Auctions Without Competition: The Case of Timber Sales in the Murmansk Region

5877 13 4562 2 10438 document 4562 IR-99-072.pdf application/pdf 88a04ee8e309c2c9f2a2dd7de0fcff15 MD5 90990 2016-01-15 02:11:19 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/5877/1/IR-99-072.pdf 5877 1 1 text en public

IR-99-072.pdf

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IR-99-072.pdf

http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/4562 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/4562 http://eprints.org/relation/isCoversheetVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/4562 archive 351 disk0/00/00/58/77 2016-01-15 02:11:19 2021-08-27 17:16:43 2016-01-15 02:11:19 monograph show 2 Jacobsen B. Auctions Without Competition: The Case of Timber Sales in the Murmansk Region pub iis_for prog_for This report analyzes the timber-auction system introduced in Russia in 1997, focusing on the Murmansk region. The Russian auction system is strongly inspired by the North American practice but many preconditions for the system to function efficiently are absent. The main obstacles are the shortage of auction participants and the resulting possibility of collusion. Thus, the "one bidder-auctions" are common. This drives the Federal Forest Service (FFS) to lease timber at a low reservation price. By doing this, the FFS ensures social efficiency in the sense that a socially beneficial trade is carried out. However, this achievement is made at the cost of a modest rent appropriation. In Murmansk, we probably witness a true disinterest in timber resources, which caused by unpredictable economic and social conditions. Short-term contracts dominate forestry activities and there are few incentives for developing sustainable forest use. Auction theory asserts that collusion is more likely in oral auctions than in sealed-bid auctions. Since the latter auction form is most common, the FFS does seem to apply the formal means of control that they posses. This has made the market more transparent. However, with only a few market participants auctions may easily "collapse" into informal bilateral bargaining between the seller and the most likely buyer. 1999-12 published IR-99-072 IR-99-072 public interim_report IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria 24 FALSE info:eu-repo/semantics/book