First carrot, then stick: how the adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation

10734 22 13727 2 24461 document 13727 IR-13-026.pdf application/pdf 16461b5463cf30c77bca1f6bbc037c2e MD5 640243 2016-01-15 08:49:58 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/10734/1/IR-13-026.pdf 10734 1 1 text en public

IR-13-026.pdf

15 14322 1 26052 document 14322 indexcodes.txt text/x-pascal db5dcfe999790d5ad17a76f8e7ea78ec MD5 9625 2016-01-15 09:32:39 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/10734/2/indexcodes.txt 10734 2 2 text/x-pascal other Generate index codes conversion from text to indexcodes en public

indexcodes.txt

lightbox.jpg

preview.jpg

medium.jpg

small.jpg

IR-13-026.pdf

http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/13727 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/13727 http://eprints.org/relation/isCoversheetVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/13727 archive 351 disk0/00/01/07/34 2016-01-15 08:49:58 2021-08-27 17:23:51 2016-01-15 08:49:58 monograph show 3 Chen X. 1948 Sasaki T. AL0345 0000-0002-4635-1389 Brännström Å. 8085 Dieckmann U. 1668 0000-0001-7089-0393 First carrot, then stick: how the adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation pub iis_ecl prog_eep Social institutions often use rewards and penalties to promote cooperation. Providing incentives tend to be costly, so it is important to find effective and efficient policies for the combined use of rewards and penalties. Most studies of cooperation, however, have addressed rewarding and punishing in isolation and have focused on peer-to-peer sanctioning as opposed to institutional sanctioning. Here, we demonstrate that an institutional sanctioning policy we call 'first carrot, then stick' is unexpectedly successful in promoting cooperation. The policy switches the incentive from rewarding to punishing when the frequency of cooperators exceeds a threshold. We find that this policy establishes and recovers full cooperation at lower cost and under a wider range of conditions than either rewards or penalties alone, in both well-mixed and spatial populations. In particular, the spatial dynamics of cooperation make it evident how punishment acts as a 'booster stage' that capitalizes on and amplifies the pro-social effects of rewarding. Together, our results show that the adaptive hybridization of incentives offers the 'best of both worlds' by combining the effectiveness of rewarding in establishing cooperation with the effectiveness of punishing in recovering it, thereby providing a surprisingly inexpensive and widely applicable method of promoting cooperation. 2013 published IR-13-026 IR-13-026 2575 2355 39 66 public interim_report IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria 31 TRUE FALSE info:eu-repo/semantics/book