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http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/13691 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/13691 http://eprints.org/relation/isCoversheetVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/13691 archive 351 disk0/00/01/07/02 2016-01-15 08:49:44 2021-08-27 17:23:46 2016-01-15 08:49:44 monograph show 3 Sasaki T. AL0345 0000-0002-4635-1389 Uchida S. pub iis_ecl prog_eep Public good game; Evolution of cooperation; Reward; Punishment; Coordination problem Properly coordinating cooperation is relevant for resolving public good problems, such as clean energy and environmental protection. However, little is known about how individuals can coordinate themselves for a certain level of cooperation in large populations of strangers. In a typical situation, a consensus-building process rarely succeeds, owing to a lack of face and standing. The evolution of cooperation in this type of situation is studied here using threshold public good games, in which cooperation prevails when it is initially sufficient, or otherwise it perishes. While punishment is a powerful tool for shaping human behaviours, institutional punishment is often too costly to start with only a few contributors, which is another coordination problem. Here, we show that whatever the initial conditions, reward funds based on voluntary contribution can evolve. The voluntary reward paves the way for effectively overcoming the coordination problem and efficiently transforms freeloaders into cooperators with a perceived small risk of collective failure. 2013 published IR-13-065 IR-13-065 2355 public interim_report IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria 10 FALSE info:eu-repo/semantics/book