Learning Through Fictitious Play in a Game-Theoretic Model of Natural Resource Consumption

15023 12 80298 2 221824 document 80298 mrmd_lcss_2017.pdf application/pdf ccb9e2986a4d364da70a9c06bff83936 MD5 527271 2018-01-08 14:17:47 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/15023/1/mrmd_lcss_2017.pdf 15023 1 1 application/pdf text en public cc_by

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accepted 80299 2 221827 document 80299 lightbox.jpg image/png 85df81f7a8d351ca75caca81d3ea7e2b MD5 66167 2018-01-08 14:18:12 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/15023/2/lightbox.jpg 15023 2 2 image/png other Thumbnails conversion from text to thumbnail_lightbox en public

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http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/80298 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/80298 http://eprints.org/relation/isIndexCodesVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/80298 archive 353 disk0/00/01/50/23 2018-01-08 08:25:16 2021-08-27 17:29:45 2018-01-08 08:25:16 article show Manzoor T. Rovenskaya E. 8206 0000-0002-2761-3443 Davydov A. 1803 Muhammad A. Learning Through Fictitious Play in a Game-Theoretic Model of Natural Resource Consumption pub prog_asa Human-in-the-loop control, game theory Understanding the emergence of sustainable behavior in dynamic models of resource consumption is essential for control of coupled human and natural systems. In this letter, we analyze a mathematical model of resource exploitation recently reported by the authors. The model incorporates the cognitive decision-making process of consumers and has previously been studied in a game-theoretic context as a static two-player game. In this letter, we extend the analysis by allowing the agents to adapt their psychological characteristics according to simple best-response learning dynamics. We show that, under the selected learning scheme, the Nash Equilibrium is reachable provided certain conditions on the psychological attributes of the consumers are fulfilled. Moreover, the equilibrium solution obtained is found to be sustainable in the sense that no players exhibit free-riding behavior, a phenomenon which occurs in the original open-loop system. In the process, via a Lyapunov-function based approach, we also provide a proof for the asymptotic global stability of the original system which was previously known to be only locally stable. 2018-01 published IEEE 10.1109/LCSYS.2017.2777898 260 60 public IEEE Control Systems Letters 2 1 163-168 TRUE 2475-1456 FALSE no info:eu-repo/semantics/article