17242 7 94273 2 274254 document 94273 games-12-00042-v3.pdf application/pdf a6702ababffcd779e2c9592e8ad020ca MD5 1747404 2021-06-07 07:23:22 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/17242/1/games-12-00042-v3.pdf 17242 1 1 application/pdf text en public cc_by_4

games-12-00042-v3.pdf

published 94281 1 274277 document 94281 indexcodes.txt text/x-c++ 5442509a094943720e6cf7749e84bd59 MD5 9962 2021-06-07 07:33:23 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/17242/2/indexcodes.txt 17242 2 2 text/x-c++ other Generate index codes conversion from text to indexcodes en public

indexcodes.txt

http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/94273 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/94273 http://eprints.org/relation/isIndexCodesVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/94273 94282 2 274281 document 94282 lightbox.jpg image/png f6825c052316a0e01e9b7315b0f4bd4d MD5 51758 2021-06-07 07:34:03 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/17242/3/lightbox.jpg 17242 3 3 image/png other Thumbnails conversion from text to thumbnail_lightbox en public

lightbox.jpg

http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/94273 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/94273 http://eprints.org/relation/islightboxThumbnailVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/94273 94283 2 274282 document 94283 preview.jpg image/png 96b3c865a67625916b103d3f3f7c2930 MD5 20906 2021-06-07 07:34:19 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/17242/4/preview.jpg 17242 4 4 image/png other Thumbnails conversion from text to thumbnail_preview en public

preview.jpg

http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/94273 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/94273 http://eprints.org/relation/ispreviewThumbnailVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/94273 94284 2 274284 document 94284 medium.jpg image/png 479eeee91c1b38f11215100458e4802a MD5 6378 2021-06-07 07:34:34 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/17242/5/medium.jpg 17242 5 5 image/png other Thumbnails conversion from text to thumbnail_medium en public

medium.jpg

http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/94273 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/94273 http://eprints.org/relation/ismediumThumbnailVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/94273 94285 2 274285 document 94285 small.jpg image/png d75430d9e40a10af5a7e000fb223a103 MD5 1780 2021-06-07 07:34:46 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/17242/6/small.jpg 17242 6 6 image/png other Thumbnails conversion from text to thumbnail_small en public

small.jpg

http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/94273 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/94273 http://eprints.org/relation/issmallThumbnailVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/94273 archive 353 disk0/00/01/72/42 2021-06-07 07:24:37 2021-08-27 17:34:49 2021-06-07 07:24:37 article show Baklanov A. 2067 0000-0003-1599-3618 pub ASA EM 1-memory or memory-one strategies; Infinitely repeated games; Nash equilibrium We explore how an incremental change in complexity of strategies (“an inch of memory”) in repeated interactions influences the sets of Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy and payoff profiles. For this, we introduce the two most basic setups of repeated games, where players are allowed to use only reactive strategies for which a probability of players’ actions depends only on the opponent’s preceding move. The first game is trivial and inherits equilibria of the stage game since players have only unconditional (memory-less) Reactive Strategies (RSs); in the second one, players also have conditional stochastic RSs. This extension of the strategy sets can be understood as a result of evolution or learning that increases the complexity of strategies. For the game with conditional RSs, we characterize all possible NE profiles in stochastic RSs and find all possible symmetric games admitting these equilibria. By setting the unconditional benchmark as the least symmetric equilibrium payoff profile in memory-less RSs, we demonstrate that for most classes of symmetric stage games, infinitely many equilibria in conditional stochastic RSs (“a mile of equilibria”) Pareto dominate the benchmark. Since there is no folk theorem for RSs, Pareto improvement over the benchmark is the best one can gain with an inch of memory. 2021-05 published MDPI 10.3390/g12020042 22 public Games 12 2 e42 TRUE 2073-4336 FALSE no info:eu-repo/semantics/article