IIASA Import |
| Date Deposited: | 15 Jan 2016 08:44 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Aug 2021 17:38 |
| URI: | https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/9350 |
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