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http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/13788 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/13788 http://eprints.org/relation/isCoversheetVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/13788 archive 351 disk0/00/01/12/44 2016-01-15 08:52:20 2021-08-27 17:24:45 2016-01-15 08:52:20 monograph show 3 Chen X. 1948 Szolnoki A. Perc M. Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment pub iis_ecl prog_eep Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the second-order free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because they contribute to the public good, but they also eschew the costs associated with punishing defectors. Altruistic punishers - those that cooperate and punish - are at a disadvantage, and it is puzzling how such behaviour has evolved. We show that sharing the responsibility to sanction defectors rather than relying on certain individuals to do so permanently can solve the problem of costly punishment. Inspired by the fact that humans have strong but also emotional tendencies for fair play, we consider probabilistic sanctioning as the simplest way of distributing the duty. In well mixed populations the public goods game is transformed into a coordination game with full cooperation and defection as the two stable equilibria, while in structured populations pattern formation supports additional counterintuitive solutions that are reminiscent of Parrondo's paradox. 2014 published IR-14-024 IR-14-024 2575 public interim_report IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria 16 FALSE info:eu-repo/semantics/book