The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation

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sasakit13_institutionOA.pdf

published 79111 2 218543 document 79111 lightbox.jpg image/png 89c6218c226e1fef008f756211b626a8 MD5 36433 2017-09-12 09:42:32 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/10881/2/lightbox.jpg 10881 2 2 image/png other Thumbnails conversion from text to thumbnail_lightbox en public

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http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/79110 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/79110 http://eprints.org/relation/isIndexCodesVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/79110 archive 351 disk0/00/01/08/81 2016-01-15 08:50:32 2021-08-27 17:24:08 2016-01-15 08:50:32 article show Sasaki T. AL0345 0000-0002-4635-1389 The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation pub iis_ecl prog_eep Evolutionary game theory; Public good games; Social dilemmas; Rewards; Punishment; Equilibrium selection Rewards and penalties are common practical tools that can be used to promote cooperation in social institutions. The evolution of cooperation under reward and punishment incentives in joint enterprises has been formalized and investigated, mostly by using compulsory public good games. Recently, Sasaki et al. (2012, Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 109:1165-1169) considered optional participation as well as institutional incentives and described how the interplay between these mechanisms affects the evolution of cooperation in public good games. Here, we present a full classification of these cases of evolutionary dynamics. Specifically, whenever penalties are large enough to cause the bi-stability of both cooperation and defection in cases in which participation in the public good game is compulsory, these penalties will ultimately result in cooperation if participation in the public good game is optional. The global stability of coercion-based cooperation in this optional case contrasts strikingly with the bi-stability that is observed in the compulsory case We also argue that optional participation is not as effective under rewards as under punishment. 2014-09 published Springer 10.1007/s13235-013-0094-7 XJ-14-169 Dynamic Games and Applications; 4(3):345-362 (September 2014) (Published online 17 August 2013) [doi:10.1007/s13235-013-0094-7] 2355 public Dynamic Games and Applications 4 3 345-362 TRUE 2153-0793 FALSE info:eu-repo/semantics/article