

Out-of-Equilibrium Economics and Agent-Based Modeling

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Out-of-Equilibrium Economics and Agent-Based Modeling

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Contents

1 Introduction	1
2 Beyond Equilibrium	2
3 Perpetual Novelty	5
4 Equilibrium Indeterminacy and the Selection Process	6
5 Expectational Indeterminacy and Inductive Behavior.....	7
6 Conclusion	10
References	11

Abstract

Standard neoclassical economics asks what agents' actions, strategies, or expectations are in equilibrium with (consistent with) the outcome or pattern these behaviors aggregatively create. Agent-based computational economics enables us to ask a wider question: how agents' actions, strategies, or expectations might react to—might endogenously change with—the patterns they create. In other words, it enables us to examine how the economy behaves out of equilibrium, when it is not at a steady state.

This out-of-equilibrium approach is not a minor adjunct to standard economic theory; it is economics done in a more general way. When examined out of equilibrium, economic patterns sometimes simplify into a simple, homogeneous equilibrium of standard economics; but just as often they show perpetually novel and complex behavior. The static equilibrium approach suffers two characteristic indeterminacies: it cannot easily resolve among multiple equilibria; nor can it easily model individuals' choices of expectations. Both problems are ones of formation (of an equilibrium and of an “ecology” of expectations, respectively), and when analyzed in formation—that is, out of equilibrium—these anomalies disappear.

Keywords

Agent-based, out-of-equilibrium economics, evolutionary economics, indeterminacy, complexity

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1 Introduction

Over the last twenty years a different way of doing economics has been slowly emerging. It goes by several labels: complexity economics, computational modeling, agent-based modeling, adaptive economics, research on artificial economies, generative social science—each of these with its own peculiarities, its own followers, and its own nuances. Whatever the label, what is happening, I believe, is more than just the accumulation of computer-based or agent-based studies. It is a movement in economics.¹

Why this movement? One answer all its practitioners agree on is that agent-based modeling came along in the 1980s because at that time economists got desktop workstations. For the first time we could not just study equilibria but ask how they form. Agent-based modeling is about how patterns in the economy form (I like Joshua Epstein's term *generative explanation* for this), and usually such formation is too complicated to be handled analytically—hence the resort to computer simulation. This is fine. But does it mean agent-based computational economics is merely an adjunct to conventional economics that adds something about pattern formation? And if it relies mainly on simulating economic processes on the computer, isn't this a retreat from theory? What does this way of doing economics really provide?

In this overview essay I want to argue that this movement is not a minor adjunct to neoclassical economics; it is something more than this. It is a shift from looking at economic problems at equilibrium to looking at such problems out of equilibrium, a shift to a more general economics—an out-of-equilibrium economics.

Before I begin, a caveat to the reader. This essay is a line of reasoning about the nature of agent-based economics; it makes no attempt to review the agent-based computation literature, nor does it give instructions on how to carry out agent-based computation. Both topics have been well covered elsewhere.

I will start not by discussing agent-based modeling, but the economy itself.

¹ The progression of the subject can be seen by comparing the volumes: Anderson, Arrow and Pines (1988); Arthur, Durlauf and Lane (1997); Blume and Durlauf (2005); and this volume of Judd and Tesfatsion (2005). For other commentaries on this approach see: Lane (1993); the introduction to Arthur *et al.* (1997); Colander (2000); and Tesfatsion (2005).

2 Beyond Equilibrium

Economic agents—banks, consumers, firms, investors—continually adjust their market moves, buying decisions, prices, and forecasts to the situation these moves or decisions or prices or forecasts together create. To put this another way, individual behaviors collectively create an aggregate outcome; and they react to this outcome. There is nothing new in saying this. Economists have seen the economy this way at least since Adam Smith. Behavior creates pattern; and pattern in turn influences behavior.

It might be natural in such a setting for economic theorists to study the unfolding of patterns that economic agents create. But this obviously is complicated. And therefore to seek analytical solutions, historically economics chose to simplify its questions. It asked instead what behavior caused an outcome or pattern that leads to no incentive to change that behavior. In other words, it asked what patterns in the economy would look like if they were at equilibrium—were consistent with the micro-behavior (actions, strategies, expectations) that creates them. Thus, for example, general equilibrium theory asks: What prices and quantities of goods produced and consumed are *consistent with*—would pose no incentives for change to—the overall pattern of prices and quantities in the economy's markets? Game theory asks: What strategies, moves, or allocations are consistent with—would be the best course of action for an agent (under some criterion)—given the strategies, moves, allocations his rivals might choose? Rational expectations economics asks: What forecasts (or expectations) are consistent with—are on average validated by—the outcomes these forecasts and expectations together create? Partial-equilibrium economics—say in international trade theory—asks: what local behaviors would produce larger patterns that would support (be consistent with) those local behaviors.

This equilibrium approach lends itself to expression in equation form. And because an equilibrium by definition is a pattern that doesn't change, in equation form it can be studied for its structure, its implications, and the conditions under which it obtains. Of course the simplicity that makes such analytical examination possible has a price. To ensure tractability we usually have to assume homogeneous (or identical) agents, or at most two or three classes of agents. We have to assume that human behavior—a notoriously complicated affair—can be captured by simple mathematical functions. We have to assume agent behavior that is intelligent but has no incentive to change; hence we must assume that agents and their peers deduce their way into exhausting all information they might find useful, so they have no incentive to change. Still, as a strategy of advancement of analysis, this equilibrium approach has been enormously successful. As it evolved into the neoclassical structure we know today, it has built a degree of understanding that is the envy of other social sciences.

I believe that economics is currently pushing beyond this equilibrium paradigm. It is natural to ask how agents' behavior might not just be *consistent with* the aggregate pattern it creates, but how actions, strategies, or expectations might in general react to—might *endogenously change with*—the patterns they create. In other words, it is natural to ask how the economy behaves when it is not at a steady state—when it is *out of equilibrium*. At this more general level, we can surmise that economic patterns might settle down over sufficient time to a simple, homogeneous equilibrium. Or, that they

might not: they might show everchanging, perpetually novel behavior. We might also surmise they might show new phenomena that do not appear in steady state.

By its very nature this approach calls for detailed instructions on how individual behavior adjusts as the situation unfolds; therefore it is algorithmic. And since there is considerable scope for learning or reacting in different ways, this approach sees no reason to treat adjustments in behavior as identical. Agents must therefore be separately considered; hence the approach is based on individual agents. Consideration of economic patterns out of equilibrium therefore naturally introduces algorithmic updating and heterogeneity of agents. On both these counts it is best handled by computation.

One possible objection to doing economics this way is that because the approach is computational, it does not constitute theory. But this statement is too facile. If working out the implications of a set of assumptions is theory, then whether this is done by hand or by computer does not matter. Both methods yield theory. But certainly there is a difference in style. Equation-based methods call for equation-based dissection of the results—and equation-based discovery of telling implications—and this dissection and analysis can be accomplished rigorously. Of course often the rigor is specious. Implications match reality only as well as the chosen assumptions and chosen functional forms do; and functional forms are always abstractions of reality—often gross ones when closely examined—so there is plenty of scope for rigorous deduction based upon faulty assumptions. Computer-based modeling is different but parallel in these regards. It calls for statistical dissection of the phenomena discovered, and in many computer-based models it may be difficult to discern phenomena through the thicket of events. There is also scope for unrealistic assumptions and for needless complication. And doing computer-based economics well is not necessarily easier than doing analytical economics well. Good work here shows an eye for elegance of experiment for the telling, simple, computational model that demonstrates a phenomenon clearly; and for extracting a phenomenon from the jumble of other data that obscure it.

The two styles can of course be mixed. If a phenomenon shows up computationally, often it can be reproduced in a simpler analytical model. If it shows up analytically, it can be probed computationally. Properly carried out, computation does not replace theory. It allows more realistic assumptions and accommodates out-of-equilibrium behavior. It thereby extends theory. It is also good to remember—and I want to emphasize this—that exploring the economy out of equilibrium does not *require* computation. That could be done in principle by analytical methods, as it has in some particular cases, especially those involving learning mechanisms (Samuelson 1997; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Brock and Hommes, 1998.) But for most agent-based situations analytical formulations are highly complicated, hence the resort to computation.

A different objection is that because out-of-equilibrium studies require detailed modeling of how individual behavior adjusts (and how agents interact), they encourage behavioral assumptions that are *ad hoc*. The point has some merit: assumptions are sometimes adopted for convenience. But we need to remember that the standard assumptions of “rational behavior” themselves are highly stylized versions of reality. If

modeling agent adjustments forces us to study and think rigorously about *actual* human behavior, this is actually a strength.

Out-of-equilibrium studies of course do not answer all possible questions. They do not tell us usually about the formation of tastes, or of technologies, or of structure. David Lane (1993) notes that such studies “offer only very limited scope to the emergence of new structures—and, so far, none at all to the emergence of higher-level entities.” What emerges is pattern, not hierarchical structure.

One thing noticeable about agent-based studies is that they are nearly always evolutionary in approach. Why should this be? I said earlier that an assumption common to most studies is that agents differ in the way they react to aggregate patterns; they have different circumstances, different histories, different psychologies. That is, agents are adaptive and heterogeneous. On first thought, this might seem to yield at most a trivial extension to standard homogeneous theory. But consider. If heterogeneous agents (or heterogeneous strategies or expectations) adjust continually to the overall situation they together create, then they adapt within an “ecology” they together create. And in so adapting, they change that ecology. So providing we use “evolution” in the broadest sense of the word, which I interpret as elements adapting their state to the situation they together create, we see that in this sense evolution emerges naturally from the very construction of such modeling. It need not be added as an adjunct. (Of course in any particular case we would need to define precisely what we mean by “elements,” “adapting,” “states,” and “situation.”) Because out-of-equilibrium economics is by its nature evolutionary, it resembles modern evolutionary biology more than it does 19th century physics.

Agent-based, non-steady-state economics is also a generalization of equilibrium economics. Out-of-equilibrium systems may converge to or display patterns that are consistent—that call for no further adjustments. If so, standard equilibrium behavior becomes a special case. It follows that out-of-equilibrium economics is not in competition with equilibrium theory. It is merely economics done in a more general, generative way.

I have made a large claim so far, namely that a new form of economics is a-birthing—a generative or out-of-equilibrium economics. If the reader accepts this, a natural question to ask is what it delivers. What novel phenomena do we see when we do economics out of equilibrium? Are there questions that equilibrium economics can not answer, but that this more general form of economics can? In Kuhnian language, are there anomalies that this new paradigm resolves?

The answer to this last question is yes. In the remainder of this essay I want to look at two characteristic anomalies—two indeterminacies, to be precise—in equilibrium economics and show that these disappear under the new approach. Along the way, I want to point to some characteristic phenomena that arise in the new approach. I will base the discussion mainly on a study by Lindgren and on three topics I have been heavily involved with, because these address directly the points I want to make (and because I am most familiar with them). There are certainly other studies that widen the

scope of agent-based economics beyond the discussion here.² These also, I believe, corroborate the arguments I will make here.

3 Perpetual Novelty

Let me begin with a phenomenon, one often we see in this sort of economics. That is the absence of any equilibrium, or more positively, the presence of ever-changing, perpetually novel behavior. For an example, consider the classic study of Kristian Lindgren (1991). Lindgren sets up a computerized tournament where strategies compete in randomly chosen pairs to play a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. The elements in his study are therefore strategies rather than human agents. Strategies that do well replicate and mutate. Ones that lose eventually die. Strategies can "deepen" by using deeper memory of their past moves and their opponent's. A strategy's success of course depends on the current population of strategies, and so the adaptive elements here—strategies—react to, or change with, the competitive world they together create.

In his computerized tournament Lindgren discovered that the simple strategies in use at the start went unchallenged for some time. Tit-for-tat and other simple strategies dominated at the beginning. But then other, deeper strategies emerged that were able to exploit the mixture of these simple ones. In time, yet deeper strategies emerged to take advantage of those, and so on. If strategies got "too smart"—that is, too complicated—sometimes simple ones could exploit these. In this computer world of strategies, Lindgren found periods with very large numbers of diverse strategies in the population, and periods with few strategies. And he found periods dominated by simple strategies, and periods dominated by deep strategies. But nothing ever settled down. In Lindgren's world the set of strategies in use evolved and kept evolving in a world of perpetual novelty. This is unfamiliar to us in standard economics. Yet there is a realism about such dynamics with its unpredictable, emergent, and complicated sets of strategies. Chess play at the grand master level evolves over decades and never settles down. Lindgren's system is simple, yet it leads to a dynamic of endless unfolding and evolution.

When, in general, do we see perpetually novel behavior in the economy? There is no precise rule, but broadly speaking perpetual novelty arises in two circumstances. One is where there is frustration (to use a physics term) in the system. Roughly this means that it is not possible to satisfy the needs of all the agents (or elements) at the same time and that these jostle continually to have their needs fulfilled. The other is where exploration is allowed and learning can deepen indefinitely—can see better and better into the system it is trying to understand. In this case collective behaviors can explore into constantly new realms, sometimes mutually complicate, sometimes simplify, but not settle down.

² For some early studies see: Bak *et al.* (1993); Durlauf (1993); Lindgren (1991); Marimon *et al.* (1990); Sargent (1994); and Schelling (1978). See also Young (1998). The earliest agent-based studies I know of were by Miller (1988), and Marks (1989). From the most recently available collection (Arthur *et al.* 1997), the reader might consult the papers of Blume, Durlauf, Kirman, Kollman *et al.*, Ioannides, Lane and Maxfield, and Tesfatsion. The forthcoming collection of Blume and Durlauf (2005) and this volume contain more recent work. For the literature on network interactions, see Wilhite (2005, this volume).

4 Equilibrium Indeterminacy and the Selection Process

In the Lindgren case, the situation shows no equilibrium; it is always in perpetual novelty. In other cases equilibrium is possible, but there may be more than one natural pattern of consistency: there may be multiple equilibria. This situation arises naturally in the presence of positive feedbacks or increasing returns—or more technically, under non-convexity. Here multiple equilibria are the norm. At first sight this does not seem to pose any major difficulty to equilibrium economics. Instead of a unique equilibrium there are several. But there *is* a difficulty. Equilibrium economics can identify consistent patterns, but can not tell us how one comes to be chosen. Standard economics therefore runs up against an indeterminacy.

This indeterminacy has been an embarrassment to economics over the years. "Multiple equilibria," wrote Schumpeter in his 1954 book, "are not necessarily useless, but from the standpoint of any exact science the existence of a uniquely determined equilibrium is, of course, of the utmost importance, even if proof has to be purchased at the price of very restrictive assumptions; without any possibility of proving the existence of uniquely determined equilibria—or at all events, of a small number of possible equilibria—at however high a level of abstraction, a field of phenomena is really a chaos that is not under analytical control." Faced with this potential "chaos," different subfields of economics took different approaches. Some—especially within game theory in the 1960s and '70s—added restrictive (and somewhat artificial) assumptions until only a single solution remained. Others, contrary to Schumpeter, accepted the chaos. They statically determined the possible equilibria in a problem and left the choice of equilibrium open and therefore indeterminate. An example is the international trade theory of Helpman and Krugman (1985) which allowed increasing returns and settled for multiple static, but indeterminate, equilibria.

A more natural approach, I believe, is to tackle the issue generatively (Arthur 1989, 1994): to see the problem not as one of equilibrium *selection* but as one of equilibrium *formation*. Economic activity is quantized by events that are too small to foresee, and these small "random" events—who sits next to whom on an airplane, who tenders an offer when, who adopts what product when—can over time cumulate and become magnified by positive feedbacks to determine which solution was reached. This suggests that situations with multiple equilibria can best be modeled by looking at what happens over time—what happens in formation. That is, they are best modeled not as static deterministic problems, but as dynamic processes with random events, with natural positive feedbacks or nonlinearities. With this strategy the situation can then be "observed" theoretically as its corresponding process unfolds again and again to "select" or determine an outcome. Sometimes one equilibrium will emerge, sometimes (under identical conditions) another. It is impossible to know in advance which of the candidate outcomes will emerge in any given unfolding of the process, but it is possible to study the probability that a particular solution emerges under a certain set of initial conditions. In this way the selection problem can be handled by modeling the situation in formation, by translating it into a dynamic process with random events. With an out-of-equilibrium approach, the anomaly disappears.

In this sense a whole realm of economics—increasing returns problems—requires an out-of-equilibrium approach. This realm, by the way, is not small. Increasing returns

arise in economic geography, finance, economics of markets, economic development, economics of technology, and economics of poverty; and the literature in these areas is becoming large. Interestingly, in most of the important cases the work has been analytical, not computational. The reason is that most increasing returns problems lend themselves to sufficient homogeneity of agents to be handled by analysis.

Whatever their topic of focus, increasing returns studies tend to show common properties: a multiplicity of potential “solutions”; the outcome actually reached is not predictable in advance; it is “selected” by small events; it tends to be locked in; it is not necessarily the most efficient; it is subject to the historical path taken; and while the problem may be symmetrical, the outcome is usually asymmetrical. These properties have counterparts in a different science that emphasizes the formation of pattern: solid-state physics. What economists call multiple equilibria, non-predictability, lock-in, inefficiency, historical path dependence, and asymmetry, physicists call multiple metastable states, unpredictability, phase- or mode-locking, highenergy ground states, non-ergodicity, and symmetry breaking. Some of these properties can be identified by static analysis (multiplicity, possible non-efficiency, non-predictability, and lock-in). But to see how they come about, and to see symmetry breaking, selection, and path-dependence in action, requires looking at the situation as the solution forms—out of equilibrium.

5 Expectational Indeterminacy and Inductive Behavior

Multiple equilibria cause one type of indeterminacy in static economics. Expectations can cause another, and this also requires out-of-equilibrium resolution. Let me explain.

All economic actions are taken on the expectation of some outcome. And in many situations this outcome is determined collectively—it depends upon the results of other people’s actions. Thus an entrepreneur may have to decide on whether to invest in a new semiconductor fabrication plant today, based upon what he forecasts supply in the market to be like in two years’ time. And his competitors may have to make similar decisions. But the collective result of their choices today will determine the aggregate supply (and hence prices and profits) in two years’ time.

In cases like this, agents attempt to forecast what the outcome will be; but their actions based on their forecasts determine this outcome. So the situation is self-referential: agents are trying to form expectations about an outcome that is a function of their expectations. Or, to collapse this further, their choices of expectation depend on their choices of expectation. Without some additional conditions imposed, there is no logical or deductive way to settle this self-referential choice. This is a fundamental indeterminacy in static economics.

It is tempting to dismiss this as a minor anomaly, but the situation that causes it pervades economics: it occurs anywhere agents’ decisions affect other agents.³ It confronts economics with a lacuna—how expectations might logically be formed in

³ For some history and commentary on this indeterminacy see Koppl and Rosser (2002).

multi-agent situations. And it is the main reason economists feel uneasy about problems with expectations.

Static economic theory, of course, *does* deal with problems where multi-agent expectations must be considered; it has evolved a theoretical method—a sort of analytical workaround—to do this: the rational expectations approach. Rational expectations ask, within a given economic problem, what expectational model (if everyone adopted it) would lead to actions that would on average validate that expectational model. If such a model existed, agents' expectations would be on average upheld, and this would solve the problem of selecting suitable expectations.

Actually, this last assertion came too fast. To be rigorously exact, if such a model existed it would demonstrate at least one set of expectations consistent with the outcome. Whether this translates into a *theory* of expectations formation matched by reality is another question, one that leaves even supporters of this approach uncomfortable. To suppose that this solution to a given problem would be reached in a one-off non-repeated problem, we would need to assume that agents can somehow deduce in advance what model will work, that everyone “knows” this model will be used, and everyone knows that everyone knows this model will be used, ad infinitum. (This is the common knowledge assumption.) And we would further require a unique solution; otherwise agents might coordinate on different expectations.

The net effect is that unless there is good reason for agents to coordinate somehow on a single set of expectations, rational expectations become theoretically singular: they resemble a pencil balanced on its point—logically possible but in reality unlikely. The situation worsens when agents differ. They must now form expectations of an outcome that is a function of expectations they are not privy to. Whether behaviorally or theoretically, barring some obvious coordinating set of expectations, the indeterminacy can not be avoided. Deductive equilibrium economics therefore faces an anomaly.

As a theory of expectations formation, rational expectations begin to look better if the situation is repeated over time, because we might suppose that agents “learn” their way over time into on-average correct expectations. In this case rational expectations would at least form a solution to which expectations converge. But it is possible to construct repeated situations in economics where rational expectations are not a guide—where in fact they *must* fail. Consider the El Farol bar problem (Arthur 1994). One hundred people must decide independently each week whether to show up at their favorite bar (El Farol in Santa Fe, say). The rule is that if a person predicts that more than 60 (say) will attend, she will avoid the crowds and stay home; if she predicts fewer than 60 she will go. We see at once the self reference I mentioned above: agents attend based on their predictions of how many agents will attend.

Will rational expectations work here? Suppose for a moment they do. Suppose that a rational expectations prediction machine exists and all agents possess a copy of it. Such a machine would take a given history of attendance (say, ten weeks back) and map it into a forecast of the coming week's attendance, and by definition it would on average predict correctly. Suppose now this machine predicts one week that 74 will attend. But, knowing this nobody shows up, negating that forecast. Suppose the next week it

predicts 44. Then 100 people go, negating that forecast as well. In El Farol, expectations that are shared in common negate themselves. Therefore forecasts that are on average consistent with the outcome they predict do not exist and can not be statically deduced. As a theory of expectations formation, rational expectation fails here. The indeterminacy is also manifest in this case. Any attempt to deduce a reasonable theory of expectations that applies to all is quickly confounded.⁴

The anomaly resolves itself in this case (and in general) if we take a generative approach and observe expectations in formation. To do this we can assume agents start each with a variety of expectational models or forecasting hypotheses, none of them necessarily “correct.” We can assume these expectations are subjectively arrived at and therefore differ. We can also assume agents act as statisticians: they test their forecasting models, retain the ones that work, and discard the others. This is inductive behavior. It assumes no a-priori “solution” but sets out merely to learn what works. Such an approach applies out of equilibrium (expectations need not be consistent with their outcome) as well as in equilibrium; and it applies generally to multi-agent problems where expectations are involved. (See Holland *et al.* (1986), and Sargent (1994).)

Putting this into practice in the case of El Farol means assuming that agents individually form a number of predictive hypotheses or models, and each week act on their currently most accurate one. (Call this their active predictor.) In this way beliefs or hypotheses compete for use in an ecology these beliefs create. Computer simulation then shows that the mean attendance quickly converges to 60. In fact, the predictors self-organize into an equilibrium pattern or “ecology” in which, on average, 40% of the active predictors are forecasting above 60 and 60% below 60. And while the population of active predictors splits into this 60/40 average ratio, it keeps changing in membership forever. There is a strong equilibrium here, but it emerges ecologically and is not the outcome of deductive reasoning.

My point in this discussion is not just that it is possible to construct problems that confound rational expectations. It is this: In multi-agent situations the formation of expectations introduces a fundamental indeterminacy into equilibrium economics; but if we allow expectations to form out of equilibrium in an inductive, agent-based way, the indeterminacy disappears. Expectation formation then becomes a natural process.

If we apply this generative approach to standard problems, do expectations indeed usually converge to the rational expectations norm? The answer is mixed: sometimes they do and sometimes they don’t, depending on whether there is a strong attractor to the rational expectations norm or not. Interestingly both answers can obtain in the same problem. Different parameter sets can show different behaviors. In one set (or phase or regime) simple equilibrium behavior might reign; in another complex, non-converging

⁴ This El Farol situation of preferring to be in the minority occurs in the economy anywhere pre-committed decisions have to be made under diminishing returns (to the numbers committing). In its minority game formulation, the problem is much studied among physicists (see Challet, Marsalis and Zhang, 2004; and Coolen, 2005).

pattern-forming behavior might obtain. My guess is that such phases will turn out to be common in agent-based models.

Consider as an example the Santa Fe artificial stock market (Palmer et al., 1994; Arthur et al. 1997). The model is essentially a heterogeneous-agent version of the classic Lucas equilibrium model (1978). In it heterogeneous agents, or artificial investors, form a market within the computer where a single stock is traded. Each monitors the stock price and submits bids and offers which jointly determine tomorrow's price. Agents form (differing) multiple hypotheses of what moves the market price, act on the most accurate, and learn by creating new hypotheses and discarding poorly performing one. We found two regimes: if agents update their hypotheses at a slow rate, the diversity of expectations collapses into a homogeneous rational expectations regime. The reason is simple: if a majority of investors believes something close to the rational expectations forecast it becomes a strong attractor; others lose by deviating from these expectations and slowly learn their way to them. But if the rate of updating of hypotheses is tuned higher, the market undergoes a phase transition into a "complex regime." Here it displays several properties seen in real markets. It develops a rich "psychology" of divergent beliefs that do not converge over time. Expectational rules such as "If the market is trending up, predict a 2% price rise" appear randomly in the population of hypotheses and become temporarily mutually reinforcing. (If enough investors act on these, the price will indeed go up.) In this way sub-populations of mutually reinforcing expectations arise, and fall away again. This is not quite perpetual novelty. But it is a phenomenon common to such studies: patterns that are self-reinforcing arise, lock-in for some time (much as clouds do in meteorology), and disappear.

We also see another phenomenon, again common to out-of-equilibrium studies: avalanches of change of varying sizes. These arise because individual out-of-equilibrium behavior adjusts from time to time, which changes the aggregate, which in turn may call for further behavioral changes among agents. As a result in such systems cascades of change—some small and some large—can ripple through the system. In artificial markets this phenomenon shows up as agents changing their expectations (perhaps by exploring new ones) which changes the market slightly, and which may cause other agents to also change their expectations. Changes in beliefs then ripple through the market in avalanches of all sizes, causing random periods of high and low price volatility. This phenomenon shows up in actual financial market data but not in equilibrium models. One interesting question is whether such avalanches show properties associated with phase boundaries in physics, namely power laws where the size of the avalanche is inversely proportional to its frequency. Systems that display this behavior may be technically *critical*: they may lie precisely between ordered and chaotic behavior. We might conjecture that in certain economic situations behavior ensures that the outcome remains poised in this region—technically that self-organized criticality (Bak *et al.*, 1988) arises.

6 Conclusion

After two centuries of studying equilibria—patterns of consistency that call for no further behavioral adjustments—economists are beginning to study the emergence of equilibria and the general unfolding of patterns in the economy. That is, we are starting to study the economy out of equilibrium. This way of doing economics calls for an

algorithmic approach. And it invites a deeper approach to agents' reactions to change, and a recognition that these may differ—and therefore that agents are naturally heterogeneous. This form of economics is naturally evolutionary. It is not in competition with equilibrium theory, nor is it a minor adjunct to the standard economic theory. It is economics done in a more general, out-of-equilibrium way. Within this, standard equilibrium behavior becomes a special case.

When viewed out of equilibrium, the economy reveals itself not as deterministic, predictable and mechanistic; but as process-dependent, organic and evolving. Economic patterns sometimes simplify into a simple, homogeneous equilibrium of standard economics. But often they do not. Often they are ever-changing, showing perpetually novel behavior.

One test of a different fundamental approach is whether it can handle certain difficulties—anomalies—that have stymied the old one. Certainly this is the case with out-of-equilibrium economics. Within the static approach, both the problem of equilibrium selection and of choice of expectations are in general indeterminate. These two indeterminacies should not be surprising, because both problems are in essence ones of formation—of coming into being—that can not be resolved by static analysis. Both have been the source of considerable discomfort in economics. But when analyzed out of equilibrium they fall into their proper setting, and the difficulties they cause dissolve and disappear.

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