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http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/79104 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/79104 http://eprints.org/relation/isIndexCodesVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/79104 archive 351 disk0/00/01/05/39 2016-01-15 08:49:10 2021-08-27 17:23:29 2016-01-15 08:49:10 article show 1 Sasaki T. AL0345 0000-0002-4635-1389 Uchida S. pub iis_ecl prog_eep Evolution of cooperation; Ostracism; Costly punishment; Second-order freerider; Public goods; Evolutionary game theory The exclusion of freeriders from common privileges or public acceptance is widely found in the real world. Current models on the evolution of cooperation with incentives mostly assume peer sanctioning, whereby a punisher imposes penalties on freeriders at a cost to itself. It is well known that such costly punishment has two substantial difficulties. First, a rare punishing cooperator barely subverts the asocial society of freeriders, and second, natural selection often eliminates punishing cooperators in the presence of non-punishing cooperators (namely, "second-order" freeriders). We present a game-theoretical model of social exclusion in which a punishing cooperator can exclude freeriders from benefit sharing. We show that such social exclusion can overcome the above-mentioned difficulties even if it is costly and stochastic. The results do not require a genetic relationship, repeated interaction, reputation or group selection. Instead, only a limited number of freeriders are required to prevent the second-order freeriders from eroding the social immune system. 2013-02 published Royal Society of London 10.1098/rspb.2012.2498 XJ-13-008 Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences; 280(1752):20122498 (7 February 2013) (Published online 5 December 2012) [doi:10.1098/rspb.2012.2498] 2355 public Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 280 1752 20122498 TRUE 0962-8452 FALSE info:eu-repo/semantics/article