Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment

10837 7 34671 2 77083 document 34671 Probabilistic sharing.pdf application/pdf 2ea721cbecfbe93d49efeb79cf80868b MD5 1550877 2016-02-26 10:35:38 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/10837/1/Probabilistic%20sharing.pdf 10837 1 1 application/pdf text en public cc_by_nc

Probabilistic sharing.pdf

published 34682 2 77138 document 34682 lightbox.jpg image/png ad6c3757ba054c8014988992e778f4c2 MD5 12829 2016-02-26 10:45:47 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/10837/2/lightbox.jpg 10837 2 2 image/png other Thumbnails conversion from text to thumbnail_lightbox en public

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http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/34671 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/34671 http://eprints.org/relation/isIndexCodesVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/34671 archive 351 disk0/00/01/08/37 2016-01-15 08:50:23 2021-08-27 17:24:05 2016-01-15 08:50:23 article show 1 Chen X. 1948 Szolnoki A. Perc M. Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment pub iis_ecl iis_met iis_sys prog_eep Social dynamics; Networks; Punishment; Public goods; Econophysics Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the second-order free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because they contribute to the public good, but they also eschew the costs associated with punishing defectors. Altruistic punishers - those that cooperate and punish - are at a disadvantage, and it is puzzling how such behaviour has evolved. We show that sharing the responsibility to sanction defectors rather than relying on certain individuals to do so permanently can solve the problem of costly punishment. Inspired by the fact that humans have strong but also emotional tendencies for fair play, we consider probabilistic sanctioning as the simplest way of distributing the duty. In well-mixed populations the public goods game is transformed into a coordination game with full cooperation and defection as the two stable equilibria, while in structured populations pattern formation supports additional counterintuitive solutions that are reminiscent of Parrondo's paradox. 2014-08 published IOP 10.1088/1367-2630/16/8/083016 XJ-14-213 New Journal of Physics; 16:083016 (7 August 2014) [doi:10.1088/1367-2630/16/8/083016] 2575 public New Journal of Physics 16 083016 83016 TRUE 1367-2630 FALSE info:eu-repo/semantics/article