Equal Pay for all Prisoners / The Logic of Contrition

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http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/4346 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/4346 http://eprints.org/relation/isCoversheetVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/4346 archive 351 disk0/00/00/52/22 2016-01-15 02:08:53 2021-08-27 17:16:02 2016-01-15 02:08:53 monograph show 2 Boerlijst M.C. Nowak M.A. 7540 Sigmund K. 1050 Equal Pay for all Prisoners / The Logic of Contrition pub iis_ecl iis_mod prog_adn This report deals with two questions concerning the emergence of cooperative strategies in repeated games. The first part is concerned with the Perfect Folk Theorem and presents a vast class of equilibrium solutions based on Markovian strategies. Simple strategies, called equalizers, are introduced and discussed: if players adopt such strategies, the same payoff results for every opponent. The second part analyzes strategies implemented by finite automata. Such strategies are relevant in an evolutionary context; an important instance is called Contrite Tit For Tat. In populations of players adopting such strategies, Contrite Tit For Tat survives very well -- at least as long as errors are restricted to mistakes in implementation ("the trembling hand"). However, this cooperative strategy cannot persist if mistakes in perception are included as well. 1997-11 published IR-97-073 IR-97-073 1481 282 public interim_report IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria 29 FALSE info:eu-repo/semantics/book