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http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/78015 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/78015 http://eprints.org/relation/isIndexCodesVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/78015 archive 351 disk0/00/01/14/34 2016-01-15 08:53:15 2021-08-27 17:39:54 2016-01-15 08:53:15 article show Hilbe C. 8465 Traulsen A. Sigmund K. 1050 pub iis_ecl prog_eep repeated games; zero-determinant strategies; cooperation; reciprocity; extortion Within the class of memory-one strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we characterize partner strategies, competitive strategies and zero-determinant strategies. If a player uses a partner strategy, both players can fairly share the social optimum; but a co-player preferring an unfair solution will be penalized by obtaining a reduced payoff. A player using a competitive strategy never obtains less than the co-player. A player using a zero-determinant strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between the two players' payoffs. These properties hold for every strategy used by the co-player, whether memory-one or not. 2015-07 published Elsevier 10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005 XJ-15-128 Games and Economic Behavior; 92:41-52 (July 2015) [doi:10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005] 1323 282 public Games and Economic Behavior 92 41-52 TRUE 1090-2473 FALSE info:eu-repo/semantics/article