Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility

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http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/13789 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/13789 http://eprints.org/relation/isCoversheetVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/13789 archive 351 disk0/00/01/12/45 2016-01-15 08:52:20 2021-08-27 17:24:45 2016-01-15 08:52:20 monograph show 2 Chen X. 1948 Perc M. Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility pub iis_ecl prog_eep We study the evolution of cooperation in the collective-risk social dilemma game, where the risk is determined by a collective target that must be reached with individual contributions. All players initialy receive endowments from the available amount of common resources. While cooperators contribute part of their endowment to the collective target, defectors do not. If the target is not reached, the endowments of all players are lost. In our model, we introduce a feedback between the amount of common resources and the contributions of cooperators. We show that cooperation can be sustained only if the common resources are preserved but never excessively abound. This, however, requires a delicate balance between the amount of common resource that initially exist, and the amount cooperators contribute to the collective target. Exceeding critical thresholds in either of the two amounts leads to loss of cooperation, and consequently to the depletion of common resources. 2014 published IR-14-023 IR-14-023 2575 public interim_report IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria 9 FALSE info:eu-repo/semantics/book