A game of common-pool resource management: Effects of communication, risky environment and worldviews

15534 15 85420 4 240124 document 85420 Forest Game 1 Manuscript 080218.pdf application/pdf 47af191090bed5466b458b6f9506ef3a MD5 664771 2018-10-16 06:08:45 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/15534/1/Forest%20Game%201%20Manuscript%20080218.pdf 15534 1 1 application/pdf text en public cc_by_nc_nd_4

Forest Game 1 Manuscript 080218.pdf

accepted 85426 2 240135 document 85426 lightbox.jpg image/png c7ff9916dfa37a5a3a019704016fce2a MD5 31687 2018-10-16 06:19:05 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/15534/2/lightbox.jpg 15534 2 2 image/png other Thumbnails conversion from text to thumbnail_lightbox en staffonly

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http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/85420 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/85420 http://eprints.org/relation/isIndexCodesVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/85420 archive 353 disk0/00/01/55/34 2018-10-22 06:08:12 2021-08-27 17:30:56 2018-10-22 06:08:12 article show Bednarik P. 2085 Bayer J. 1354 Magnuszewski P. 8149 Dieckmann U. 1668 0000-0001-7089-0393 A game of common-pool resource management: Effects of communication, risky environment and worldviews pub prog_eep prog_risk prog_wat tragedy of the commons, social dilemma, cooperation, behavioural experiment, cultural theory The ‘tragedy of the commons’ has been investigated for several decades. At its centre is the question whether a common resource will collapse under over-exploitation. The isolated analysis of one resource has many conceptual benefits, yet in reality resources and welfare are intertwined. In this paper, we investigate a situation where a resource which is exploited for profit has the additional feature of protecting against risk. Our main question is whether participants in an experimental game will prioritize such additional feature over maximizing profit and, if so, to what extent. Therefore, we designed a forest-harvesting game: Participants can harvest trees to generate income, and at the same time the forest serves as a protection against floods. Communication has been shown to play a vital role in managing commons. Our second aim is to test the importance of communication when the resource functions as a device of protecting against external risk. Lastly, we introduce a new perspective to the tragedy of the commons literature. Specifically, we investigate how the anthropologically motivated theory of risk perception (often called Cultural Theory) correlates with behaviour in our economic game. We believe that there is much potential in combining insights from these separate disciplines. 2019-02 published Elsevier 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.10.004 27 182 192 66 public Ecological Economics 156 287-292 TRUE 1873-6106 FALSE no info:eu-repo/semantics/article